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ABSTRACT
John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made
about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even
arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought
for symbolic reasons—some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only
consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However,
these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law
doctrines are not responsive to the threat these suits pose to Internet
discourse. Although the constitutional privilege for opinion holds
promise as a solution to this problem, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence provides little assurance that the privilege can protect the “robust, uninhibited, and wide-open nature” of Internet discourse without giving Internet speakers free license to harm the reputation of
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others. Therefore, this Article attempts to articulate a theory that justifies protecting John Doe and suggests the steps courts should take to
adapt the existing opinion privilege to the unique context of cyberspace.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a
1
whole society.
[T]he First Amendment . . . presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and al2
ways will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.

John Doe is a day trader.3 Trading stocks is a hobby bordering on
an obsession, and, like many other day traders, John Doe likes to exchange information about stocks via online message boards.4 But as
Doe recently learned, free speech on the Internet may not be as free
as he thought. After posting a scathing message accusing Net Company of defrauding its investors and accusing its CEO of being a liar
and a cheat, John Doe found himself a defendant in a libel suit.5

1. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (opinion of the
court by Judge Learned Hand), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
3. See CHRISTOPHER A. FARRELL, DAY TRADE ONLINE 2, 14 (1999) (defining day trading as “the practice of buying and selling stocks over the Internet for quick profits” and estimating that by the year 2000 there will be 10 million individual accounts online).
4. See Matthew Heimer, Herd on the Net, BRILL’S CONTENT (May 1999)
<http://www.brillscontent.com/columns/moneypress_0599.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (discussing the influence and popularity of Internet financial bulletin boards, including
Raging Bull, Silicon Investor, and Yahoo! Finance). Ordinarily, users like John Doe post to message boards devoted solely to discussion of a particular corporation (the Net Company message
board, for example). See, e.g., Michael Moss, CEO Exposes, Sues Anonymous Online Critics,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 1999, at B1 (noting that Yahoo! “has several thousand [financial message]
boards, each dedicated to a single company”).
This Article uses the term “message board” synonymously with “computer bulletin
board,” which at least one author has defined as “a computerized version of a cork and pin
board on which users can post, read, and respond to messages.” Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from
Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 238 (1995). This Article draws
no distinction in this discussion between boards that are available via the Internet and those that
are available only to subscribers of a particular commercial online service. See id. at 243-46 (examining the differences between Internet-supported boards and those run by commercial online
services).
5. See generally Rebecca Landwehr, Companies Battle Libel on the Web, DENV. BUS. J.,
Oct. 9, 1998, at A3 (anticipating “a flurry of court actions” over libelous statements posted in
Internet chat rooms); Steve Woodward, Three Corporations Go to Court to Fight Internet Falsehoods, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5 (“John Doe may be the most wanted person in cyberspace. Corporations everywhere . . . are tracking him down in lawsuits that allege sins ranging from interference with business relationships to defamation to breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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This hypothetical case, Net Company v. John Doe, is typical of a
rapidly expanding new category of Internet libel suits.6 One of the
6. This Article refers to these as “Internet” libel suits for consistency of reference even
though some suits may involve statements posted on bulletin boards available only through
commercial service providers. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“The
Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks.”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For a discussion of the history and technological features of the Internet, see, for example, David P.
Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 229, 229-32 (1996); Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defamation Published by Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247,
251-53 (1995).
In the typical case, plaintiffs sue an unknown “John Doe” defendant for defamation and
then subpoena John Doe’s Internet service provider (“ISP”) to uncover his identity. See, e.g.,
Complaint, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed Oct. 28,
1998) (alleging that John Doe, later discovered to be Peter Krum, posted that HealthSouth
Corporation and its CEO were engaging in fraudulent behavior and that the CEO’s wife was
having an adulterous affair) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Bob Cook, Down and
Dirty: PhyCor and Other Companies Sue Anonymous Message Posters for Internet Mudslinging,
MOD. PHYSICIAN, June 1, 1999, at 30 (“By suing defendants called John Does, a company or an
aggrieved person can convince a judge to issue a subpoena forcing an Internet service provider
to turn over the e-mail addresses and identities of the message posters.”).
Although many of these cases have not yet made their way into reported decisions, I shall
list them here by party names for ease of reference. See American Eco Corp. v. John Doe, discussed in American Eco Wins Libel Suit Against Internet Critic, NAT’L POST, Dec. 15, 1998, at
C2 (reporting that a corporation and its former executive were awarded $8.325 million against
an unknown John Doe); Americare Health Scan v. Technical Chem. & Prods., Inc., discussed in
Americare Health Scan Files Libel Suit Against TCPI and Individuals over Anonymous Yahoo!
Postings, BUS. WIRE, June 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File; BioShield
Tech., Inc. v. John Does # 1-3, discussed in INVESTOR RELATIONS BUSINESS, Sept. 20, 1999;
Carnegie Int’l v. John Does # 1-3, discussed in Adam H. Fleischer & S. William Grimes, What a
Tangled Web: The New Legal Liabilities Created by the Internet, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP., Sept.
16, 1999; Cohr, Inc. v. John Doe, discussed in Greg Miller, Firm Accuses Former Executive of
Defamation on the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at C1 [hereinafter Miller, Firm Accuses
Former Executive] (discussing a suit by a corporation that publicly accused its former president
of being behind “John Doe’s” allegedly defamatory postings); Harbor Florida Bancshares, Inc.
v. John Doe, discussed in Harbor Florida Sues Internet User over Takeover Rumor, FIN. POST,
July 28, 1999, at C2 (noting that a corporation sued an anonymous John Doe “for posting false
rumors of the company’s imminent takeover”); HealthSouth Corp. v. Landry, No. 455485M
(Dist. Ct. La. 1999.) (alleging defamation of the corporation and the president of the surgery
division, Pat Foster); Hitsgalore.com v. John Does, discussed in Don Benson, Hitsgalore.com
Searches for New Life After Setbacks, BUS. PRESS, June 7, 1999, at 7 (press release) [hereinafter
Benson, Hitsgalore.com] (noting that Hitsgalore.com “announced plans to file a lawsuit against
anonymous posters on the Raging Bull and Silicon Investor online message boards” for allegedly false and defamatory postings); Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8, No. 99-22831 CA 01 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Image Guided Technologies v. Surfin Rat,
discussed in Karen Auge, Firm Tries to Find ‘Net ‘Surfin Rat’, DENV. POST, Mar. 22, 1999, at B1
(alleging that John Does posted defamatory statements on Yahoo! Finance board); Itex Corp. v.
John Does # 1-100, discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (alleging that John Does posted
defamatory statements on a Yahoo! Finance board); Medphone Corp. v. DeNigris, No. 92-3785
(D.N.J. 1993) (involving a Prodigy subscriber who posted that Medphone Corporation “appears
to be a fraud” on a Money Talk bulletin board); Melvine v. Doe, No. 21942 (Va. Cir. Ct., June
24, 1999), discussed in MULTIMEDIA & WEB STRATEGIST, Aug. 1999; PacifiCorp v. John Doe,
discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (noting that the plaintiff filed a $1 million suit
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most striking features of these new cases is that, unlike most libel
suits,7 they are not even arguably about recovering money damages,
for the typical John Doe has neither deep pockets nor libel insurance
from which to satisfy a defamation judgment.8 Why, then, do plainagainst John Doe for misappropriating insider information and posting it on a Yahoo! Finance
board); Phoenix Int’l, Ltd. v. John Does, discussed in Randal, supra; Bochan v. La Fontaine,
(E.D. Va. May 26, 1999), discussed in Behnam Dayanim, Jurisdiction and Online Tortfeasors;
Out-of-State Defendants Beware, THE TEXAS LAW., Sept. 13, 1999, at 37; PhyCor v. John Does,
discussed in Cook, supra, at 30; Philip Servs. Corp. v. John Does # 1-12, discussed in Peter
Kuitenbrouwer, Philip Drops Internet Suit: Too Broke to Continue, NAT’L POST, Jan. 15, 1999,
at C8 (noting that the plaintiff corporation had dropped its defamation suit against the John
Does because the plaintiff was “too broke” to pursue it); Southern Pacific Funding Corp. v.
John Does, discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (alleging John Does posted defamatory
statements on Yahoo! Finance board); Sykes Enterprises v. John Doe, discussed in Tampa Bay
Area, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 24, 1999, at Business & Finance 1 (alleging that a possible employee
was using a website to defame the company and one of its customers); Technical Chem. and
Prods., Inc. v. John Does 1-10, Case No. 99004548 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (alleging that John Does
used a Yahoo! message board to accuse a corporation and its officers of fraudulent and criminal
activity) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Wade Cook Fin. Corp. v. John Does # 1-10, discussed in Washington State Senate First in the Nation to Seek to Remedy Anonymous Internet
Slander, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 16, 1999, at 1 (same); Xircom Inc. v. John Doe, discussed in Laura
Randal, Web Anonymity Suits Face Obstacles, NEWSBYTES, July 26, 1999.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995) held that an ISP could be liable as the publisher of defamatory statements posted by an
unknown user on its financial bulletin board. See id. at *12. Although Stratton Oakmont involved facts similar to those in the cases discussed above, this Article argues that it does not fall
into the same category as these new cases because the identity of the anonymous poster was
never revealed and because the decision in the case focused only on the liability of the ISP. See
id. In the new Internet libel cases, plaintiffs sue only the anonymous poster of the allegedly defamatory statements.
7. Defamation consists of two torts: libel and slander. Libel ordinarily refers to written
defamation, slander to oral defamation. See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.2, at
97 n.8 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999); infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Most of the new
John Doe cases should involve libel rather than slander because of the ability of online defamation to reach a mass audience. See David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer
Information Systems and Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 91 (1993). But
see R. James George, Jr. & James A. Hemphill, Defamation Liability and the Internet, in 18TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 693, 708 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-507, 1998) (observing that no opinion has
explicitly addressed the issue and that the answer may vary according to jurisdiction).
8. Although the plaintiffs who bring Internet defamation suits often request money damages, these plaintiffs will rarely have any realistic hope of obtaining money damages. See Anne
Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1645 n.16 (1995) (observing that many of those who
post abusive messages are “young users just learning their computer skills, who have little or no
financial capability to pay damages imposed by a legal judgment”); Tom Gibb, Internet Attacks
Bring Man Charges, Suit, Suspension, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1998, at B3 (quoting Duquesne University Law School’s Professor Kenneth Hirsch, who believes that the lawsuit
is less about money than about “terroriz[ing] other people who might be inclined to do the
same” thing). This feature is not unique to this new generation of Internet defamation actions.
Defamation suits are often driven by “emotion, rather than money,” since defamation actions
may be the only avenue available to vindicate a plaintiff’s damaged reputation. SANFORD, supra
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tiffs, many of whom are wealthy corporations, choose to sue relatively
impecunious John Does? The goals of this new breed of libel action
are largely symbolic,9 the primary goal being to silence John Doe and
others like him.10 This feature, standing alone, does not distinguish
these new Internet libel cases from more traditional ones.11 All libel
suits are at least partially about silencing the defendant,12 and from
the standpoint of traditional First Amendment law, there is no harm
in silencing knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact, for these
statements have no value to public discourse.13
What is unique about these new Internet suits is the threat they
pose to the new realm of discourse that has sprung up on the Internet.
The promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers ordinary
individuals with limited financial resources to “publish” their views
on matters of public concern.14 The Internet is therefore a powerful
tool for equalizing imbalances of power by giving voice to the disenfranchised and by allowing more democratic participation in public

note 7, § 13.1, at 609 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1996-1). For further discussion of why plaintiffs
choose to sue relatively impecunious John Does, see infra Part I.D.
9. This is not to say that the plaintiffs do not have financial motives, just that they do not
hope to recover money damages. Often the suits are part of a concerted public relations campaign aimed to improve the corporation’s image. For further discussion of this point, see infra
Part I.D.
10. David Osborne, a libel defendant sued by U-Haul after he described his moving experiences on his U-Hell website, stated, “[U-Haul] ha[s] plenty of money. We do not. . . . If we
back down, . . . . [i]t would be liek [sic] telling any other company with huge amounts of money
that the easiest way to deal with a disgruntled customer is to threaten them into silence.” David
Osborne, The U-Hell Website, (visited June 1, 1999) <http://coyotes.org/~consumer/uhell/
lawsuit.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT 1-2 (1996) (discussing the increased use of defamation and other suits to punish
citizens for speaking out on matters of public concern). The suits discussed by Pring and Canan
differ from the suits I discuss here because a SLAPP (i.e., a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation) refers only to suits based on “communications made to influence a governmental
action.” Id. at 8. They are similar to the suits discussed here in the sense that both are brought
primarily to silence defendants for speaking out. See id. at x (labeling SLAPPs as just “one subset of intimidation litigation”); see also Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on
SLAPPS: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine Years After Professors Pring and Canan First Yelled
“Fire!”, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1997); Geoffrey Paul Huling, Note, Tired of Being
Slapped Around: States Take Action Against Lawsuits Designed to Intimidate and Harass, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 401 (1994).
12. See Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 462 (“The defendant’s solvency is probably not central to the
decision to sue because the plaintiff’s reputation is at issue and thus an apology or a small recovery may vindicate the plaintiff.”).
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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discourse.15 In other words, the Internet allows ordinary John Does to
participate as never before in public discourse, and hence, to shape
public policy.16 Yet, suits like the hypothetical John Doe suit discussed
above threaten to reestablish existing hierarchies of power, as powerful corporate Goliaths sue their critics for speaking their minds. Defendants like John Doe typically lack the resources necessary to defend against a defamation action, much less the resources to satisfy a
judgment. Thus, these Internet defamation actions threaten not only
to deter the individual who is sued from speaking out, but also to encourage undue self-censorship among the other John Does who frequent Internet discussion fora.
Although one might intuitively expect the First Amendment17 to
prevent powerful plaintiffs from silencing their critics,18 the First
Amendment extends only limited protections in such circumstances.
Beginning with the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sul19
livan, the Supreme Court grafted numerous constitutional limitations onto the structure of the defamation tort. But Sullivan and much
of its progeny involved an individual plaintiff (often a public official
or public figure) challenging statements made by a relatively powerful
media defendant.20 The First Amendment jurisprudence that devel-

15. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 91 (1948) (arguing that “[t]he unabridged freedom of public discussion is the
rock on which our government stands”).
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (applying the First Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
18. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: The Economic Contingency of Legal Rights?, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1163, 1164 (1995) (“Undergirding First Amendment constriction of defamation
actions has been the economics of a typical defamation action: normally, an individual plaintiff
has sued a large, corporate media entity.”).
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to 1964, defamatory statements were outside the scope of the
First Amendment’s protection. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (including defamation within the category of unprotected speech).
20. Although most libel suits are brought against the media, the “power” of the media visà-vis the plaintiff should not be overstated. Most libel plaintiffs are educated and prominent
members of their communities. See Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel, in THE
COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 21, 23 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M.
Noam eds., 1989). Although Sullivan involved a relatively powerful media defendant, the jury’s
verdict in the case was $3 million, an enormous sum in 1964. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO
LAW 14 (1991). By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, libel actions threatened to silence media reporting on the civil rights movement. See Sullivan, 376 U.S at 277-78 (noting that,
under state libel actions, newspapers could be faced with such large judgments that “those who
would give voice to public criticism” would be effectively silenced). Sullivan also involved several nonmedia defendants in addition to the New York Times, and the logic of the decision ap-
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oped was therefore responsive to the culture of the institutional
press21 and its need to deliver information quickly without risking
crippling liability for minor mistakes of fact.22
It is little wonder that this same jurisprudence may not be responsive to the emerging institutional culture—or, more appropriately, cultures23—of the Internet. Although Internet communications
are almost invariably “written” communications, they lack the formal
characteristics of written communications in the “real world.”24 In the
real world, the author is separated from her audience by both space
and time, and this separation interposes a formal distance between
author and audience, a distance reinforced by the conventions of written communication. Internet communications lack this formal distance. Because communication can occur almost instantaneously, participants in online discussions place a premium on speed.25 Indeed, in
many fora, speed takes precedence over all other values, including

plied equally to them all. Sullivan held that a public official may not recover for defamatory
statements about his conduct while in office absent a showing that the defendant published the
defamatory statements with actual malice, i.e., knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.
See id. at 279-80. Nonetheless, a recurring issue since Sullivan has been whether nonmedia
speakers receive the same protection as media speakers, suggesting that the prime concern of
the First Amendment is protection of the media. See infra Part II.C and sources cited therein;
see also, e.g., Katherine W. Pownell, Comment, Defamation and the Nonmedia Speaker, 41 FED.
COMM. L.J. 195, 197-98 (1988) (noting that, although most lower courts have extended constitutional protections to nonmedia defendants when the plaintiff is a public figure or public official,
the picture is less clear when the plaintiff is a private figure).
21. In other words, one might argue that defamation has been adapted to the demands of
“print culture” rather than “Net culture.” See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1684 (1995) (“Computer networks, interactive machines, new modes of visual communication, and hypertext expand individual and group opportunities for working with information and, in the process, build an
environment that contrasts significantly with ‘print culture.’”). The adaptation of First Amendment doctrine to print culture is logical, since “most libel suits involve the mass media, usually
newspapers.” RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 27 (1987).
22. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the
First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 579-83 (1991) (arguing that freedom of speech is
necessary to protect the wide dissemination of important information to the public).
23. This Article discusses only the culture of the financial bulletin boards. Different discussion fora have different cultures, even on the Internet. As my friend and former student Rebecca Newton Clarke has pointed out, the discussion group alt.sewing has completely different
conventions governing the range of appropriate comments than does the discussion group discussion group alt.sex. It is important for courts to take account of these varying conventions in
determining whether a statement is defamatory, since these conventions aid one in determining
how any particular comment is to be interpreted. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet: Developing a Framework for Making New
Law, in FIRST ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 11, 17-18 (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-482, 1997).
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not just accuracy but even grammar, spelling, and punctuation.26 Hyperbole and exaggeration are common, and “venting” is at least as
common as careful and considered argumentation.27 The fact that
many Internet speakers employ online pseudonyms28 tends to
heighten this sense that “anything goes,” and some commentators
have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.29 While this
view is undoubtedly overstated, certainly the immediacy and informality of Internet communications may be central to its widespread
appeal.
Although Internet communications may have the ephemeral
qualities of gossip with regard to accuracy,30 they are communicated
through a medium more pervasive than print, and for this reason they
have tremendous power to harm reputation.31 Once a message enters

26. See id.
27. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1645 (alluding to the facile dissemination of false information in cyberspace confrontations).
28. See id. at 1642 (noting that for some Internet users “the ability to remain unknown removes many of the layers of civilized behavior as they realize that they can escape responsibility
for negligent or abusive postings”); see also ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230-32 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction against a law that would restrict anonymous Internet communications).
29. See, e.g., David Allweiss, Copyright Infringement on the Internet: Can the Wild, Wild
West Be Tamed?, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1005, 1005 (1999) (comparing the Internet to the old western American frontier); Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and
Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 430 (1998) (noting that the Internet
substantially increases the rate of the dissemination of information). But see Jonathan D. Bick,
Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 43 (1998) (disputing the Wild
West characterization).
30. This Article does not deal with the related issue of Internet stock manipulation. See
generally Joseph J. Cella III & John Reed Stark, Securities Regulation and the Internet, in
SECOND ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 798, 826-35 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property No. G-520, 1998) (describing the various forms of Internet stock
manipulation and the SEC’s accompanying enforcement mechanisms); Holly C. Fontana, Securities on the Internet: World Wide Opportunity or Web of Deceit?, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 297, 312 (1998) (analyzing the “Internet’s impact on securities regulation” and particularly
its “use to facilitate fraudulent securities transactions”); John Reed Stark, Tombstones: The
Internet’s Impact upon SEC Rules of Engagement, 12 INSIGHTS 10, 11 (1998) (discussing how the
Internet can be used to create false “buzz” about a company to manipulate its market value);
David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot See: Securities Regulation on
the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 612, 627-30 (1998) (addressing securities fraud on the
Internet).
31. Michael Hadley makes a convincing argument on this point in one of the best notes on
the topic of Internet defamation. See Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet
Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477 (1998).
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cyberspace, millions of people worldwide can gain access to it.32 Even
if the message is posted in a discussion forum frequented by only a
handful of people, any one of them can republish the message by
printing it or, as is more likely, by forwarding it instantly to a different
discussion forum. And if the message is sufficiently provocative, it
may be republished again and again.33 The extraordinary capacity of
the Internet to replicate almost endlessly any defamatory message
lends credence to the notion that “the truth rarely catches up with a
lie.”34 The problem for libel law,35 then, is how to protect reputation
without squelching the potential of the Internet as a medium of public
discourse. This Article attempts to solve this problem and, in the pro-

32. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1996) (“In cyberspace, the
power to defame is unprecedented.”).
33. The extraordinary persistence of certain Internet rumors illustrates this point. See
Hadley, supra note 31, at 495 (discussing a “bizarre hoax that flooded thousands of e-mail
boxes” and misattributed a graduation speech to Kurt Vonnegut). An Internet rumor that the
clothing designer Tommy Hilfiger had insulted African-Americans during an interview on
Oprah Winfrey’s show reached millions of people, despite the fact that Hilfiger never appeared
on the show, much less made the remarks attributed to him. See Designer Hilfiger Disputes Net
Rumors of Racism, USA TODAY TECH. REP. (visited Jan. 21, 2000)
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cta109.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Furthermore, the rumor persisted long after it had been refuted, and even now many Internet
users may not know that it has been debunked.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974); accord Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge.”).
35. A product disparagement action (also known as an action for injurious falsehood) is
very similar to a libel action. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that the tort of injurious falsehood is
known by many other names, including “slander of goods” and “trade libel”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (using the term “injurious
falsehood”). The Restatement states that an action for “injurious falsehood” arises when a
speaker “publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another” that causes pecuniary
losses to the other and the speaker (a) “intends for publication of the statement to result in
harm . . . or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so,” and (b) the speaker
“knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.”
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 623A; accord KEETON ET AL., supra, § 128, at 964 (noting the difficulties of distinguishing between “personal defamation of the plaintiff on the one hand and disparagement of his property on the other”); Lisa Magee Arent, A Matter of “‘Governing’ Importance”: Providing Business Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First
Amendment Protection, 67 IND. L.J. 441, 445 (1992) (arguing that the same constitutional standards should be applied to both business defamation and product disparagement actions); Arlen
W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial
Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 903, 904 (1989) (noting that business defamation actions are designed to protect reputation, whereas disparagement (or injurious falsehood) actions protect only economic interests).
Although the analysis offered in this Article responds specifically to libel actions, it should be
equally applicable to product disparagement actions.
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cess, to assess the proper role for defamation law in “civilizing” discourse in cyberspace.
Part I examines a perplexing feature of the new Internet libel
suits: why do plaintiffs wish to sue John Doe when they can have no
hope of recovery? As this part argues, plaintiffs find bringing suit
worthwhile because of the distinctive nature of libel actions, which
allows plaintiffs to pursue symbolic goals regardless of any monetary
award. Yet, while it might be tempting to characterize all of these new
suits as Internet SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation)36 brought by plaintiffs solely to harass and to silence their
critics, this characterization ignores the power that the Internet gives
irresponsible speakers to damage the reputations of their targets and
underestimates the potential benefits that defamation law may bring
to Internet discourse.
Part II argues that, despite the potential benefit, strict application of existing law threatens to chill unduly the ordinary John Does
who frequent online discussion fora and, by doing so, threatens the
Internet’s promise as a medium for revitalizing the “marketplace of
ideas”37 metaphor that lies at the heart of First Amendment theory.
Part II appraises John Doe’s contribution to public discourse and
concludes that it warrants substantial, though not unlimited, First
Amendment “breathing space” to guarantee its survival.
Existing First Amendment protections, however, are inadequate
to prevent corporations from intimidating John Doe into silence, at
least so long as these protections do not recognize the unique culture
of the Internet message boards. Part III therefore contends that the
constitutional privilege for nonfactual expression (the “opinion
privilege”) may be a viable defense against the use of defamation law
to silence John Doe, but only if courts are willing to adapt the privilege to the unique social context of cyberspace. The Article concludes
with a plea for the Supreme Court to remedy the deficits in its defamation jurisprudence and gives practical guidance to lower courts
that wish to protect John Doe in the likely event that this plea goes
unheeded.

36. For a discussion of SLAPPs, see supra note 11.
37. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and significance
of the phrase).
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It is easy to portray the recent rash of libel actions against Internet users38 as David versus Goliath battles, or even perhaps as Internet SLAPP suits, used by big corporations to intimidate their critics
into silence. After all, these suits almost inevitably involve wealthy
and powerful plaintiffs suing anonymous individuals for speaking out
on matters of public interest. However, upon closer examination, this
characterization is too facile to capture the complex issues raised by
these new suits.
A. HealthSouth v. Krum and the New Internet Libel Cases
Consider the case of HealthSouth Corp. v. John Doe,39 which
later became HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum.40 There could hardly be a
less sympathetic John Doe defendant than Peter Krum. Peter Krum
was a disgruntled former employee of HealthSouth,41 a publicly
traded corporation that operates rehabilitative health care facilities.42
Posting under the name “I AM DIRK DIGGLER,” a reference to
38. In addition to the John Doe suits that are the focus of this Article, libel suits also have
arisen over “gripe sites”—sites in which customers, students, former employees, business associates, and others vent their grievances on a website. See, e.g., Eric Bailey, California and the
West: Feud with Officer Pursued Online, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A3 (discussing a suit
brought by a police officer against a woman who, having been jailed for speeding, later posted
allegedly defamatory statements on a website); Kathleen Parrish, Teacher Sues Boy, Parents,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (discussing a defamation suit brought by a
teacher against a student and his parents for derogatory remarks posted on the student’s website); Robert Trigaux, Web Sites Aid Let Consumers Publicly Vent Gripes Against Companies,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, KRTBUS
File (discussing a suit brought by U-Haul against a disgruntled customer who complained about
U-Haul on a website). The U-Hell Website details U-Haul’s lawsuit against U-Hell’s creator. See
Osborne, supra note 10.
Yet, other libel suits arise when someone appropriates a plaintiff’s online identity and
posts hostile messages to others. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (involving a Boy Scout who sued after “John Doe 1” posted a “‘vile and obscene’ e-mail message in the name of the plaintiff”); Jay Croft, Lawsuit Alleges Cyberlibel,
ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 5, 1999, at B1 (stating that plaintiff Ronald Attkisson filed suit against a
former employee, Scott Gerstein, who had created a “bogus profile to make . . . postings” on
Yahoo! message boards that would be attributed to the plaintiff). These “appropriation of identity” suits present a set of concerns different from the ones I shall be discussing above, since the
only possible motivation of the defendant was to harm the person whose identity was appropriated.
39. See HealthSouth Files Libel Suit for Statements Made on Web, SUNDAY PATRIOTNEWS, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5 [hereinafter HealthSouth Files Libel Suit].
40. Complaint, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed
Oct. 28, 1998).
41. See Cook, supra note 6.
42. See Complaint ¶ 6, HealthSouth Corp.
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the well-endowed porn star in the 1997 movie Boogie Nights,43 Krum
verbally savaged HealthSouth, its CEO Richard Scrushy, and even
Scrushy’s wife, Leslie, on a Yahoo! Finance message board dedicated
to discussion of the corporation.44 Krum’s postings ranged from relatively innocuous statements about HealthSouth’s “self-serving” management45 to accusations that Richard Scrushy was “bilking . . .
[M]edicare reimbursement.”46 The most egregious postings by Krum
were those that discussed, in salacious detail, an affair “I AM DIRK
DIGGLER” was allegedly having with Leslie Scrushy.47 Krum, for
example, wrote, “I am dirk diggler and I have what [Richard] Scrushy
wants. Too bad I keep giving it to his new wife . . . [and] [a]s for those
of you who disapprove of my crowing about sexual liasons [sic] with
Dick’s wife, lighten up. I’m practicing safe sex.”48 Krum seemed to
relent from his vicious attacks at one point, stating that he would be
“‘toning down’”49 his statements because he “felt blessed” that his
wife was expecting.50 Yet, just a week later, Krum was back to his old
tricks,51 which ultimately prompted HealthSouth to sue for libel and
commercial disparagement and Richard and Leslie Scrushy to sue for
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress.52
There is no real question that the statements at issue in Krum
were at least facially defamatory. A defamatory statement is a false
statement that harms or tends to harm53 an individual’s reputation in
43. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Krum “purposely chose[] as his screen name ‘I AM
DIRK DIGGLER,’ thereby intending to reflect the persona of a violent, amoral, and sexually
aggressive drug addict from the recent and popular movie ‘Boogie Nights.’” Id. ¶ 10. An alternative explanation might be that Krum chose that screen-name to imply that he was similarly
well-endowed.
44. See id. ¶¶ 3-4.
45. Id. ¶ 13.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See Gibb, supra note 8.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 559 cmt. d (“To be defamatory, it is not necessary
that the communication actually cause harm to another’s reputation or deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him. Its character depends upon its general tendency to have such an
effect.”). The abstract nature of this inquiry into the “tendencies” of words is related to the
defamation doctrine of presumed damages. See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation,
and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 751 (1984) (criticizing the doctrine of presumed damages); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (1996) (explaining that, under the doctrine of presumed damages, “[i]f the
court finds that the statement [has] the tendency to harm reputation, the plaintiff may recover
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the eyes of his community.54 Accusations of dishonesty, criminality,
and adultery are prototypical defamatory statements.55 The real issue
raised by the case is what the plaintiffs hoped to gain by suing “I AM
DIRK DIGGLER.” HealthSouth operates almost two thousand rehabilitation centers in the United States,56 Australia, and the United
Kingdom, with recent annual revenues in the billions.57 Its CEO,
Richard Scrushy, makes $13 million a year.58 Even before Yahoo! revealed Krum’s identity, the plaintiffs could have had no expectation
that “I AM DIRK DIGGLER” would have the resources necessary
to satisfy a defamation judgment. As it turned out, Krum was a foodservice worker at Penn State University, who lost his job (and his annual salary of $35,000) once the plaintiffs filed their suit.59 Thus, even
if one concedes, as one must, that Peter Krum was an embittered and
malicious former employee engaged in what might be thought of as a
new form of industrial sabotage, it is not entirely clear what HealthSouth stood to gain by suing him.
B. The Practical Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act
Obviously, plaintiffs would prefer to sue defendants with deeper
pockets than John Does typically have. Indeed, the first generation of
Internet libel actions sought to impose liability on Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) for defamatory messages posted by their subscribers.60 ISPs are logical targets for defamation suits. Suing the ISP frees
substantial damages without any proof whatsoever of actual harm”). See generally KEETON ET
supra note 35, § 111, at 774, 780-83 (providing examples of statements that have been found
either defamatory or nondefamatory, based on “whether the words are reasonably capable of a
particular interpretation”).
54. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 559 (defining a defamatory statement as one that
“harm[s] the reputation of another [so] as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or . . . deter[s] third persons from associating or dealing with him”).
55. See SANFORD, supra note 7, § 4.13, at 132.11 to 132.14 (2d ed. 1991) (listing “red flag”
words likely to trigger defamation suits).
56. See Gibb, supra note 8 (1800 centers); HealthSouth Files Libel Suit, supra note 39 (2000
centers).
57. See Gibb, supra note 8 ($2.8 billion); HealthSouth Files Libel Suit, supra note 39 ($3
billion).
58. See Oliver August, WorldCom Chief Gets Pounds 10M for MCI Deal, TIMES (London),
Apr. 25, 1998, at 27.
59. See Moss, supra note 4.
60. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995). Stratton Oakmont was not the first Internet libel action, but it was the first decision
that posed any realistic threat of imposing liability on ISPs based on content posted by third parties. The facts of Stratton Oakmont are almost identical to the facts of the John Doe suits disAL.,
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cussed above. Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment firm, and its president, Daniel Porush,
sued for libel after an unknown user of a financial bulletin board made vague accusations that
the plaintiffs had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with an initial public
stock offering. See id. at *1 (alleging that the poster defamed plaintiff by alleging that the IPO
was a “major criminal fraud” and a “100% criminal fraud,” that the president of Stratton Oakmont was “soon to be proven criminal,” and that the firm was a “cult of brokers who either lie
for a living or get fired”). The John Doe in Stratton Oakmont evidently used a former employee’s access code to post the message. See Robert B. Charles & Jacob H. Zamansky, Liability for Online Libel After Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 28 CONN. L. REV.
1173, 1189 n.68 (1996).
Despite the factual similarities, however, the Stratton Oakmont decision teaches little
about how to resolve the John Doe cases. The key issue in Stratton Oakmont, which was decided
on a motion for partial summary judgment, was whether Prodigy was a “publisher” or a “distributor” for purposes of defamation liability. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1. A
second issue was whether its bulletin board moderator, who was also a defendant in the suit, was
its agent for purposes of defamation liability. See id. “Publisher” and “distributor” are terms of
art in defamation law. At common law, a publisher would be strictly liable not only for originating a defamatory statement but also for repeating or otherwise republishing a third party’s
defamatory statements. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 578. A distributor, on the other
hand, would be liable only for “distributing” the defamatory communications of third parties if
the distributor knew or had reason to know of the defamatory content. See id. § 581 (“[O]ne
who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”). The reason
for the distinction was simple. Publishers, like newspapers and broadcasters, have complete editorial control over the material they publish, and therefore it is fair to hold them liable for it.
Distributors, such as bookstores, libraries, and newsstands, have no practical ability to monitor
every publication they distribute, and it is therefore unfair to impose liability absent notice of
defamatory content and some type of fault. See generally id. § 581 cmts. d, e, f & g. Because the
facts of Stratton Oakmont suggested at most negligence on the part of the ISP, the plaintiff
needed the court to treat the ISP as a publisher in order to have any hope of recovery. But the
problem for the Stratton Oakmont court, and for the two other courts that had dealt with the
issue, was that ISPs do not fit neatly into defamation’s traditional categories. See Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that an ISP that exercised
no editorial control over the online newsletter in which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared should not be held liable as the “publisher” of the defamatory statement). See generally
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 581 cmts. d, e, f & g (describing news dealers, bookstores, libraries, telegraph companies, and radio and television broadcasters as those capable of transmitting defamatory material); SANFORD, supra note 7, § 2.4, at 48.14 (2d ed. 1991) (acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing between the “‘publisher/republisher/distributor/common
carrier’ designation”); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT.
L. REV. 993, 1001 (1994) (noting the difficulty of applying traditional analogies to resolve Internet defamation cases). Some ISPs exercise a fair amount of editorial control, others exercise
almost none, and still others exercise control in only some fora. The Stratton Oakmont court
therefore deemed it appropriate to examine the degree of editorial control exercised by Prodigy
in the case at hand rather than to adopt a categorical rule for ISPs. Applying this approach, the
court found that Prodigy should be treated as a publisher rather than as a distributor. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. Unlike other ISPs, which do not purport to exercise control over the content they provide to subscribers, Prodigy explicitly marketed itself as a “‘family
oriented’ computer service” based at least in part on its policy of censoring bulletin board messages for offensive content. Id. Moreover, the court stressed, Prodigy not only used screening
software to delete offensive messages; it also “created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who
have the ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact do spend time censoring notes.” Id. The court therefore held that, although ISPs should normally be categorized
as distributors, Prodigy’s “own policies, technology and staffing decisions . . . have altered the
scenario and mandated the finding that it is a publisher.” Id.
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plaintiffs from having to discover the identity of the person who
posted the message, and ISPs have plenty of money to satisfy defamation judgments.61 Moreover, ISPs have at least some of the characteristics of a traditional publisher, including, in some cases, the ability to
edit content supplied by a third party. Logical or not, Congress
largely foreclosed access to these deep-pocket defendants when it
passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).62
Subsection 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service63 shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content pro-

61. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 174-75
(1997) (listing “the most significant players in the game [as] AOL, a publicly owned company
with a market value of $6.5 million; Prodigy . . . ; and Microsoft Network, which is owned by Microsoft Corp., a company with a market value of $148 billion”). In addition to guaranteeing a
deep-pocket defendant, any judgment the plaintiffs received would have signaled ISPs to control carefully the contents posted on their message boards.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III 1999). The CDA is Title V (§§ 501-09) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). Section 230 was at least partially a
response to the perceived threat to Internet discourse posed by the first generation of Internet
libel suits, and more specifically to the threat posed by Stratton Oakmont, which is discussed
more extensively supra note 60. The problem with the Stratton Oakmont decision (at least as
some members of Congress saw it) was that it protects ISPs that take no steps to curb offensive
or defamatory content, and it penalizes ISPs like Prodigy that try to curb offensive and defamatory content but fail. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.S.C.A.N. 124, 207-08 (suggesting that the CDA was meant to overturn the Stratton Oakmont decision). Based on a formalistic application of defamation law, the Stratton Oakmont decision makes sense. Increased editorial control brings with it the responsibility to monitor for
defamatory content, and therefore it is fair to impose liability on those ISPs that, like Prodigy,
choose to exercise editorial control. Of course, this reasoning ignores the fact that an ISP that
has the same ability to exercise editorial control as Prodigy but chooses not to will be treated as
a distributor. Presumably, as the court noted, the benefit Prodigy receives from customers who
choose its service because it exercises editorial control offsets the detriment of being treated as
a publisher for defamation purposes. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in
Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1115-33 (1996) (suggesting that in the wake of the Stratton Oakmont
decision, ISPs should “abdicate responsibility” to avoid liability). But see Douglas B. Luftman,
Note, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services: The Sky Is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1071, 1073 (1997) (“[I]f on-line services heed the commentators’ warnings and stop exerting editorial control over their on-line services, the general public’s refusal to tolerate disorganized virtual environments will lead to stagnation, which ultimately can devastate the on-line
services industry.”).
63. The CDA of 1996 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (Supp. III 1999). America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy, which operate bulletin boards, are typical examples.
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vider.”64 Despite the broad wording of subsection (c)(1), the title of
the subsection (c) suggests that its purpose is to protect “Good Samaritans,” as the Act dubbed them,65 by shielding them from liability
when they attempt to censor offensive material66 on the Internet.
Both the title of the Act and its legislative history suggest that
Congress meant to establish a policy that ISPs would not be subject to
liability as “publishers” of content posted by third parties just because
they exercise a limited degree of editorial control over content.67 But
court decisions interpreting subsection 230(c) have broadened its ambit far beyond merely protecting “Good Samaritan” editorial control.
As interpreted, section 230 gives ISPs complete immunity from liability for defamatory content initiated by third parties, even if the ISP
consciously decides to republish the defamatory content.68 The practi64. Id. § 230(c)(1). Subsection 230(c)(2) further provided as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to materials described in
paragraph (1).
65. Subsection (c) is entitled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material.” Id. § 230(c).
66. See id.
67. A logical corollary might be that ISPs should get the benefit of the more beneficial distributor standard. See James B. Speta, Internet Theology, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 227, 230-31 (1999)
(“[T]he [CDA] and legislative history can be read to limit [section 230(c)(1)’s] exemption to
Internet service providers that do no more than provide access services (i.e., dumb pipes) . . . .”).
But see Luftman, supra note 62, at 1074 n.22 (noting that the language of the Act “does not address restrictions on access to libelous material” and that the focus of the Act was to protect
screening for sexual materials). Unfortunately, this interpretation has not held sway.
68. In Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998), for example, the court ruled
that Congress had expressly granted immunity to ISPs, including those “aggressive[ly] . . . making available content prepared by others.” Id. at 52. And in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998),
a district court held that ISPs are immune from defamation liability under the CDA for failing
to remove defamatory content posted by a third party, even after the ISP has been notified of
the defamatory content. See id. at 1137. In Doe v. America Online, Inc., 1997 WL 374223 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. June 26, 1997), the plaintiffs asserted a variety of claims against AOL for failing to prevent its service from being used to market child pornography, even after AOL was “on notice”
of the criminal use of its services. See id. at *1. The pornographic materials at issue contained
images of the minor plaintiff taken when he was only 11 years old. See id. at *2-3. Although the
plaintiffs sought to hold AOL liable as a distributor rather than as a publisher, the Florida circuit court followed Zeran in holding that all of plaintiff’s claims were barred by section 230 of
the CDA. See id. at *4 (“[T]o hold AOL liable for negligently ‘distributing’ . . . chat room
statements, as Doe seeks, would treat AOL as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of those statements in
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cal effect of these interpretations of section 230 of the CDA is to
leave Internet defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue. The defamed plaintiff can no longer sue the intermediary who republished a
defamatory communication. Instead, the plaintiff must go to the
source and sue the person who originated the defamatory communication, even if that person is an unknown John Doe.
C. The Nonmonetary Benefits of Libel Actions
Thus, one answer to the question of why sue John Doe is that he
is the only person left to sue.69 But this is an inadequate answer. Most
tort actions will never be pursued if it is clear that the potential defendant lacks the resources to satisfy a judgment.70 Most plaintiffs do
not have the money to litigate based on principle,71 and, even in contingency-fee cases most plaintiffs’ attorneys realize that 33% (the
typical contingency fee) of zero is still zero.72
The sudden surge in John Doe suits stems from the fact that
many defamation actions are not really about money.73 If they were,
the tremendous obstacles to recovery would almost certainly make
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) conclude that the game was not worth
the candle. Defamation plaintiffs often find their suits derailed at the
very early stages, with never so much as a mention of the First

violation of section 230.”). The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s analysis. See Doe v.
America Online, Inc. 718 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the CDA immunized AOL from being held liable as a “distributor” of child pornography), rev. granted, 729
So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1999).
69. See Greg Miller, “John Doe” Suits Threaten Internet Users’ Anonymity, L.A. TIMES,
June 14, 1999, at A1 (“Companies that file the ‘John Doe’ suits say the tactic is one of their few
weapons against what they consider digital defamation.”).
70. Whence arises the adage that I learned in law school: “You can’t get blood from a turnip.”
71. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 69 (stating that 73% of libel plaintiffs use a
contingency fee arrangement to pursue their libel actions).
72. As one group of researchers noted, many conventional analyses of legal problems rest
on three assumptions:
[F]irst, that parties to a dispute are motivated chiefly by money; second, that the parties’ actions are based on economically rational decisions about financial risks, costs,
and benefits of recovery in litigation; and third, that negotiation and litigation are
governed by an economic calculus shaped by the doctrines and rules of liability within
the formal legal system.
Bezanson et al., supra note 20, at 21. Libel litigation often defies the “conventional expectations
of economic rationality.” Id. at 22.
73. Or, rather, they are not really about recovering money damages, which is a different
issue. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.74 The common law elements of defamation,75 which have
been set for centuries,76 remain “filled with technicalities and traps for
the unwary.”77 A plaintiff must begin her suit by proving, at a minimum,78 that the defendant made a defamatory communication about
the plaintiff to a third party.79 What she must prove next depends on
whether the communication was communicated orally or whether it
was written. If the defamation was oral (i.e., slanderous), the plaintiff
will have to prove that the defendant’s slander caused her economic
or pecuniary loss, unless the slanderous allegation falls into one of the
four narrowly defined categories of slander per se.80 If the defamation
was written (i.e., libelous), the plaintiff ordinarily does not have to
prove that it caused her any economic loss, unless the defamatory
meaning was not obvious from the statement itself.81 Even if a plain74. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS
MEDIA LAW 196 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that, because many defamation cases are defeated by
state law defenses, federal law issues are never raised).
75. It is important to note that defamation is a tort and that therefore states may vary in
defining it. For an example of an unusual state variation, see the Illinois “innocent construction”
rule, discussed in Barter v. Wilson, 512 N.E.2d 816, 818-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). I attempt here to
give merely a thumbnail sketch of the typical obstacles a defamation plaintiff must face in order
to recover.
76. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 1 (noting that libel “is largely judge-made (or
common law) in origin”). For a history of defamation, see generally R.C. Donnelly, History of
Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99; Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904).
77. David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1285 (1942).
78. See ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 2.1, at 63 (2d ed. 1994) (“It was once standard operating procedure to begin a discussion of the law of defamation by stating the elements of a cause of action for libel and slander. That is no longer easy, not since the Supreme Court ‘constitutionalized’ the torts.”).
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 558 (listing the elements as modified by constitutional law); DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 147 (2d ed. 1981) (listing the common law
elements). At common law, the defendant was strictly liable for publishing defamatory statements, and the falsity of the underlying statement was presumed. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 35, § 116, at 839. Today, the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove fault and falsity
in almost all cases. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
80. Defamatory communications causing pecuniary harm constitute “special harm.” See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 575 cmt. b (defining special harm as “the loss of something
having economic or pecuniary value”). The plaintiff must prove special damages unless the oral
communication was “slanderous per se,” that is to say, unless it consisted of (1) allegations that
the plaintiff had engaged in criminal behavior, (2) allegations that the plaintiff had contracted a
“loathsome disease,” (3) allegations that would injure the plaintiff in his “trade, business, profession, or office,” or (4) allegations that the plaintiff was unchaste, although this category traditionally applied only to female plaintiffs. SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2.7.2, at 129-30.
81. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 218 (noting that some states do not require proof of special damages if a statement is libelous, but that others states require plaintiffs
to prove special damages if the defamatory meaning is not obvious on the face of the statement). A statement that is defamatory on its face is deemed “libelous per se.” For an explana-
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tiff is able to prove the elements of her case, she must still overcome a
host of common law privileges designed to protect reports of government meetings,82 job recommendations,83 and other types of speech
deemed worthy of extra protection from defamation liability.84
In the unlikely event that the plaintiff makes it past the high barriers posed by tort law, First Amendment obstacles will prove almost
insurmountable.85 What these obstacles are depends on a number of
factors: the identity of the plaintiff, the identity of the defendant, and
the type of speech at issue.86 Public officials and public figures must
prove that the defendant’s statements were false and that they were
made intentionally or with reckless disregard of their falsity, at least
where the speech at issue deals with a matter of public concern.87 Private figures face a different set of requirements. Private figures suing
for speech on a matter of public concern must prove falsity88 and neg-

tion of the differences between slander and libel and the confusion engendered by the terms
libel per se and slander per se, see SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2.7.3, at 132-33.
82. The “fair and accurate report” privilege and its justifications are discussed extensively
in Medico v. Time Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally DAVID A. ELDER, THE FAIR
REPORT PRIVILEGE (1988) (explaining the rationale, requirements, and applicability of the fair
report privilege).
83. A version of this privilege is codified in the California Civil Code, which provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . . [i]n a communication, without
malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one
who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
84. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 1-2 (“The [common law] privileges were designed to protect expression in settings of special importance . . . .”). See generally FRANKLIN &
ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 221-24 (discussing the common law privileges).
85. I refer here to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but it is important to note that state constitutional law may also impose limits on defamation actions. See, e.g.,
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994) (construing Article I, Section 15
of the Utah Constitution as giving a state constitutional right to express one’s opinion, thereby
“circumscrib[ing] the reach of state defamation law”); see also JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ¶ 5.06
(1993) (surveying cases in which state constitutional provisions for freedom of expression were
invoked to defend defamation actions); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and
State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 178 (1984) (arguing that states should first decide whether
state law is violated before looking to federal law).
86. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic
Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1547, 1567-70 (1987); see also
SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2 at 63 (noting that “the jurisdiction whose law applies” is also
a crucial factor in determining the requirements for a cause of action).
87. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 726 (1964).
88. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
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ligence (at least) on the part of the defendant in order to recover.89
Private figures suing for speech on private matters may not face any
First Amendment hurdles,90 but the Supreme Court’s decisions make
at least one thing clear: truly private figure/private concern cases are
likely to be few and far between.91 As if these obstacles were not
enough, a host of other constitutional privileges for hyperbole,92 satire,93 and the like stand as independent obstacles to recovery.94
Empirical studies confirm that the practical effect of these labyrinthine doctrines is to make it almost impossible for any plaintiff to
succeed in a defamation action.95 Statistics show that only 13% of
plaintiffs ultimately prevail in libel litigation,96 and, as one commentator has observed, the few plaintiffs who do prevail owe more to good
fortune than “to their virtue, their skill, or the justice of their cause.”97
However, even these grim statistics do not indicate that it is always
economically irrational to sue for defamation; after all, defamation

89. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court has never decided
whether the Gertz requirements apply to nonmedia defendants. As a practical matter, many
private plaintiffs will still choose to prove actual malice in order to obtain presumed and punitive damages. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487,
502 (1991).
90. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985)
(plurality) (holding that private plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive damages without
proof of actual malice). Justice White noted in his concurrence that “[i]t must be that the Gertz
requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such
as this.” Id. at 774 (White, J., concurring). The Supreme Court, however, never explicitly
adopted this position.
91. See, e.g., id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the lack of a consensus in
the plurality opinion indicates that the case should be restricted to its rather peculiar facts).
92. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1990); Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 264-65 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 6 (1970); infra Part III.A-B.
93. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46-47 (1988) (holding that public
officials cannot recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of the publication of a caricature without a showing of actual malice).
94. See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (1990) (reading the Court’s prior cases as providing
constitutional protection for “statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual” (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50)).
95. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 3, 239-40 (concluding, after analyzing almost
every reported defamation case decided between 1974 and 1984 and conducting surveys of libel
plaintiffs and libel defendants, that “[t]hose who bring suit confront a frustrating obstacle
course, and they almost always lose”).
96. See id. at 119. The figure for public figure corporations was even more grim: they succeeded in just 5% of cases. See id. A similar study of cases decided between January 1976 and
mid-June 1979 suggested that in suits against nonmedia defendants, plaintiffs prevailed in only
12% of cases, and against media defendants in only 5%. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 476.
97. SACK & BARON, supra note 78, at xxix (from Sack’s preface to the first edition).
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verdicts reach millions of dollars,98 which may be large enough to
make it worthwhile to gamble on a large recovery.99
But the slim chance of a damages award does not explain why
plaintiffs sue in most defamation cases,100 and it certainly cannot explain why plaintiffs sue in Internet libel cases. Instead, what the evidence suggests is that libel plaintiffs often sue because they believe
that the social and psychological benefits of suing make it worthwhile,
even if they never recover a money judgment from the defamer.101
Plaintiffs often seek vindication, and bringing suit provides a means—
perhaps the only means available—to announce to the world that the
defendants’ statements were false.102 On the other hand, plaintiffs may
be seeking an even simpler goal: they may just want the defamation
to stop, and a defamation suit is the only legal tool available to accomplish this goal. Thus, to say that the new Internet libel suits are
brought for symbolic goals is not necessarily pejorative, particularly
when a symbolic victory is the only kind available.
D. Why Corporations Sue John Doe
This symbolic aspect of bringing a defamation action is particularly evident in the John Doe cases, although corporate plaintiffs may
be seeking a symbolic victory partially for financial reasons.103 Many
of these actions appear to be brought as merely one tool in a concerted public relations campaign. Corporations often issue press re-

98. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 340 (asserting that an examination of
libel cases from the 1980s reveals that the median jury award was $200,000, but the average
award was $1.5 million).
99. See Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1167, 1167-68 (1995) (arguing that, while individual plaintiffs may sue for emotional or psychological reasons, corporations usually bring libel suits for business reasons).
100. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 28 (“The role money plays in plaintiffs’ decision to sue for libel is complex. . . . [I]t does not appear to be the case that most libel plaintiffs
see their suit principally as an opportunity to profit at the expense of the media.”).
101. See id. at 162 (concluding that libel plaintiffs believe that they win by suing, because
“[t]he act of suing, itself, represents a public and official form of response and denial, legitimating the plaintiff’s claim of falsity”); see also David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995) (“One of
the things that distinguishes defamation litigation from most commercial litigation is the extent
to which noneconomic motives (i.e., motives other than to receive compensation for economic
loss caused by the alleged breach of duty) are operative.”).
102. In traditional libel suits, plaintiffs’ primary goals in bringing suit include restoring reputation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and exacting vengeance. See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV.
226, 227 (1985).
103. See Redlich, supra note 99, at 1168.
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leases announcing their decision to sue those who post on financial
bulletin boards,104 even though doing so gives more widespread publicity to the defendants’ remarks than they received at the time they
were posted.105 The tendency to publicize the decision to file suit may
be partly a function of the economic motivations that drive corporate
plaintiffs to sue. Although corporations that sue John Doe may never
recover money damages, they may still deem it economically rational
to sue the pseudonymous posters who make negative statements
about them on financial message boards. Corporate plaintiffs are at
least partly motivated by the fear that negative statements on financial bulletin boards will drive down their stock price.106 The stock
market trades on information, and negative information shifts stock
prices very quickly.107 Hence, corporations must act quickly to offset
the potentially negative effects of defamatory messages by offering an
alternative version of events.108 Indeed, failure to respond may itself
be deemed an admission that the negative statements are true. Suing
John Doe, as it turns out, is good for business to the extent that it

104. See, e.g., Americare Health Scan Files Libel Suit Against TCPI and Individuals over
Anonymous Yahoo! Postings, supra note 6 (reporting the filing of a libel suit based on unsubstantiated allegations of personal and professional wrongdoing); Business Wire Files Suit for
Fraud & Trademark Violations, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BWIRE File (reporting on a lawsuit alleging that three individuals used Business Wire’s press
release distribution service to publicize a fraudulent investment opportunity); Technical Chemicals & Products, Inc., Technical Chemicals & Products Files Defamation Lawsuit Against OnLine Posters (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.031799/
190761222.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
105. It is for this reason that lawyers traditionally have cautioned plaintiffs that pursuing an
action for defamation may cause more harm than good, since it republishes the allegedly libelous statements to a different audience. See, e.g., Redlich, supra note 99, at 1176 (advising corporations contemplating suing for defamation to consider the harm that may arise from republishing the defamatory statements).
106. See Moss, supra note 4 (discussing HealthSouth’s attempt to sue anonymous detractors
on its Yahoo! message board for defamation).
107. According to the efficient capital market hypothesis, new information about a security
will immediately be reflected in its market price, and “any change in a security’s price must be
the result of new and unforeseen information (either about the security or the state of the world
generally).” WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 392 (6th ed. 1996); see also Redlich, supra note 99, at 1169:
Of particular importance to a publicly held corporation is a defamation’s impact upon
financial markets. A defamation may lead to a dramatic drop in the market value of a
company’s stock. Moreover, since corporate transactions are often directly dependent
on stock values, the consequential impact of a drop in share values can be enormous.
108. See Redlich, supra note 99, at 1170 (observing that corporations may engage in “media
campaigns” to refute defamatory accusations).
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sends a message to shareholders that the corporation is stable and
strong.109
It may be no coincidence, then, that some corporations decide to
bring suit for Internet libel when they are already taking a beating in
the market for unrelated reasons. The chronology of Hitsgalore.com’s
decision to file a libel action,110 for example, seems somewhat suspect.
Hitsgalore.com, Inc., is an Internet company that provides a “business-to-business Web portal and search engine.”111 In 1998, Hitsgalore.com had a reported revenue of less than $10,000.112 In March of
1999,113 Hitsgalore.com entered a “reverse merger”114 with another
company to become a publicly traded over-the-counter (“OTC”) security on the OTC Bulletin Board.115 The move was a stunning success. Due to investor enchantment with Internet stocks,116 the market
109. These suits may be part of a broader trend. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a),
Commercial Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV.
309, 310 (1993) (“Business entities have become increasingly inclined in recent years to institute
litigation as a means of vindicating corporate reputation or economic interests when false
statements have been made about their products, services, or commercial activities.”).
110. See Complaint, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D. Fla. filed
June 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
111. Benson, Hitsgalore.com, supra note 6; see also Complaint ¶ 6, Hitsgalore.com, No. 991387-CIV-T-26C:
HITSGALORE is currently engaged in the business of an Internet, business-tobusiness search engine, and provides a searchable database for businesses bringing
people (“hits”) to their Internet websites. . . . The Company derives revenues from,
inter alia, the sale of sponsorships, keyword bid and rank rights, audio banners, advertising and local city editions.
112. See Jeff Leeds, Net Firm’s Stock Plunges on News of Fraud Probe Regulation: Reports
Surface That Hitsgalore.com’s Founder Failed to Disclose, in SEC Filings, His Earlier Troubles
at Another Firm, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at C1. Another source put the company’s reported
revenue for 1998 at $20,000 and noted that its reported revenue in March of 1999 was $243,981.
See Hits Keep on Coming, BUS. PRESS, Apr. 12, 1999, at 8.
113. The date of the “reverse merger” is contested. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that it took
place in March, see Complaint ¶ 25, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C, but newspaper
accounts placed it in February, see Don Benson, Hits Just Keep Coming for Beleaguered Net
Ventures; Fallout over Past Fraud Allegations Spurs Lawsuit, Poisons Stock Deal, BUS.
PRESS/CAL., May 24, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Benson, Hits Just Keep Coming]; Hitsgalore.com
Asserts Recent Class Action Lawsuits Based on False and Misleading Bloomberg Report, BUS.
WIRE, June 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File; Leeds, supra note 112.
114. The company became publicly traded through a reverse merger with Systems Communication, Inc., in which that company acquired all of its stock. See Don Benson, ‘Net Search Engine Locates Favor Among OTC Investors, BUS. PRESS, Mar. 29, 1999, at 2.
115. See Complaint ¶ 29, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C; Leeds, supra note 112, at
C1. Hitsgalore.com’s common stock trades on the OTC Bulletin Board as “HITT.” See id. (“The
OTC Bulletin Board is a regulated quotation service that displays real-time quotes, last-sale
prices, and volume information in over-the-counter securities (OTC) securities.”). See generally
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 107, at 382-92 (describing the NASDAQ and the OTC market).
116. See Robert Sobel, Mania Milestones: Forget the Internet IPOs, What About Radish Oil
Bubble?, BARRON’S, Feb. 22, 1999, at 19 (discussing investor fascination with Internet stocks).

LIDSKY TO PRINTER2

2000]

06/22/00 3:15 PM

SILENCING JOHN DOE

879

value of Hitsgalore.com leapt from $53 million to $1 billion in less
than three months.117 In March the stock was trading at $2.38.118 By
May 10, 1999, the stock was trading at $20.69 per share.119 Hoping to
capitalize on this tremendous success, the company announced plans
to launch a nationwide advertising campaign.120 But on May 11, the
Cinderella story took an unhappy turn. Bloomberg News reported,
apparently truthfully, that a principal shareholder and “founder” of
Hitsgalore.com had had a run-in with the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) over false and deceptive promises he had made to customers
of an earlier Internet firm with which he was involved.121 The report
also implied, perhaps incorrectly,122 that Hitsgalore.com improperly
failed to disclose the FTC case to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).123
In the wake of the report, Hitsgalore.com’s stock price cratered.124 The bad press continued, and lawyers began announcing
117. See Leeds, supra note 112, at C1.
118. See Benson, Hitsgalore.com, supra note 6.
119. See id.
120. See Don Benson, Net Firm Hits Airwaves to Boost Value, BUS. PRESS, May 10, 1999, at
1 (reporting that Hitsgalore.com announced the advertising campaign in the first week of May);
Hitsgalore.com to Launch National Radio Campaign on June 1, 1999, BUS. WIRE, May 27, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (reporting the launch of a national radio advertising campaign by Hitsgalore.com). Its stock price plummeted on May 12, 1999. See Leeds, supra note 112.
121. See Complaint ¶¶ 30-31, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D.
Fla. filed June 1999). The plaintiffs conceded that the FTC had entered a default judgment in a
civil lawsuit against a shareholder of the “pre-merger” company, Hitsgalore.com. See id. ¶ 21.
The judgment ordered the shareholder to pay $613,110 in damages for “failing to refund money
to customers and . . . misleading investors about the potential return on investment (the ‘FTC
Civil Action’).” Id. Evidently, the shareholder, Dorian Reed, had also been convicted of wire
fraud in 1992. See Hitsgalore.com Seeks to Clarify May 27 Bloomberg Article, BUS. WIRE, May
27, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (explaining that the information regarding Mr. Reed’s past conviction was obtained from a voluntary disclosure in the company’s
10-K filing).
122. Plaintiff contends that Hitsgalore.com was not “legally required” to disclose the existence of the FTC action because the shareholder was not “an executive officer, director, significant employee, promoter, or control person,” and because the civil action was not within the
category of a “reportable event” under federal securities laws. Complaint ¶¶ 22-24, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C. In a company press release, however, the shareholder was
listed as a “director” and the “largest shareholder” of Hitsgalore.com, Inc., the company formed
by Hitsgalore.com’s merger with a Florida corporation in March of 1999. See Hitsgalore.com
Announces Resignation of Dorian Reed, BUS. WIRE, May 13, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BWIRE File. The company also conceded that the shareholder had “developed much
of the technology behind the website.” Id.
123. See Complaint ¶¶ 31-32, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
124. The stock price fell from its high of $20.69 to close the week of May 10 at $7.09. See
Benson, Hits Just Keep on Coming, supra note 113; see also Complaint ¶ 1, Hitsgalore.com, No.
99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
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plans to pursue class action lawsuits against Hitsgalore.com on behalf
of angry shareholders.125 Discussions of the company on the Raging
126
Bull and Silicon Investor bulletin boards also took a negative turn.
Many message posters saw Hitsgalore.com as a “scam,” and many reviled its officers as “crooks,” “criminals,” and “con men.”127 One
poster, “Mr. Pink,” stated that “[t]hese crooks belong in Jail!”, and he
even dared Hitsgalore.com to sue him: “No disclaimer, this is not
opinion but a fact and if company doesn’t like it, please sue Him; discovery will be a treat!”128
Hitsgalore.com obliged “Mr. Pink” by promptly suing him and
one hundred other John Doe defendants (although, notably, the
company chose to identify only one defendant by name and only four
by their “screen names”).129 The $20-million suit included claims for
libel, tortious interference, and a civil conspiracy to defame the plaintiff in order to unlawfully drive Hitsgalore.com’s stock price “into a
downward spiral” and thus to enable the defendants to profit by selling the common stock short.130 And, in addition to the $20 million that
plaintiff asked for in compensation for the 75% drop in its stock
price, the plaintiff also sought removal of the allegedly defamatory
postings from the message boards and an injunction against further
postings of that nature.131
A company’s decision to sue when it finds itself in a position
similar to Hitsgalore.com makes some degree of financial sense. By
announcing its decision to file suit, the company appears to respond
aggressively to the Internet rumor-mongers who revel in reports of its
demise. Bringing suit sends a message to shareholders and potential

125. See Complaint ¶ 1, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
126. See id.
127. See id. ¶¶ 39-43. Apparently some posters began calling Hitsgalore.com “scam” prior
to the publication of the Bloomberg News article, see id., but there is no indication that these
posts affected the stock price. I am indebted to a “John Doe” for bringing this to my attention.
128. See id. ¶ 1.
129. See id. Hitsgalore.com finally sued Bloomberg and David Evans, the reporter, for libel
almost a year later. See Hitsgalore.com Files Libel Lawsuit Against Bloomberg, L.P., and David
Evans, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 28, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File. The original
suit against Janice Shell and the Doe defendants was dismissed. See Telephone Interview with
Daniel J. Becka, Esq., Counsel for Hitsgalore.com, Inc. (June 12, 2000).
At least three class action suits were filed in federal district court in California.
130. See Complaint ¶ 64, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
131. See id. ¶ 57. Granting this request would almost certainly violate the First Amendment.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that any system of
prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutionality); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 698 (1931) (same).
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investors that they should not believe all the negative information
they hear about the company; it quells rumors and takes the focus
away from the negative press the company has been receiving—
whether true or untrue. Even if the company ultimately decides not to
pursue its action past filing a complaint, it may have won a symbolic
victory simply by suing John Doe.
Suing John Doe may also be a victory if it silences John Doe.132
Although “silencing” ordinarily has a pejorative connotation,133 it is
perfectly legitimate for plaintiffs to seek to stop an onslaught of offensive and damaging untruths. Indeed, silencing John Doe may be
one of the chief motivations behind the new Internet libel actions.
Armed with subpoenas, plaintiffs often are able to discover the real
identity of the John Doe who has attacked them in an Internet discussion forum.134 The mere fact of being uncovered may itself be enough

132. See Technical Chemicals & Products Files Defamation Lawsuit Against On-Line Posters, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (“Through this
lawsuit, TCPI is hoping to identify the individuals using the following screen names to affect a
judgment for the defamation made by these posters as well as do its part to prevent this kind of
Internet slander from happening to other legitimate companies.”).
133. See, e.g., Robert Jensen & Elvia R. Arriola, Feminism and Free Expression: Silence and
Voice, in FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 195, 199 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds.,
1995) (discussing the relationship between silencing and oppression).
134. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30; Erika S. Koster & Jim Shatz-Akin, Set Phasers on Stun:
Handling Internet Fan Sites, 15 COMPUTER LAW. 18, 21 (1998) (noting that one can uncover an
Internet user’s identity by “obtaining a subpoena pursuant to a ‘John Doe’ lawsuit”). But see
Rancho Publications v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 276-78 (1999) (quashing a subpoena seeking the names of anonymous advertisers who had criticized a community hospital
and holding that the hospital had failed to show a compelling need for the names sufficient to
overcome a qualified immunity grounded in the speech and privacy provisions of the United
States and California constitutions).
This Article does not address the procedural rules that allow John Doe’s identity to be
revealed. The new cases suggest that it is a relatively simple matter for plaintiffs to uncover the
John Doe’s identity by filing an action against John Doe and obtaining a subpoena to have the
ISP turn over John Doe’s name and address. Although suits against Doe defendants are common, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically address what procedure plaintiffs
should follow in suing John Doe and discovering John Doe’s identity. See Carol M. Rice, Meet
John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 883, 914 (1996) (“Despite widespread use of Doe pleading, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure undermine it. Unlike most state court systems, the Federal Rules do not expressly provide for any form of fictitious name parties . . . .”). Professor Rice has offered cogent criticism of
this omission in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though some state rules may address the problem or courts may work out their own solution, see id. at 896 n.39 (giving examples), there is a pressing need for resolution of the uncertainty surrounding the procedure for
suing unknown defendants. As an example of one court’s approach, see Estate of Rosenberg v.
Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that ordinarily “it is impermissible to name fictitious parties as defendants,” but that “an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to
be ascertained after reasonable discovery” (citation omitted)).
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to stop the alleged defamer from posting further messages.135 Suing
may be particularly effective in stopping an onslaught of damaging
messages being posted by corporate insiders,136 since the fear of losing
their jobs may make “inside agitators” tread more cautiously in the
online environment.137 This strategy may not always be successful, of
course. Some John Doe defendants have begun to fight these subpoenas with their own subpoenas seeking to uncover embarrassing information about the company,138 and at least one John Doe seems to
have escalated his remarks once the plaintiffs tried to uncover his
identity.139 Nevertheless, removing the cloak of anonymity from John
Doe defendants is likely also to remove their sense that anything
goes, and the mere threat of being revealed may be enough to force a
defendant to temper his remarks in the future.
Even silencing the defendant may not go far enough for some
plaintiffs. Corporate plaintiffs, like individual plaintiffs, will sometimes insist that the defendant publicly atone for posting defamatory
falsehoods, and, as Krum illustrates, this goal can be attained even
without a formal trial. HealthSouth not only sued Peter Krum but
also sought criminal harassment and stalking charges against him.140
According to court records, the abashed Krum apparently had never
realized that his words might have consequences.141 Krum made no effort to contest the suit, but instead agreed to sign an apology, pay $50
a month to a charity of the plaintiffs’ choice for a period of four years,
and to perform three hours of community service every week for two

135. In the HealthSouth case, for example, HealthSouth subpoenaed Yahoo! to reveal the
“true identity” of “I AM DIRK DIGGLER.” See Moss, supra note 4 (noting that HealthSouth’s
attorney subpoenaed Yahoo! and obtained records for about 20 of the board’s more than 300
anonymous posters). Once it was publicly revealed that “I AM DIRK DIGGLER” was really
Peter Krum, a food services employee at Penn State, Krum’s defamatory postings ceased. See
Cook, supra note 6, at 30.
136. See, e.g., Web Site Abandoned After Newspaper Files Lawsuit, DES MOINES REG., July
20, 1998, at Metro Bus. 4 [hereinafter Web Site Abandoned] (discussing how the Orange County
Register forced a gossip website to shut down after obtaining the real identity of the website operator from AOL). AOL’s Rules of User Conduct provide: “America Online generally does not
pre-screen, monitor, or edit the content posted by users of communications services, chat rooms,
message boards, newsgroups, software libraries, or other interactive services that may be available on or through this site.” AOL.COM Rules of User Conduct (visited Feb. 17, 2000)
<http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
137. See Web Site Abandoned, supra note 136.
138. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30.
139. See id.
140. See Moss, supra note 4.
141. See id.
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years.142 The fact that Richard Scrushy, who makes $13 million a year,
deemed it necessary to exact this modest monetary fine on a defendant who now works as a fry cook making $22,000 a year143 suggests
that the suit was not about the money but about the principle at stake:
the plaintiffs must have thought it worthwhile to score at least a symbolic victory over the likes of Peter Krum.
E. David vs. Goliath?
It is tempting to portray the new Internet libel suits as David versus Goliath battles, pitting ordinary John Does against powerful corporate interests out to intimidate their critics into silence. This image
is bolstered by the fact that libel suits are hard to win but easy to
bring.144 Many corporate plaintiffs that sue for Internet libel seek to
send a message to the public that they will pursue aggressively anyone
who criticizes them online, and these plaintiffs seem to be using libel
law to squelch not just defamatory falsehoods but legitimate criticism
as well (a topic this Article discusses in the next part).145 But to focus
only on the obvious power differential between corporate plaintiffs
and John Doe defendants is to ignore the real harm Internet libel can
cause.
As a rule, corporate plaintiffs have more power and wealth in the
“real world” than any anonymous John Doe could hope to have, and
in the real world that power and wealth translates into corporations’
having the ability to be heard. Corporations often will be able to conduct expensive media campaigns to influence favorable coverages,
142. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30 (“As part of the settlement, [Krum] had to sign a threepage mea culpa stating his messages were ‘thoughtless lies.’”).
143. See id.
144. First, the threat of being sued is enough to chill many John Does, and libel law makes it
easy to use the tort to threaten one’s critics. Although plaintiffs rarely prevail in libel trials,
plaintiffs will find it easy to sue for libel any time they come in for harsh criticism. Indeed, the
ease with which plaintiffs can sue for libel explains why libel actions are the most common type
of SLAPP. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 11, at 217. Defamation’s anomalous doctrine of
presumed harm allows plaintiffs to sue for defamation without ever having to prove that a defendant’s statements caused any actual harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 35, § 559 cmt. d; see also Anderson, supra note 53, at 749-51 (discussing illogical consequences of the doctrine of presumed harm and advocating its abolition); Lidsky, supra note
53, at 44-45 (advocating abolition of the doctrine of presumed harm). The justification for the
rule—that harm to reputation “occurs in ways that are too subtle to prove”—makes some degree of sense, but the practical effect is to make defamation a potent weapon for harassing one’s
critics. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 714-15 (1st ed. 1989);
see also 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.30, at 468
(1956).
145. See infra notes 169-93 and accompanying text.
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and corporate CEOs can use traditional media outlets to communicate with the public.
But the Internet helps equalize power imbalances in the real
world by giving anonymous John Does like “I AM DIRK
DIGGLER,”146 “Mr. Pink,”147 or “HiSiCat”148 a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In the online world, every John Doe is potentially a
publisher, capable of transmitting messages instantaneously to millions of readers. More significantly, the Internet allows John Doe to
target a message to an audience with common interests and concerns,
the very audience likely to be most receptive to his comments. Thus,
for example, a John Doe who wishes to discuss the management and
future prospects of a company in which he has just invested can find a
bulletin board dedicated to the use of like-minded shareholders.
Moreover, John Doe’s online comments can have real-world effects.
While the financial bulletin boards ordinarily give notice to subscribers that the messages posted are merely the opinions of the author
and that they should not be relied on to trade,149 people do, of course,
use them to trade.150 If John Doe is a scrupulous critic of a particular
corporation and its CEO, the Internet is a powerful tool for him to
begin a dialogue about the corporation and to convey his criticisms to
a receptive audience.151
If John Doe is unscrupulous or merely reckless, however, he can
use the power the Internet gives him to inflict serious harm on the
corporation. He can pollute the information stream with defamatory
falsehoods, which may in turn influence other investors to question
the corporation’s credibility or financial health.152 Moreover, once the
defamatory information enters the information stream, it may have a
greater impact than if it had appeared in print. Because the defamatory statements can be copied and posted in other Internet discussion
146. See Complaint ¶ 10, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County,
filed Oct. 28, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
147. See Complaint ¶ 10, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D. Fla.
filed June 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
148. See Complaint ¶ 5, Technical Chems. and Prods., Inc. v. John Does 1-10, No. 99-4548
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
149. See
Yahoo!
Finance
Message
Boards:
Business
and
Finance>Stocks>Healthcare>Healthcare Facilities>HRC (HealthSouth Corp.) (visited Aug. 18,
1999) <http://messages.yahoo.com/bbs?action=topics&board=7076888&sid=7076888&type=r>.
150. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that day traders often use message boards to
guess which stocks to buy or sell).
151. See infra Part II.B.
152. See generally Cella & Stark, supra note 30, at 793-832 (discussing the potential for
abuse by con artists of those who conduct investment activities over the Internet).
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fora, both the potential audience and the subsequent potential for
harm are magnified. And, as the persistence of Internet hoaxes demonstrates,153 once a rumor takes hold in cyberspace, it may be almost
impossible to root out. Thus, to view the rise of John Doe libel suits
as merely an attempt by powerful corporations to intimidate their
critics into silence is to substitute metaphor for analysis and to suppress the fact that the “speech” of ordinary John Does, both scrupulous and unscrupulous, has more power to affect corporate interests
than ever before.
F. Benefits of Civilizing Cyberspace
To view these libel suits as no more than attempts to silence John
Doe also ignores the potential contribution of defamation law to cyberspace discourse. The Internet has often been compared to the
Wild West, a frontier society free from the stifling conventions of
civilization, and some have even argued that defamation law is an unnecessary anachronism in this new society.154 A strong argument can
be made, however, that Internet discourse could benefit from the
civilizing influence of defamation law.
“[A] civilized society,” as David Anderson has written, “cannot
refuse to protect reputation,”155 but it is worthwhile to explore why
this is so. By protecting reputation, defamation law safeguards the
dignity of citizens.156 Defamation law therefore reflects liberal society’s “basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being.”157 Even if this were the only contribution of defamation law,
policymakers might justifiably conclude that defamation law is necessary to mediate interactions between “netizens” in order to preserve
individual dignity.158 Yet, as Robert Post has shown, defamation law
153. See supra note 33.
154. See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS 77 (1998).
155. Anderson, supra note 89, at 490.
156. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)):
We would not lightly require the State to abandon [compensating defamed individuals because] the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name “reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”
157. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
158. The protection of the “dignity and worth of every human being,” however, cannot explain why defamation law should protect corporate reputation, since corporations possess only
financial interests in their reputations. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 740-41 (1986) [hereinafter Post,
Social Foundations]. My analysis here obviously owes a debt to Professor Post’s seminal article,
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exists not merely to validate the dignitary interests of individual plaintiffs; defamation law also helps to make meaningful discourse possible.159 Defamation law has a civilizing influence on public discourse: it
gives society a means for announcing that certain speech has crossed
the bounds of propriety.160
This civilizing influence could benefit Internet discourse in at
least two ways. First, to the extent that the prospect of being verbally
“attacked” deters some citizens from participating in Internet discourse, application of defamation law can help to ensure that Internet
discourse remain open to all.161 Second, defamation law might help to
cure the largest single threat to meaningful discourse in cyberspace:
incoherence. Precisely because the Internet makes every person a
publisher, the volume of information available is enormous. Furthermore, since much of the information is “published” by unknown John
Does, it is difficult to evaluate its credibility.162 Even the participants
on financial bulletin boards complain of this problem. The people
who use the boards not only seek the experience of discussing the
stock market or particular companies with like-minded individuals;
they also seek information that would enable them to evaluate a particular company. But because most users post messages pseudony-

which demonstrated convincingly that much of the modern incoherence of defamation law
stems from the fact that it is designed to protect three very different conceptions of reputation:
reputation as property, reputation as honor, and reputation as dignity. See id. at 693; see also
Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 590-98 (1997) (discussing reputation as a fundamental property interest).
159. My version of Post’s argument cannot do justice to the rich nuances of his analysis.
Those who wish to explore further should read ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS
(1995).
160. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 158, at 713.
161. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 638-39
(1990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept] (observing that “words that are deeply uncivil
‘by their very utterance inflict injury’” and that the “dignitary torts . . . carry the strong sense of
a defendant having used ‘words as instruments of aggression and personal assault’” (citations
omitted)).
162. This Article makes an extended version of this argument. See infra notes 329-32, 461-70
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized the principle suggested here in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and has offered a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether information provided by anonymous informants is credible enough to support
a finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) (observing that a “totality of the circumstances analysis . . . permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of
all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip”); see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1994) (“‘Don’t underestimate the
common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing . . . . They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted . . . to read that message.’” (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974))).
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mously, it becomes difficult (though not impossible) to evaluate the
reliability of the information. Thus, participants criticize those who
post inane messages or those who they suspect are “bashers”—people
who post negative messages trying to drive the stock price down so
that they can profit from selling short. Some bulletin board participants even laud corporations for bringing defamation suits against
other bulletin board participants,163 indicating their recognition that
some curb on abusive or meaningless speech is necessary if meaningful discussion is to occur. One bulletin board service, Raging Bull, offers participants a nonlegal means of ridding the information stream
of unwanted flotsam: it offers a button that allows users to block the
messages of other users whose comments are inane, useless, or merely
annoying.164
Defamation law has the potential to curb the excesses of Internet
discourse and to make Internet discourse not just more civil but more
rational as well. It is important to note, moreover, that defamation
law can serve these functions regardless of whether plaintiffs actually
pursue their lawsuits all the way to judgment. Consider again the case
of HealthSouth v. Krum.165 The result of that case sent a powerful
message to other users of the Yahoo! financial message boards on
which Krum posted his retraction. That message—that users should
not rely on anonymity to shield them from being sued if they post
abusive and untrue messages—is one that has positive implications
for Internet discourse. The quality of speech is improved when
speakers realize that their speech has consequences.166
II. CHILLING JOHN DOE
If the only effect of these new Internet libel suits were to send a
message to Internet users that they are accountable for their speech,

163. See, e.g., SI: Stocktalk: Five Dollars and Under: Hitsgalore.com (HITT), Reply # 4549
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.siliconinvestor.com/stocktalk/msg.gsp?msgid=1167440>
(posting by “Boris Badenuff”) (chastising others that are “bashing a legitimate company”) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
164. See Heimer, supra note 4, at 53.
165. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
166. See W. John Moore, Taming Cyberspace, 24 NAT’L J. 745, 746 (1992) (“Like Wyatt
Earp arriving in Dodge City, law and order has come to cyberspace.”). Other alternatives to
defamation law include a “right of reply,” although it is not clear how effective this remedy
would be given the potential of the original message to be republished instantly in numerous
discussion fora. See Hadley, supra note 31, at 478; see also Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox:
Libel, Slander & The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279, 286-89 (1999) (discussing alternatives to libel law).
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these suits might well be an unalloyed good. It might still be worth
questioning whether plaintiffs should be allowed to use the legal system to pursue symbolic goals,167 but the secondary benefits of the suits
might be enough to overcome this objection.168 The problem, however, is that these new suits threaten to make Internet users too accountable for their speech, thereby threatening to suppress legitimate
criticism along with intentional falsehoods. Although existing law has
a number of doctrines available to combat the chill of defamation law,
these doctrines are ill suited to the unique context of cyberspace.
A. The Chill in Cyberspace
Much ink has been spilled on the chilling effect,169 but the basic
idea is a simple one. “The very essence of a chilling effect,” as Professor Frederick Schauer has observed, “is an act of deterrence.”170
Defamation law legitimately seeks to deter individuals from communicating defamatory falsehoods; the problem arises, for First
Amendment purposes when defamation law “overdeters”—that is,
when it deters speech that is truthful or nondefamatory—for such
speech occupies a “preferred position” in the constitutional hierarchy
of values.171 In other words, the chilling effect occurs when defamation
law encourages prospective speakers to engage in undue selfcensorship to avoid the negative consequences of speaking.172 Although commentators and the Supreme Court have been preoccupied
principally with the chilling effect of defamation law on the mass me-

167. See Boies, supra note 101, at 1210:
Lawsuits do not exist to provide discovery for its own sake (or to provide grist for
publicity mills), to punish criticism (fair or unfair) by imposing the expense and disruption of litigations, or even to provide an outlet for somebody’s dissatisfaction with
criticism. Lawsuits are to vindicate a legal right.
168. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 158, at 693 (discussing how libel actions serve
community values).
169. Although the threat of “chilling” free speech is invoked talismanically as an argument
against various First Amendment restrictions, there are relatively few sustained and systematic
treatments of the “chilling effect.” The most notable exception is Frederick Schauer’s Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978) [hereinafter Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment].
170. Id. at 689.
171. See id. at 693 (“[I]f a common-law sanction aimed at punishing the publication of defamatory factual falsehood causes the suppression of truth or opinion, chilling effect reasoning is
again applicable.”).
172. See id. (“Deterred by the fear of punishment, some individuals refrain from saying or
publishing that which they lawfully could, and indeed, should.”).
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dia,173 chilling-effect arguments have particular resonance in cases involving “nonmedia”174 defendants like those typically sued in the new
Internet libel cases.
First, these new libel suits may chill simply by threatening to reveal the identities of those who speak their minds online. As noted
previously, corporate plaintiffs easily can make out a prima facie libel
claim any time they receive harsh criticism online. Once a complaint
is filed, it is a simple matter to get a subpoena to force the ISP to divulge the anonymous defendant’s identity.175 As more and more suits
are filed, many Internet users will come to recognize the ease with
which their online anonymity can be stripped simply by the filing of a
libel action, and they will censor themselves accordingly. Such selfcensorship is salutary to the extent that it makes Internet users more
temperate and more cautious about making unsupported factual assertions.176 Indeed, the widespread use of pseudonyms online is re-

173. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 89, at 513-16 (discussing the chilling effect of litigation
costs on mass media); Bezanson et al., supra note 20, at 22 (same); Boies, supra note 101, at
1208-09 (same); Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69
IND. L.J. 689, 711 (1994) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Politics of the Mass Media] (same); cf. Steven
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV.
915, 933-34 (1978) (asserting that, since plaintiffs will rarely bring defamation actions against
“those with little resources causing little damage,” nonmedia defendants have similar economic
interests and levels of legal sophistication to those of media defendants and that therefore “the
nature of the legal standards governing liability makes little difference”). The literature on the
chilling effect of SLAPPs is useful because these suits are typically brought against nonmedia
defendants. See generally PRING & CANAN, supra note 11, at 214-15 (noting that the majority of
defendants are individuals who are “not regularly involved in political action” but who are motivated by the plaintiff’s actions).
For Supreme Court cases discussing the chilling effect of defamation suits on mass media
defendants, see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401
U.S. 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401
U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publ’g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
174. To call them nonmedia defendants is something of a misnomer, since the Internet is the
ultimate medium of mass communication. See infra notes 262-73 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 134.
176. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1675-76 (arguing that anonymity should not be used as
a shield for “abusive posters”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state law requiring authors of election-related materials to
identify themselves would foster “a civil and dignified level of campaign debate”).
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sponsible for many of the abuses perpetrated by Internet speakers.177
But revelation of identity has negative consequences as well—it may
subject the user to ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, invite retaliation from those who oppose her ideas or from those whom she
criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure to her mental processes.178 There is some danger, therefore, that the growing popularity
of the new Internet libel suits may chill more than defamatory falsehoods—it may also chill the use of the Internet as a medium for freeranging debate and experimentation with unpopular or novel ideas.179
The high cost of libel litigation is another source of the chilling
effect of libel suits. Media defendants identify litigation costs as a
primary source of the chilling effect,180 and these costs will fall even
more heavily on the nonmedia defendants181 who are the targets of the

177. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1675-76.
178. See Lee Tien, Innovation and the Information Environment: Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 123-25 (1996). In ACLU v. Miller,
977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997), a federal district court held that a Georgia law violated the
First Amendment by requiring senders of electronic communications to identify themselves. See
id. at 1233.
179. See Tien, supra note 178, at 144 (“[C]ompelled revelation of speaker identity has serious costs for speech.”). The solution that I advocate in this Article does little to alleviate the
chill that flows solely from having one’s identity revealed. What this Article seeks to curb is the
far more serious chill that results from being forced to defend against a meritless action, and the
Article provides a theory for defendants to use in order to have such actions dismissed at a very
early stage of litigation. Moreover, a defendant might be able to use the solution that I advocate
here and still maintain his anonymity. In at least one case, for example, the ACLU filed an amicus brief recommending, inter alia, that the court resolve the question of whether a defendant’s
speech constituted constitutionally protected opinion prior to ordering disclosure of the defendant’s identity. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida, Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 99-2831 CA
01) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The author assisted the ACLU as cooperating counsel
in drafting the amicus brief, which was filed in February 2000. See id.
180. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 516 (noting that the actual malice rule tends to further
increase defense costs); Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An
Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1789 (1998) (“[I]t is now clear that
chill on speakers comes not just from fear of damage awards, but also from concern about the
costs of litigation.” (footnote omitted)); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra
note 169, at 700 (“[T]here is a heavy price to pay for simply being in a position to have to explain, or defend.”).
181. The chilling effect is not confined to the Internet context. Note, for example, the debate
aroused when McDonald’s chose to sue two penniless pamphleteers who had criticized the
company. See JOHN VIDAL, MCLIBEL: BURGER CULTURE ON TRIAL (1997). Although the
McDonald’s case involved English rather than American libel law, many of the same issues are
presented in the new Internet libel cases.
The use of libel suits by corporations to harass their online critics is consistent with evidence that corporations have used libel suits to punish those who petition the government to
adopt or reject measures that threaten the corporation’s interests. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN,
supra note 11, at 37-39 (giving an example of a suit brought by a developer against residents
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new Internet libel cases. This new class of nonmedia defendants are
unlikely to have enough money even to defend against a libel action,
much less to satisfy a judgment. Thus, wealthy plaintiffs can successfully use the threat of a libel action to punish the defendant for her
speech, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the libel action. As a
case in point, consider U-Haul International, Inc. v. Osborne.182 John
Osborne and his roommate, Glenda Woodrum, rented a U-Haul to
move from Florida to Georgia.183 Not only did the truck break down
numerous times, turning an eight-hour trip into a twenty-seven-hour
trip,184 but U-Haul also tried to make them pay the costs of fixing the
truck.185 Whatever the merits of U-Haul’s argument, Osborne was understandably upset about this episode. He first complained to UHaul’s customer service department and then to the Better Business
Bureau.186 When neither of these avenues gave him satisfaction, Osborne decided to use the Internet to express his displeasure. Osborne
developed a website entitled The U-Hell Website: Misadventures in
Moving as a forum to tell his own story and to let other disgruntled
U-Haul customers tell theirs.187
After an initial round of legal correspondence, U-Haul promptly
sued Osborne and Woodrum for libel and trademark infringement.
U-Haul did not sue them in Georgia, where they lived. U-Haul instead chose to sue them in Arizona,188 arguing by analogy to tradiwho had petitioned the city to reject the developer’s plan to build condominiums on a parcel of
municipal-use land).
182. No. CIV 98-0366 (D. Ariz. 1998). This case is not technically a John Doe case because
Osborne’s name appeared on the website on which the allegedly libelous statements were
posted, but it does present similar issues. U-Haul also threatened to sue at least one other individual who created an independent U-Haul “gripe site.” See infra note 187.
183. See David Segal & Caroline E. Mayer, Sites for Sore Customers, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
1999, at A1.
184. See id.
185. See Trigaux, supra note 38.
186. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Osborne, No. CIV 98-0366.
187. See id. Osborne’s was not the only such site. Marc Becker, whose site was called UHaul Makes Moving Miserable, was also threatened with litigation by U-Haul. See Letter from
Rod S. Berman of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro LLP, Attorney for U-Haul, to Marc
Becker, Author of the U-Haul Makes Moving Miserable website (Mar. 23, 1998) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal); E-mail Interview with Marc Becker (July 1, 1999). Mr. Becker
promptly sought to remove from his website the graphics that U-Haul alleged were infringing
on its trademark. See Letter from Marc Becker to Rod S. Berman (Mar. 31, 1998) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). The attorney for U-Haul then requested that Mr. Becker “cease and
desist from any use of the U-Haul mark as a meta tag in [Becker’s] website.” Letter from Rod S.
Berman to Marc Becker (July 2, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Mr. Becker’s website can be found at <http://falcon.cc.ukans.edu/~marc/uhaul>.
188. See Segal & Mayer, supra note 183. The corporate headquarters of U-Haul are located
in Arizona. See Complaint ¶ 5, Osborne, No. CIV 98-0366.
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tional defamation law that Osborne had “published” his website in
Arizona because it was available to be downloaded by Internet users
there.189 But suing Osborne and Woodrum in Arizona was also a strategic means of trying to force them to capitulate to U-Haul’s demands. As Osborne said, U-Haul knew that “we ha[d] no way to
travel [to Arizona] to defend ourselves. [T]he apparent aim there
[was] to prevent us from answering their charges, so that they [would]
win a default judgment against us. . . . They want[ed] us quiet.”190
Luckily for the defendants in this case, the ACLU of Arizona and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation came to their rescue by providing
them with free legal assistance.191 As a result, the Arizona suit was
dismissed, although U-Haul is currently threatening to pursue the action in Georgia.192
Not all defendants are as lucky or as tenacious as Osborne and
Woodrum, and many would choose to forego speaking in the future
to avoid the hassle and expense of libel litigation. The great jurist
Learned Hand once wrote that, “short of sickness and death,” he
dreaded nothing more than being involved in a lawsuit.193 If this is true
for the great jurist, how much more dread and anxiety must the prospect of being sued pose for the targets of the new Internet libel actions?194
B. John Doe and First Amendment Theory
As argued in Section II.E, the new libel suits can be valuable to
the extent that they deter malicious falsehoods. Thus, before lamenting the chill that defamation actions will have on the John Does who
frequent financial message boards, it is worthwhile to explore
whether their speech is worthy of First Amendment protection.
189. It is still not entirely clear what type of online conduct justifies a court in exercising jurisdiction in an Internet libel case. For a good discussion of jurisdictional issues in Internet libel
cases, see generally George & Hemphill, supra note 7.
190. See John Osborne, U-Haul Is Suing Us (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http//www.coyotes.org/
~consumer/uhell/lawsuit.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
191. See id.
192. See Segal & Mayer, supra note 183.
193. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS: 1921–22, at 89, 105 (James N. Rosenberg et al. eds., 1926).
194. A credible counterargument is that, since the defendants have “nothing to lose,” they
will not be chilled by the prospect of defamation liability. See Hadley, supra note 31, at 505 (“If
the chance of recovery is nominal once inside the courtroom, there seems almost no reason to
avoid being as vicious as possible in cyberspace.”). This point will undoubtedly hold true for
some Internet users, but even defendants of modest means have “something to lose” from being
sued, as the above discussion illustrates.
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It is easy to get lost in the hype surrounding the Internet in answering this question. Scholars have touted the Internet as the living
embodiment of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor that lies at the
heart of First Amendment theory. This idealized vision of Internet
discourse contrasts rather sharply with the reality of the financial
message boards. Discourse on the boards bears more resemblance to
informal gossip than to rational deliberation, and the culture of the
boards fosters, as one commentator put it, “disinformation, rumors
and garbage.”195 Yet, extending “breathing space” to this type of
speech may be necessary if the Internet is to fulfill its promise of giving ordinary John Does a meaningful role in public discourse.
1. The New Marketplace of Ideas. From a First Amendment
scholar’s perspective,196 the fascination of the Internet lies in its
potential for realizing the concept of public discourse at the heart of
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.197 The
dominant First Amendment metaphor for describing public discourse
is the “marketplace of ideas.”198 The marketplace of ideas is a sphere
of discourse in which citizens can come together free from
government interference or intervention199 to discuss a diverse array

195. Reliable Sources: Are 24-Hour TV and the Internet Helping People Understand Wall
Street, or Is There Too Much Bull in the Bull Market? (CNN television broadcast, July 31, 1999),
transcript available in LEXIS, Transcripts File. When asked by Howard Kurtz whether he
thought that the Internet fostered “disinformation, rumors, [and] garbage,” Jim Cramer responded that “there’s been disinformation, rumors and garbage . . . for many, many years. It’s
got a new form in some of it on the Net . . . . You’ve never had as much information at your fingertips.” Id.
196. For scholarship on the First Amendment implications of the Internet, see Fred H. Cate,
The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1995); Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32; Symposium, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104
YALE L.J. 1613 (1994).
197. Professor Robert C. Post convincingly and elaborately elucidates this concept of public
discourse. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 633 (demonstrating that “the ambition of constitutional law [is] to create a distinct realm of public discourse independent of the
norms of any particular community”).
198. This metaphor first made its way into First Amendment jurisprudence in Justice
Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”). See generally FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 10 (identifying
use of the metaphor in Milton’s Areopagitica and in the writings of John Stuart Mill).
199. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“‘[A] central tenet of the
First Amendment [is] that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.’”
(quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978))).
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of ideas and opinions.200 Ideally, the process of interacting in the
marketplace of ideas not only fosters the “search for truth”;201 it also
enables citizens to transcend their differences in order to forge
consensus on issues of public concern, or, as Professor Robert C. Post
eloquently puts it, “to speak to one another across the boundaries of
divergent cultures.”202 Public consensus, in turn, is an essential
precondition of democratic self-government.203
This, at least, is the First Amendment ideal. As a practical matter, however, many citizens are barred from meaningful participation
in public discourse by financial or status inequalities, and a relatively
small number of powerful speakers dominate the marketplace of
ideas.204 But the Internet promises to eliminate structural and financial barriers to meaningful public discourse, thereby making public
discourse more democratic and inclusive, less subject to the control of
powerful speakers, and, at least potentially, richer and more nuanced.
It therefore promises to make the marketplace of ideas more than
just a hollow aspiration.205
One of the most significant ways in which the Internet promises
to change the nature of public discourse is by allowing more participants to engage in public discussion and debate.206 The Internet gives
200. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (observing that the First
Amendment assumes that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public”).
201. Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory
of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 272 (1978).
202. Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 634.
203. See id. at 634-40; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
15, at 26-27 (“When men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a
hearing as well as wise ones . . . .”).
204. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 58 (1993)
(noting financial restrictions on access to broadcasting); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the
Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1967) (observing that the
power to control both the content and availability of information rests in a relatively few private
hands); Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV 781, 787-88 (1987) (same); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806 (1995) (“The perfect ‘marketplace of ideas’ is one where all ideas, not just the popular or well-funded ones, are accessible
to all. To the extent this ideal isn’t achieved, the promise of the First Amendment is only imperfectly realized.”).
205. See Fred H. Cate, Comment, Law in Cyberspace, 39 HOW. L.J. 565, 578 (1996) (“The
‘marketplace’ metaphor, however worthy, has had little meaning in the physical world, where
the ability to reach large audiences is controlled by a handful of major media corporations.”).
206. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Approximately
70.2 million people of all ages use the Internet in the United States alone.”).
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citizens inexpensive access207 to a medium of mass communication and
therefore transforms every citizen into a potential “publisher” of information for First Amendment purposes.208 “[F]reedom of the
press,” as one court noted, “is [no longer] limited to those who own
one.”209 The Internet enables speakers to bypass commercial publishers and editors and to speak directly “to an audience larger and more
diverse than any the Framers could have imagined.”210 Although it
may be an overstatement to say that the speech of ordinary John
Does “compete[s] equally with the speech of mainstream speakers in
the marketplace of ideas,”211 it is certainly true that ordinary John
Does need no longer win approval of the mainstream media in order
to be heard212 and that Internet discourse is more broadly inclusive
than real-world discourse.213
But the Internet not only removes barriers to speaking; it also
removes barriers to being heard. In a now well-known New Yorker
cartoon, a picture of a dog typing at a computer reads, “On the Internet nobody knows you’re a dog.”214 The cartoon pithily encapsulates

207. This access is inexpensive, but not free. Many citizens will still be effectively excluded
from public debate because they cannot afford the technology necessary to use the Internet, and
still others will be barred from the debate by a lack of technical know-how. See Volokh, supra
note 204, at 1807 (noting that “poor listeners” may be “shut out” from some of the benefits of
the Internet). Even conceding these problems, however, the Internet certainly gives ordinary
citizens more access than they had previously to an avenue of mass communication. See id. at
1806-07; see also M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 336 (finding that the First Amendment has not
been very concerned about “the inability of an individual to employ a particular medium [of
communication] because of a lack of education or economic resources”).
208. See GODWIN, supra note 154, at 14 (describing widespread capacity to be a “content
producer” as creating a revolution of “radical pluralism”); Ballon, Law of the Internet, supra
note 25, at 20 (same); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 431 (1993) (“The network provides the facilities for individuals to
distribute their messages efficiently and cheaply, both widely and narrowly, to large groups as
well as small.”); Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1141 (“[T]he Internet is capable of maintaining an unlimited number of information sources, thereby eliminating concerns about ‘scarcity’ that currently plague the broadcast media.”); see also David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339-40 (1995).
209. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (entering a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of 47 U.S.C. § 231, a provision of the Child Online Protection Act).
210. Id.; see also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1141 (noting that “the Internet has
no ‘gatekeepers’—no publishers or editors controlling the distribution of information”).
211. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
212. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a
New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 437 (1998) (observing that the Internet liberates “the
‘marketplace of ideas’ from the institutional dominance of publishers, distributors, broadcast
media, and other traditional gate-keepers of speech”).
213. See Volokh, supra note 204, at 1807.
214. Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61 (cartoon).
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one of the chief attractions of online anonymity.215 Many participants
in cyberspace discussions employ pseudonymous identities, and, even
when a speaker chooses to reveal her real name, she may still be
anonymous for all practical purposes. For good or ill, therefore, the
audience must evaluate the speaker’s ideas based on her words
alone.216 This unique feature of Internet communications promises to
make public debate in cyberspace less hierarchical and discriminatory
than real-world debate to the extent that it disguises status indicators
such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and age, which allow elite speakers to dominate real-world discourse.217
The Internet also challenges existing hierarchies of power that
permeate public discourse by making it harder for powerful speakers
to control the interpretation of public events.218 The mainstream media no longer have the power to exclusively define what is “news,”219
215. For discussion of the dark side of online anonymity, see Tien, supra note 178, at 150-51.
216. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 640 (“In most circumstances we
attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the social context of her words, as we
do to the bare content of her communication.”).
217. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1108-09
(1993). Some commentators also wisely point to the dangers that the Internet poses to minority
groups. For example, the Internet has become a forum for bigots of all types to come together
to reinforce their antisocial beliefs. See JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 486-87 (1999) (discussing the use of the Internet by hate
groups); Volokh, supra note 204, at 1834 (noting that the “shift of control to listeners” may
make it easier for them to remain closed-minded because they will select only information that
confirms their existing prejudices).
218. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
“the increasingly prominent role of mass media in our society and the awesome power it has
placed in the hands of a select few”); Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 582 (1984) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983))
(“[T]hose willing and able to pay have the ability to spread their messages.”); Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 385, 407-08
(1994) (describing the tools that policymakers use to manipulate traditional media); see also
Robert M. O’Neill, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 623, 624-25 (1998) (observing that journalistic standards for deciding what to publish seem
to be lower in cyberspace).
219. The extraordinary success of Internet “journalist” Matt Drudge demonstrates this
point. The Drudge Report, Matt Drudge’s website, aims to provide political gossip to its subscribers and visitors. See Roger Bull, Online and Loving It, FLA. TIMES UNION, Feb. 27, 1998, at
D1. Many subscribers are themselves members of the mainstream press and political insiders.
See David McClintick, Town Crier for the New Age, BRILL’S CONTENT (Nov. 1998),
<http://www.brillscontent.com/features/cryer_1198.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Drudge gathers information for his report using two computers, one telephone, a police scanner,
and a television, and he publishes the information from his studio apartment. Drudge lays claim
to “scooping” the mainstream press on the presidential impeachment scandal. See Howard
Kurtz, Clinton Scoop So Hot It Melted: Newsweek Editors Held off in Scandal Story, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 1998, at C1 (“[W]ord of [Newsweek]’s suppressed scoop leaked out through an
increasingly familiar route: Matt Drudge’s Internet gossip column.”). While Newsweek debated
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and governments, particularly authoritarian governments, have less
power to control public discourse220 by controlling the information
their citizens receive.221 Wealthy and powerful private speakers may
similarly find it more difficult to impose their agendas by manipulating media coverage. By changing the locus of control of public discourse, the Internet may therefore contribute to the development of
an informed citizenry capable of deciding its collective fate.
A more subtle benefit of the Internet to public discourse is its potential for making public discourse richer and more nuanced. The
more speakers who engage in public debate, the more perspectives
that will be brought to bear on public problems. And beyond simply
allowing more people to speak, the Internet also gives people more
topics about which to speak.222 The Internet allows people to transcend the limits of geography in order to find those with similar interests, and no topic is too obscure to generate Internet discussion.
Moreover, speakers are able to experiment with controversial or unpopular ideas online, thereby making Internet debate more freewhether it was ethical to divulge Monica Lewinsky’s name before she had been indicted by Ken
Starr, Drudge preempted the debate by publishing the story on his website. See Howard Kurtz,
Out There; It’s 10 Past Monica, America, Do You Know Where Matt Drudge Is?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 1999, at F1. What the incident tellingly illustrates is the challenge that “journalists” like
Drudge present to the ability of the mainstream media to decide what issues are appropriate for
public debate. I have previously criticized this incident as indicating that concern for individual
privacy receives few rewards in the marketplace of ideas. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying,
Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 173, 181 (1998). The Drudge Report appears at <http://www.drudgereport.com/>.
220. See Salbu, supra note 29, at 436 (noting that, by making original government documents available, the Internet offers “an alternative to filtered information”); Scott E. Feir,
Comment, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted Repair of Rupture in China’s Great
Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 361, 384 (1997) (observing that “[t]here is concern [in China] that Internet technology is weakening the Chinese Communist Party’s control over people”).
221. In authoritarian governments, this takes the form of direct control of the mass media;
in democracies, governments ensure that their “spin” is put on public events described in the
mainstream media. When citizens have access to the Internet, however, they have access to information coming from beyond their country’s borders and hence beyond the control of their
leaders. By making it impossible for governments or private entities to control what information
the public receives, the Internet may therefore aid in the formation of an informed citizenry. See
Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1143 (highlighting the importance of global computer
networks in conveying information to the outside world about the use of Chinese troops to suppress protest in Tiananmen Square in 1989).
222. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1640 (“[W]e now have within our grasp a technology
designed to bring together like-minded individuals, regardless of where they live, work, or play,
to engage in the creation of a new type of democratic community: a community unbounded by
geographical, temporal, or other physical barriers.”); Volokh, supra note 204, at 1833 (noting
that, although a “greater diversity of available speech need not lead to diversification of what is
actually consumed,” it nonetheless serves “those people whose tastes differ from the majority’s”).
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ranging and expansive than real-world debate. Thus, the number and
type of discussions in which citizens engage are bound to expand, and,
as they do, the nature of public discourse is likely to change as well.223
2. Chaos in the Marketplace? This high theory contrasts rather
markedly with the nature of actual discourse on the boards. A
primary justification for protecting the marketplace of ideas from
governmental interference is that competition of ideas in the
marketplace fosters the search for truth. Indeed, this justification was
the underpinning of Justice Holmes’s famous defense of the “free
trade in ideas,” in which he argued that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”224 If the speech of anonymous John Does in cyberspace
fosters the search for truth, it is largely by accident. As anyone who
has spent time perusing the financial message boards knows, board
discussions are no model of rational deliberation and informed
debate. Idle speculation, unintelligible musing, and “off-topic” trivia
predominate over serious financial discussion, and many of the
participants appear to lack financial sophistication. The operative
principle is speed rather than accuracy, and the idea seems to be that
users should present whatever tidbits of rumor or speculation they
can and the audience can sort it out.225
Discourse on financial message boards resembles informal gos226
sip more than it does formal written conversation. Indeed, Sissela
Bok’s observations about the informal character of gossip form a use-

223. As Professor Volokh has observed, the Internet brings us closer to realizing the idealized premises of First Amendment doctrine than do print and broadcast media. See Volokh, supra note 204, at 1847.
224. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 71 (1975); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (questioning whether the marketplace theory
fosters the search for truth).
225. See, e.g., Ballon, supra note 25, at 16 (“Time, rather than content, often is the commodity being marketed in cyberspace.”); Heimer, supra note 4, at 54 (discussing how Raging Bull
and most other investment-related boards rely on the readers’ ability to collectively address unfounded claims or other inappropriate posts).
226. Gossip is defined by Sissela Bok as “informal personal communication about other
people who are absent or treated as absent.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 91 (1982); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 333
(1983) (defining gossip as “the exchange of personal information about character, habits and
lifestyles”).
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ful point of comparison.227 Like gossip, discourse on the boards “lacks
formal rules setting forth who may speak and in what manner, and
with what limitations from the point of view of accuracy and reliability.”228 Discourse on the boards is, like gossip, highly “spontaneous,”
and it “relies more on humor and guesswork” than it does on rational
argumentation. Also like gossip, it is a form of discourse that forces
the audience to take an active role in gleaning the valuable bits of information from the great mass of chaff.229
Nevertheless, the boards are not useless as a source of information.230 If one “lurks”231 around long enough on a message board, observing the ongoing, rambunctious, and often disjointed dialogue over
a period of time, one can become adept at judging the credibility of
individual participants based on the quality and tone of a participant’s
remarks and the interaction between that participant and others.232
Often, too, one goes to the financial boards to get a “feel” for what is
being said about the corporation rather than to gather actual facts;
what is important is the general tenor of the discussion, rather than
any particular factual assertion.233
Thus, even if the financial message boards do not further the
search for truth in a direct and efficient manner, they do allow those
interested in a particular corporation to gather information that may
not be supplied by traditional media outlets.234 The message boards
may even help to remedy the “‘chronic tilt [that] distorts mainstream
227. See BOK, supra note 226, at 91; see also Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (“In some sense, cyberspace communication is very speech-like. People speak informally.”).
228. See BOK, supra note 226, at 91.
229. See JACK LEVIN & ARNOLD ARLUKE, GOSSIP: THE INSIDE SCOOP (1987). As a book
on online etiquette admonishes newcomers to Internet message boards, “Don’t assume that
posted information is correct, and don’t spread it around if you have any questions at all about
it.” VIRGINIA SHEA, NETIQUETTE 67 (1994).
230. See Moss, supra note 4 (“Serious investors find merit in the boards. . . . ‘Looking at and
monitoring the boards is something a prudent analyst has to do.’” (quoting Howard Capek, a
stock analyst at Warburg Dillon Read, New York)).
231. SHEA, supra note 229, at 6 (“‘Lurking’ is reading the discussion group correspondence
without actually participating . . . . Lurking gives you an idea of who the participants are and
what the tone of the discussion is.”).
232. In this respect, too, board discussions are like informal spoken conversations in the
“real world.” One must still “consider the source”; it is just that evaluating source credibility is
more difficult in the online environment.
233. See Heimer, supra note 4, at 53 (advising that the quality of the information varies
greatly and that one should not “bet the farm on a message-board tip”); Moss, supra note 4
(noting that the message boards let participants vent their feelings).
234. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 4 (observing that “[s]erious investors find merit in the
boards”).
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media coverage of grave, persisting, and pervasive abuses of corporate power.’”235 This is not to say that the speech of anonymous John
Does is as important a source of financial information as, say, the
236
Wall Street Journal or CNBC. The typical John Doe is not a financial journalist, and the boards are often cluttered with pointless ramblings.237 Yet, to the extent that participants in online discussions learn
more information about a corporation through a message board, it is
still a valuable, albeit flawed, source of specialized financial information.
From a First Amendment perspective, the financial message
boards contribute to the marketplace of ideas by encouraging citizens
to participate in public decisionmaking. The financial message boards
exercise a powerful democratizing effect on public discourse about
the publicly held corporations that shape citizens’ daily lives. Publicly
held corporations exercise tremendous influence in American society:
they influence “what we buy, where we work . . . which diseases we
cure, [and] much, much more.”238 At a minimum, therefore, the
boards provide an avenue for citizens to converse with one another
and to seek consensus about topics that affect their lives. But the
boards also serve as a kind of informal education for investors and
noninvestors alike about the behavior of a particular corporation,
about the workings of the stock market,239 and about economic matters in general.
By providing a forum for discussion of financial matters and by
contributing to citizens’ store of knowledge about such matters, the
boards help to shape public opinion.240 But the boards also help citi235. Shiffrin, Politics of the Mass Media, supra note 173, at 711 (quoting Morton Mintz, a
Washington Post reporter). Professor Shiffrin also notes that libel laws often “discourage aggressive media reporting” because “[c]orporations often have the resources and the will to bring
a lawsuit.” Id.
236. See FARRELL, supra note 3, at 217 (“CNBC . . . is the leader in providing up-to-theminute news on the financial markets.”).
237. See, e.g., supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
238. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (1991).
239. The extraordinary growth in the number of individual investors in the stock market,
which is itself attributable to the Internet to a large degree, has spurred the success of the financial message boards. See FARRELL, supra note 2, at 2 (“In the matter of a few short years, the
Internet has changed the very landscape of investing . . . . Trading stocks has never been
cheaper or more accessible.”).
240. Thus, even if discourse on the message boards contributes only marginally to the
“search for truth,” it promotes “participation in decision making by all members of society.”
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). Alexander
Meiklejohn is perhaps most famously associated with the philosophy that the First Amendment
protects speech essential to “democratic self-governance,” and many of Meiklejohn’s argu-
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zens to transform public opinion into action.241 The more citizens
know about economic matters, the more likely they are to make informed voting decisions. More significantly, the boards provide an
important “back channel” for individual shareholders to convey their
feelings to the corporations in a market largely dominated by institutional shareholders,242 especially since, as noted above, many CEOs
closely follow what is said about their corporation on the financial
message boards.243 Even if the “buzz” on the boards does not directly
influence corporate decisionmaking, it may influence decisions indirectly. And, if the boards have even a tiny impact on corporate behavior, they have broad social ramifications not limited to the participants in online discussions. Indeed, it is the worry that message

ments, when taken out of context, would support extending broad First Amendment protection
to discourse in cyberspace. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, passim. Meiklejohn argued, for example, that the First Amendment’s “primary purpose” is to guarantee “that all the citizens shall,
so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life. That is why no idea,
no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from
them.” Id. at 88-89. This argument supports the provision of broad First Amendment protection
to speech on message boards. Financial message boards, for example, deal with issues of corporate behavior and corporate decisionmaking that have ramifications beyond the financial selfinterest of shareholders. And certainly most message boards deal, if only tangentially at times,
with “issues which bear upon our common life.” Id. Meiklejohn, however, did not envision a
fully participatory model of discourse. For him, the appropriate model of discourse was “the
traditional American town meeting,” a forum that regulates the speech of participants to attain
particular goals. Id. at 22. “What is essential,” wrote Meiklejohn, “is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.” Id. at 25. But see Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV.
1109, 1117 (1993) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s “town meeting model” because “it reflects an insufficiently radical conception of the reach of self-determination”).
241. Some commentators even seem to contend that raising citizens’ awareness of economic
affairs and the behavior of corporations has the potential to generate more social and economic
reform than participation in overtly political discourse. See James A. Fanto, Investor Education,
Securities Disclosure, and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm
Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 15, 33-34 (1998) (“Without dramatizing the issue, there are political and ideological implications in failing to instruct people about the consequences of their
ownership of property and in encouraging them to view such ownership in a limited way.”);
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to
Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 81 (1997).
242. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 238, at 181 (“Institutional shareholders now hold the
majority of common stock.”).
243. See Rebecca Buckman, Gumshoe Game on the Internet: Companies Hire Private Eyes
to Unmask Online Detractors, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999, at B1:
With an explosion of online corporate chat by investors, more companies are hiring
private eyes to track down people posting anonymous messages they don’t like.
Though the freewheeling banter is frequently off-base, companies fret that investors
may believe—or trade stock on—what they see posted on a Web site or a stockmessage board.
See also Moss, supra note 4.
245. See Buckman, supra note 243.
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boards will transform opinion into action that prompts many companies to hire others to monitor what is being said about them on the
web, to hire private investigators to track down online detractors,245
and even to sue anonymous John Does for libel.
Any argument that message boards further First Amendment
values must, of necessity, concede that much of the conversation on
the boards is cryptic, uninformed, and inane.246 But “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate”247 will often be cryptic, uninformed, and
inane, especially when such debate is not restricted to educated elites
but is expanded to include ordinary John Does. Thus, to concede this
point does not detract from the importance of the boards as an outlet
for ordinary citizens to discuss corporate behavior, to vent frustrations, and to have some small measure of input into corporate decisions that affect not only their own lives but those of their fellow citizens.
3. The Pitfalls of Participatory Public Discourse. A central
premise of First Amendment theory in the twentieth century has been
that truth is best gathered “out of a multitude of tongues,”248 and the
Internet promises, if nothing else, to put this theory to the test.
Already there are indicators that the “new” public discourse will look
quite different from the old. As the financial message boards
demonstrate, a financial discourse that includes ordinary John Does
looks quite different from a discourse dominated by Wall Street
analysts.249 Discourse on the boards is lively and engaging, providing
“the masses” with a highly accessible source of information and
education about the stock market. The boards give ordinary citizens
an opportunity to become active participants in an ongoing dialogue
about economic affairs and, in the process, allow them to transform
the way business is done.250
But fostering a more participatory public discourse may come at
a high cost. Speech from a “multitude of tongues” may lead to truth,

246. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
247. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
248. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
The Supreme Court cited this language with approval in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
249. See Moss, supra note 4 (“Until the Internet came along, the traffic in opinion about
stocks and bonds was largely—and for the most part calmly—controlled by Wall Street analysts.”).
250. See id.
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but it may also lead to the Tower of Babel.251 And the level of discourse on the financial message boards also suggests that fostering
unmediated participation may make public discourse not only less rational and less civil; it also runs the risk of making public discourse
meaningless. A discourse that has no necessary anchor in truth has no
value to anyone but the speaker,252 and the participatory nature of
Internet discourse threatens to engulf its value as discourse.
The problem, therefore, is to strike a balance between free
speech and the preservation of civility. If the goal of making public
discourse more participatory and ultimately more democratic is to be
realized, the speech of ordinary John Does merits a very wide expanse of “breathing space,”253 wider than it currently receives. First
Amendment doctrine therefore cannot hold ordinary John Does to
the standards of professional journalists with regard to factual accuracy, because part of what gives the Internet such widespread appeal
is the fact that it allows ordinary citizens to have informal conversations about issues of public concern. Although any approach to the
problems posed by the new Internet libel actions must respond to the
unique culture of the message boards, the law cannot allow that culture to degenerate into a realm where anything goes, where any embittered and malicious speaker can lash out randomly at innocent targets. Although many of the new libel plaintiffs are powerful corporate
Goliaths suing to punish and to deter their critics, some are not. Some
are simply responding in the only way available to prevent aggressively uncivil speech, the sole purpose of which is to cause emotional
and financial harm. Hence, any solution to the problems posed by
251. In the Tower of Babel account, the people of the earth began to build a tower “whose
top may reach unto heaven.” Genesis 11:4 (King James). When God saw the tower, he said:
Behold the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do:
and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go
to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand
one another’s speech.
Id. 11:6-7 (King James). The next verses reveal the aftermath:
[T]he Lord scattered [the people] abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth:
and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because
the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the
Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of the earth.
Id. 11:8-9 (King James).
252. My thanks to Professor David A. Anderson for bringing this point home to me.
253. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (“[E]rroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have
the breathing space that they need . . . to survive . . . .” (citation and internal quotation omitted)); see also Cate, supra note 196, at 15 (discussing rationales for extending a “breathing
space” around constitutionally protected speech). For further discussion, see infra Part II.C-D.
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these new suits must be tuned finely enough to distinguish incivility
that must be tolerated for the good of public discourse from incivility
that destroys public discourse.254
C. John Doe and First Amendment Doctrine
One might intuitively expect such a solution to come from the
First Amendment. Since 1964, the First Amendment has been attuned to the danger that plaintiffs will use the threat of libel lawsuits
to intimidate their critics.255 Existing First Amendment doctrine, however, provides only a limited response to the problems posed by the
new Internet libel suits.
First Amendment doctrine, for example, has little to say about
the chilling effect that the mere threat of being sued imposes on defendants of modest means.256 Although some courts have indicated
that the First Amendment requires judges to take an active role in
dismissing libel cases at an early stage, it is not a constitutional requirement.257 Indeed, as Professor Susan Gilles has noted, the first set
of constitutional protections often will not come into play until the
summary judgment stage,258 which may be too late to protect the de-

254. See generally POST, supra note 159, at 119-78 (discussing the nature of, and difficulties
inherent in, the concept of public discourse).
255. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (expressing fear that “would-be critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their criticisms, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true” because of the risk of a libel suit).
256. Existing First Amendment doctrine currently provides defendants no protection from
having their anonymity stripped away once a libel action is filed, although one might argue that
the First Amendment right to speak anonymously should be extended to provide such protection. In McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized that “an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment.” Id. at 342. Two district courts have extended the right to speak anonymously to the Internet context. See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(stating that a Georgia “statute’s prohibition of internet transmissions which ‘falsely identify’
the sender constitute[d] a presumptively invalid content-based restriction”); ACLU v Johnson,
4 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1033 (D.N.M. 1998) (striking down a statute that prohibited “people from
communicating and accessing information anonymously”).
257. See Gilles, supra note 180, at 1768-69 (“Thus, at the front end of a law suit no First
Amendment procedural protections have been granted.”).
258. See id. at 1771 (“Summary judgment then is the site of the first set of procedural accommodations granted to libel defendants.”); see also id. at 1780-81 (“[M]uch of the cost of defending a libel suit has already been incurred by the time the first constitutional protection, an
enhanced summary judgment standard, kicks in.”). Gilles does not consider the constitutional
privilege for statements that do not imply an assertion of fact (opinion statements), which courts
traditionally have applied to screen cases out at an earlier stage. See infra
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fendant from incurring substantial costs in defending himself, even if
the case is frivolous.
More to the point, the Supreme Court crafted the constitutional
privileges largely for the benefit of the institutional media, and these
privileges are not entirely responsive to the chilling effect of defamation law on nonmedia defendants of the type targeted by the new
Internet libel actions. Indeed, it is not even certain what level of First
Amendment protection, if any, the typical John Doe defendant would
receive.259 The typical John Doe case involves a publicly held corporation suing a defendant over statements posted on a financial message
board dedicated to discussion of the company’s prospects and management—indeed, of anything that might affect its stock price.260 With
respect to the level of constitutional protection that John Doe will receive, the Supreme Court’s decisions make clear that courts must resolve at least three questions: (1) Is John Doe entitled to the same
level of constitutional protection as a media defendant? (2) Is the
corporate plaintiff a public figure? and (3) Is the speech at issue of
public concern? In the typical case, the answer to all three questions
should probably be yes, which means that John Doe should receive
the maximum level of First Amendment protection from defamation
liability.261 But even if John Doe receives the maximum level of First
Amendment protection, it is not clear that corporate plaintiffs will be
barred from using defamation law as a tool for silencing their critics.
1. The Media/Nonmedia Distinction (or Lack Thereof). Internet
users like John Doe defy the traditional distinction between media
and nonmedia defendants.262 One of the defining characteristics of the
media is their ability to reach a mass audience. Although one might
argue, therefore, that the typical John Doe is a media defendant, the
259. Obviously, the precise level of protection will vary with the facts of each individual
case. See Smolla, supra note 86, at 1572 (providing a chart of the possible permutations of plaintiff status (public official, public figure, or private figure), defendant status (media versus nonmedia), and type of speech (a matter of public concern versus a matter not of public concern)).
260. See supra note 6 (citing cases).
261. Defamation law, however, is so complex that it is almost impossible to state even the
most basic proposition with certainty. Even for those relatively rare Internet users who have the
resources to defend against a defamation action and who contemplate in advance whether their
postings will subject them to liability, the inability to predict with any certainty what level of
constitutional protection they will receive may itself have a chilling effect. See SANFORD, supra
note 7, § 7.4, at 314 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999) (opining that “uncertainty can kill protected
commentary as effectively as the bluntest censorship”).
262. See Hadley, supra note 31, at 487 (arguing that “most speakers on the Internet could
not properly be described as the ‘press’”).
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Supreme Court traditionally has referred to only the institutional media—broadcasters, newspaper publishers, and so forth—as the “media” for First Amendment purposes.263 The question, then, is whether
nonmedia defendants like John Doe are entitled to the same level of
First Amendment protection as media defendants. The Supreme
Court has studiously avoided providing a definitive resolution to this
question,264 but the “best educated guess”265 of most commentators266
(and, more importantly, of most lower courts267) is that nonmedia de263. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (applying the standard
analysis for media defendants to a newspaper publisher); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (same); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limiting
the Court’s First Amendment discussion to publishers and broadcasters).
264. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), involved both media and nonmedia defendants, and the holding of the case, that public official plaintiffs must prove actual malice with convincing clarity in order to recover for defamation, seemed to apply equally to both
classes of defendants. See id. at 285-86. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), noted that the issue of whether the actual malice standard applied to
nonmedia defendants was still open. See id. at 134 n.16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), further complicated matters because it repeatedly referred to the fact that the defendants were members of the media. See id. at 347. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), the Supreme Court seemed ready to resolve the issue; although
the Court did not address the media/nonmedia distinction directly, a majority of Justices indicated their willingness to reject it. See id. at 758-62 (plurality). Nonetheless, in both Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986), the Court went out of its way to assert that the issue was not in fact resolved. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 11 n.5. (“In Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia
defendants . . . and accordingly we do the same.”); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779 n.4 (“Nor do we need
to consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant.”).
265. The phrase is Professor Smolla’s. See Smolla, supra note 86, at 1564.
266. See, e.g., id.; see also Developments in the Law—The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1610, 1616 n.50 (1998) (arguing that, “[a]lthough guilty of giving mixed signals,”
the Supreme Court has “confirmed the irrelevance of the media/nonmedia distinction . . . .”);
Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 84 (1998) (“With few exceptions, constitutionalized defamation law applies the same
principles to a libel in the New York Times as it does to a slander over the back fence.”);
Hadley, supra note 31, at 487 (assuming that the distinction makes no difference); Francis M.
Dougherty, Annotation, Defamation: Application of New York Times and Related Standards to
Nonmedia Defendants, 38 A.L.R.4th 1114 (1981).
Numerous commentators have questioned whether the distinction is viable. See, e.g.,
SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 5.6.1, at 311 (“A press/nonpress distinction remains unjustified
and unlikely.”); Smolla, supra note 86, at 1564 (arguing that a media/nonmedia distinction is
unsound and that, although the court has vacillated as to whether such a distinction exists, “[t]he
best educated guess . . . is that the Court will ultimately reject the media/nonmedia distinction”);
Anne Benaroya, Note, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited: A Critical Approach to Different Standards of Protection for Media and Nonmedia Defendants in Private Plaintiff Defamation Cases, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1268, 1270 (1990) (arguing “that the defamation defendant’s
status as part of the institutional media should have no bearing on whether, and to what degree,
the defendant should receive constitutional protection”).
267. See John B. McCrory & Robert C. Bernius, Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law, in 1
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 7, 464-73 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G-398, 1994). McCrory and Bernius note that lower courts gener-
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fendants should receive the same level of protection from defamation
liability as media defendants. A media/nonmedia distinction would
draw unsound and unworkable status distinctions among speakers,
and, as the Supreme Court has recognized in a poignant but now obsolete metaphor, the “lonely pamphleteer’s” contribution to public
debate can be just as important as that of the most powerful media
speaker.268 Moreover, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build269
ers, Inc., at least six Justices seemed to reject the media/nonmedia
distinction,270 although the case was decided on other grounds.271 Since
that time, the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to state that this
issue remains unresolved,272 but it seems fair to conclude (or at least to
hope) that the “increasing convergence of what might be labeled
‘media’ and ‘nonmedia’”273 speakers makes it unlikely that the Supreme Court will extend less First Amendment protection to Internet
users than it has extended to traditional media defendants.
2. Corporations as Public Figures. The second determinant of
the level of First Amendment protection that John Doe will receive is
the public figure status274 of the new class of Internet defamation

ally require public figures or public officials to prove actual malice, regardless of whether the
defendant is a media defendant or nonmedia defendant. See id. at 465-71 (collecting cases).
There is some disagreement amongst the lower courts as to what standard applies when a private figure plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant, although many lower courts appear to extend
nonmedia defendants the benefits of Gertz when the speech involves a matter of public concern.
See id. at 472-77 (collecting cases). Whether the defendant is media or nonmedia is likely to
have some bearing on whether the speech is of public concern. See Robert E. Drechsel, Defining
“Public Concern” in Defamation Cases Since Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 43 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 14 (1990) (observing that lower courts “consider the forum of the libel [i.e.,
whether it is disseminated by a mass medium] to be an important factor” in determining
whether a defendant’s statement was of public concern).
268. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
269. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
270. See id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[A]t least six Members of this Court . . .
agree today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no
greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the
same activities.”).
271. See id. at 764 (plurality) (holding, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Powell, that,
in cases involving private figure plaintiffs and matters of private concern, states may award presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases, even absent a showing of actual malice).
272. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11 n.5 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986).
273. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 782 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
274. Under federal law, the determination of whether a plaintiff is a public figure is a question of law. See Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 939 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
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plaintiffs.275 The distinction between public and private figures is an
important one because a public figure plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with actual malice in order to recover for
defamation.276 Although this distinction is important, the Supreme
Court has given only limited guidance on how to distinguish public
from private figures, especially when the plaintiff is a corporation.277
A strong argument can be made that the typical corporate plaintiff in
a John Doe libel case will be a public figure. The typical plaintiff is a
publicly held corporation listed on a national stock exchange; a
publicly held corporation by definition avails itself of the capital
markets to raise funds from investors.278 Regardless of how such
corporations should be treated generally,279 it is fair to conclude that a
275. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (observing that distinguishing between public figures and private figures “is much like trying to nail
a jellyfish to the wall”), aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); SANFORD, supra note 7, § 7.3.1 (2d
ed. 1991) (criticizing the public figure test as “a failure”). On the difficulty of applying the public
figure doctrine to corporate plaintiffs, see Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation
Plaintiff as First Amendment “Public Figure”: Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35 (1982);
John Hilbert, Note, A Criticism of the Gertz Public Figure/Private Figure Test in the Context of
the Corporate Defamation Plaintiff, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (1981); Douglas E. Lee, Note,
Public Interest, Public Figures, and the Corporate Defamation Plaintiff: Jadwin v. Minneapolis
Star and Tribune, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 318 (1987).
276. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
public figures must prove actual malice.
277. See Redlich, supra note 99, at 117 (“The analysis is rendered even more difficult where
the plaintiff is a corporation, given the absence of a clear analytic framework, let alone authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court.”); see also SANFORD, supra note 7, § 7.7, at 354.5 (2d
ed. 1991) (“[T]he Supreme Court has yet to address squarely the constitutional status of defamation suits in which the plaintiff is not a human being.”). Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), for example, involved a corporate plaintiff, but the Court did
not discuss its status as a public or private figure.
278. A few courts have concluded that a business listed on a national stock exchange should
be treated automatically as a public figure. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 442 F. Supp. 1341,
1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (observing that a corporation “is certainly a public figure with respect to
issues involving its offering of securities to the public” and also that its “role in society is such
that it is a figure generally in the public eye”); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 375
So. 2d 239, 242 (Ala. 1979) (concluding that a corporation is a public figure because the “power
and influence of such a business over society cannot be ignored”). But see Silver Screen Management Servs., Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1744, 1745 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991) (stating that not “all businesses which make public offerings . . . are subject to the ‘higher’
constitutional privilege for public figures”).
279. Even publicly held corporations are not invariably treated as public figures, at least by
most courts. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 311 (citing cases indicating that
“[t]he overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that the fact of incorporation alone does
not make the plaintiff a public figure”). In Minnesota, however, corporations are public figures
as a matter of law. See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn.
1985). Other courts have held that corporate plaintiffs must prove actual malice, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is a public figure, because the state interest in protecting corporate reputation is weaker than that in protecting individual reputation. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976).
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corporation should be treated as a public figure when the alleged
defamation appears in a forum dedicated to discussion of the
corporation’s management and operation and is reasonably related to
that subject.280
Although courts have developed a variety of tests for determining whether a corporation is a limited-purpose public figure,281 the two
most important determinants of public figure status are those set
forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:282
(1) whether the plaintiff has access to channels of effective communication to rebut the defamatory falsehood;283 and (2) whether the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a prominent role in a public controversy and
the attendant risk of enhanced public scrutiny that accompanies it.284
Both of these factors cut in favor of treating the typical corporate
plaintiff in the new Internet libel actions as a public figure. The typical publicly held corporation will have a great deal of access to effective channels of communication.285 The corporation can post an
authoritative rebuttal to any defamatory message on the financial

280. There are three categories of public figures: (1) involuntary public figures, (2) allpurpose public figures, and (3) limited-purpose public figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). To the extent that the corporation’s name is a “household name,” it
should probably be treated as an all-purpose public figure. See Redlich, supra note 98, at 1172.
In the text, I argue that the typical corporate plaintiff in a John Doe case will be at least a limited-purpose public figure. Cf. Lynn B. Oberlander, Corporate Plaintiffs: Public or Private Figures?, 16 COMM. LAW. 1, 1 (1998) (“It would be reasonable to postulate that . . . corporations
should always be considered public figures or, more narrowly, limited purpose public figures if
the alleged defamation concerns their business.”). Obviously, some cases also will involve private figures; it is hard to imagine, for example, that the wife of a CEO of a publicly held corporation would be treated as a public figure when she did nothing to inject herself into any public
event.
281. See, e.g., Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993); National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 635 (D. Md. 1992) (setting out a
five-factor test). Professor Smolla has identified at least nine factors that influence the outcome
of the limited-purpose public figure determination. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 2.09[4] (1997).
282. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
283. See id. at 345 (“Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.”).
284. See id. at 344-45. The normative argument underlying this factor—that public figures
assume the risk of being defamed by participating in public controversies—is questionable. It is
also questionable whether this factor has much relevance to corporate defamation cases. See,
e.g., Martin Marietta, 417 F. Supp. at 955 (“It makes no sense to apply these standards to a corporation, which, regardless of its activities, never has a private life to lose.”).
285. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 258 (1998)
(“Corporations invariably will possess both the economic incentive and resources to express
their views effectively and persuasively.”).
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message board on which the message first appeared.286 The corporation can also issue press releases to counteract any defamatory statements, and many publicly held corporations can even finance intensive media campaigns to rehabilitate a damaged corporate reputation.
Although the corporation’s access to “self-help”287 remedies for
defamation suggests that it should be treated as a public figure, it is
somewhat harder to argue in the typical John Doe case that the corporate plaintiff “thrust [it]self to the forefront of [a] particular public
controvers[y].”288 The “public controversy”289 at issue ordinarily will
be a topic that affects the corporation’s stock price: it may be as diffuse a subject as the overall financial health of the corporation or as
specific as a particular venture on which the company has embarked
or a particular corporate decision. The problem with applying this
analysis to the John Doe cases is that they do not tend to involve a
“controversy”290 but rather a subject of discussion.291

286. Several commentators have argued that all participants in Internet discussion fora
should be treated as public figures, because the Internet gives a defamed party the ability to rebut the allegedly defamatory statement relatively quickly. See GODWIN, supra note 154, at 82
(arguing in support of his “access to self-help” argument that, “[i]f some bozo writes one hundred lines of false statement and innuendo about your sex life or personal habits, you can write
five hundred lines of point-by-point refutation”); Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 237 (1995) (arguing that “libel plaintiffs who
have been defamed by bulletin board speech and who have both access to the bulletin board on
which the defamatory material appeared and a history of participating on the bulletin board are
functionally equivalent to public figures”). Although corporations have the same access to this
remedy as other Internet users, the corporation has more credibility and authority in rebutting
the defamatory statement than will the typical victim of defamation.
287. Gertz, 418 U.S at 344 n.9.
288. Id. at 345. This Article’s ultimate analysis does not hinge on whether the corporation is
a public or private figure. If I am correct that the actual malice standard applied to public figures provides insufficient protection to John Doe, the argument is even stronger with regard to
the negligence standard applied to private figures.
289. A “public controversy” is one that has ramifications for more than just the parties involved. See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1544 (4th Cir. 1994). Typically,
the public controversy “must have existed prior to the [publication of the defamatory] statements.” See, e.g., Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 702 N.E.2d
149, 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
290. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defining “public controversy” as ”not simply a matter of interest to the public,” but as “a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable
way”); Gannett Co. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1985) (defining a public controversy as “‘a
dispute . . . between sides holding opposite views’” (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language)). Indeed, Robert Sack and Sandra Baron have criticized courts that
rigidly adhere to the requirement that there be a particular controversy, arguing that the more
important factor is whether the plaintiff voluntarily involved itself in a public issue. See SACK &
BARON, supra note 78, § 5.6.2.2, at 316.
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Despite the lack of a true “controversy,” the justifications for
treating a publicly held corporation as a public figure for purposes of
Internet discussions of its financial well-being are compelling.292 All
corporations have an interest in convincing the public of their financial well-being,293 but publicly held corporations are more likely to
“invite attention and comment”294 on their business dealings and affairs by their affirmative acts. Publicly held corporations must make
an affirmative decision to “take the company public” in order to solicit money from investors. In making the decision to “go public,” the
corporation seeks and often obtains national attention.295 The corporation also voluntarily submits itself both to extensive legal regulation
(including public disclosure requirements)296 and to a degree of public
scrutiny297 in order to obtain “the special benefits conferred by the
corporate structure.”298 Moreover, corporations have a vested interest
291. See SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 5.3.8, at 274-75 (observing courts have found that
“the public nature of a corporation’s business does not necessarily render it a public figure absent a preexisting “controversy” about the entity or its products or services, irrespective of
whether the entity is offering goods or services to the public, is publicly owned, or is in a regulated industry” (footnote omitted)).
292. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding
that a large publicly held company is a public figure and that information concerning such a
company’s financial status should be communicated as freely as other public issues); Fotochrome, Inc. v. New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 305 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)
(“There is no less interest in, nor less of a need for information concerning, the stock market in
general or the successes, failures or manipulations of specific corporations in which thousands of
people have invested their personal fortunes, than there is in basketball, football, crime or public health.”); SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 5.3.8, at 273 (arguing that “[d]ecisions holding
that any publicly held corporation is a public figure for purposes of commentary about its corporate affairs are persuasive”).
293. However, this does not automatically turn corporations into public figures. See Snead v.
Redland Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that it is impossible to
conclude from corporate status alone that corporations have “thrust themselves into the public
eye”).
294. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
295. See, e.g., Snead, 998 F.2d at 1329 (suggesting that the notoriety of a corporation is a
relevant factor in determining whether it is a public figure).
296. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-.404 (1999).
297. See SACK & BARRON, supra note 78, § 5.3.8, at 274. The degree of media scrutiny has
intensified in the last few years with the development of television networks devoted to the coverage of business issues. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 201 (1996) (noting that “highlypaid CEOs attract media attention”); Edward D. Rogers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 777, 799 (1994) (arguing that “public
scrutiny” of “corporate decisional processes” is minimal compared to the scrutiny given to government decisionmaking); see also ROBERT LAMB ET AL., BUSINESS, MEDIA, AND THE LAW:
THE TROUBLED CONFLUENCE 27 (1980) (lamenting that “most business people have been slow
or reluctant to develop the instinct for the camera angle and the newsmaking stunt that their
counterparts in politics and sports have acquired”).
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in fostering discussion of their stock valuation amongst investors and
potential investors who frequent financial message boards. Many corporations even monitor board discussions, and they may sometimes
take an active role in shaping the discussion to their benefit.299 Given
that Internet message boards are dedicated to discussion of business
activities voluntarily undertaken by corporations, courts should ordinarily treat corporations as having assumed the risk of hard-hitting
debate and criticism of their activities.
3. Public Concern and Financial Discourse. The last
determinant of the level of protection John Doe’s speech will receive
is whether the speech deals with a matter of public concern or a
matter of only private concern. The Supreme Court grants extensive
First Amendment protection from defamation claims only to “speech
on matters of public concern.”300 If this Article is correct in predicting
that many plaintiffs in the new John Doe libel cases will be public
figures, it follows almost automatically that the cases will also involve
matters of public concern.301 Even if the plaintiff is a private figure,

298. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990). These include
“limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets.” Id. at 658-59. The Court also noted that “[t]hese state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.’” Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)).
299. See Moss, supra note 4.
300. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 749 (1985) (plurality). The Supreme Court has “long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance.” Id. at 758. Speech involving matters of purely private concern receives little, if any,
First Amendment protection. See id. at 749. Even speech involving matters of public concern
does not receive the highest level of protection unless it also involves a public figure plaintiff.
Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350-51 (1974) (holding that, while a private
figure plaintiff involved in a matter of public concern may not recover punitive damages absent
a showing of actual malice, that plaintiff may recover for actual injury upon a showing of negligence), with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (affirming that public
officials must prove actual malice in order to recover against critics of their official conduct).
301. The Supreme Court’s cases make it clear that establishing the existence of a “public
controversy” is more difficult than establishing the existence of a “matter of public concern.”
See Drechsel, supra note 267, at 16 (explaining that “courts appear to be holding that defamatory expression about a public figure or public official is inherently a matter of public concern”);
see also, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (finding no controversy sufficient
to make a public figure of a scientist who was publicly criticized by a Senator, despite the fact
that the subject of the criticism was of general public concern); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 457 (1976) (finding no controversy and pointing out that individuals should not lose the
ability to sue for defamation simply because of their presence in court); Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989) (expressing “doubt that it is possible to have
speech about a public figure” that is “not of public concern”).
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however, defendants like John Doe should still receive a high degree
of First Amendment protection because their speech will typically
involve matters of public concern.
Discussion of the financial health of a publicly held company
listed on a national stock exchange would certainly be a matter of
public concern if it appeared in the Wall Street Journal, a Bloomberg
302
News report, or a CNBC broadcast. Yet, the very same discussion
may not be of public concern when it occurs on a financial bulletin
board in cyberspace. Whether speech deals with a matter of public
concern is not judged by its subject matter alone, but by its “content,
form and context.”303 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build304
ers, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court deemed a report about
the financial health of a corporation to be of only private concern,305
although the facts and the reasoning of the case suggest that matters
of truly private concern should be rare. Dun & Bradstreet, a credit
reporting service, erroneously reported to five of its subscribers that a
corporation was bankrupt; however, the five subscribers who received
the report were contractually bound not to reveal the contents to
anyone else.306 The Court upheld a jury award in favor of the defamed
corporation for $50,000 in presumed damages and $300,000 in punitive damages,307 even though the corporation failed to show that Dun
& Bradstreet published the report with actual malice.308 Although the
Supreme Court did not spell out the practical implications of the decision, the reasoning suggests that the state’s strong interest in protecting the reputations of private figures might well justify imposing strict
liability on defamation involving issues of private concern, and indeed
this interpretation has persuaded many commentators that defendants receive no special constitutional protections in this type of case.
The new John Doe cases, however, are distinguishable from Dun
& Bradstreet on a number of grounds. A key factor in the Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet was that the credit report at issue involved
302. Although “[s]peech about commercial or economic matters” takes a back seat to political speech in the First Amendment hierarchy, the Supreme Court has nonetheless acknowledged that economic speech is “an important part of our public discourse.” Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
303. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
304. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality).
305. See id. at 762 (plurality); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring).
306. See id. at 751 (plurality).
307. See id. at 752, 763.
308. See id. at 763.
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“speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific
business audience.”309 Almost by definition, the credit report could
not contribute to “the free flow of commercial information” because
the “audience” for the speech consisted of only five paid subscribers
who were contractually bound not to disseminate the information
more widely.310 A second factor that the Court emphasized was that
the report merited no “special protection” due to its “hardy” nature.311 Because credit reporting agencies like Dun & Bradstreet have
a powerful market incentive both to continue publishing credit reports and to verify the accuracy of such reports, the Court thought it
unlikely that imposing defamation liability for false reports would
unduly chill credit reporting agencies from producing them.312
Neither of these factors is present in the typical John Doe case.
In contrast to the speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet, the John Doe
cases involve speech that contributes, albeit modestly,313 to the free
flow of financial information and that is particularly susceptible to
being chilled by libel suits. First, unlike the credit report in Dun &
Bradstreet, messages posted on financial bulletin boards reach a large
national and even international audience. Of course, one might still
argue that, regardless of the size of the audience, most of those who
follow the message board for a particular corporation will be investors or potential investors who have self-interested motives for following the discussion. However, this argument overstates the extent
to which the message boards involve speech that is “solely in the individual interest of the speaker and [his] specific business audience.”314
As argued in Section II.C, publicly held corporations play a vital role
in shaping both the United States economy and the lives of ordinary
citizens.315 The financial message boards can be a useful source of information about the financial health of publicly held corporations,
and they can provide an informal education to investors and nonin-

309. Id. at 762.
310. Id. Justice Brennan was probably correct in stating that this peculiar feature of the Dun
& Bradstreet case was the key factor in the plurality’s determination that the defendant’s speech
was only of private concern, since by the terms of the contract the speech could not affect the
flow of commercial information generally. See id. at 786 n.12. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (theorizing that “it may well be that this element of confidentiality is crucial to the outcome” of Justice Powell’s plurality opinion).
311. Id. at 762.
312. See id. at 762-63.
313. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text.
314. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
315. See supra notes 274-99 and accompanying text.
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vestors alike about financial matters more generally. But most significantly, the boards allow ordinary citizens to participate, however
marginally, in corporate decisionmaking, and they enhance the ability
of citizens to make informed decisions on matters of economic policy.
To the extent, therefore, that discourse on the boards affects corporate decisionmaking or even political decisions on economic matters,
it has the potential to affect all citizens. The powerful democratizing
effect of the boards gives corporations a reason to fear them, but it
also justifies treating discourse on the board as involving a matter of
public concern.
The threat libel suits pose to John Does who contribute to financial message boards bolsters the argument for treating such discussions as a matter of public concern. Unlike the credit report at issue in
Dun & Bradstreet, the speech of individual posters to Internet discussion boards is not likely to be especially “hardy.” Although a shareholder of a corporation may have some financial self-interest in following discussion of the corporation on a financial bulletin board, the
shareholder has no financial interest in contributing to the discussion
(unless, perhaps, she is planning to try to “hype” the stock to drive up
its price, behavior which in some cases is illegal).316 Because John Doe
has no financial incentive to speak, he likely will find it easier to engage in self-censorship than to risk being sued for libel. Being sued is
not a risk John Doe can easily avoid. It is no simple matter for John
Doe to “objectively verify” every piece of information about a corporation before publishing it, and, even if he kept a staff of factcheckers, much of the information published on the boards is inherently speculative in nature, even where it appears to be couched in
the form of “facts.” John Doe’s contribution to public discourse may
therefore by silenced by strict application of defamation law. Given
this threat, it seems clear that, even in cases involving private figure
plaintiffs, John Does should ordinarily receive at least some level of
First Amendment protection.
D. The Inadequacies of the Actual Malice Standard
Even if a court were to conclude that the corporate plaintiffs in
the new Internet libel actions should be treated as public figures, corporations might still be able to use libel suits to intimidate John Doe
316. Moreover, it may be the more sophisticated or knowledgeable posters who will be deterred by the threat of being sued for libel, since such posters may be more capable of understanding the true magnitude of the threat.
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and others like him into silence, since the actual malice standard is
not responsive to the distinctive problems raised by these new cases.317
In addition to proving the common law elements of a libel action,
public figure plaintiffs must also prove that the defendant’s statements were false318 and that the defendant made them with actual
malice—that is, with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.319
The actual malice standard is designed to prevent juries from imposing crippling liability on unpopular defendants for minor mistakes of
fact.320 Negligent, and even grossly negligent, publication of defama317. I discuss the application of only the actual malice standard in the John Doe cases, but
my argument—that the standard is not adequately responsive to the problems raised by the
John Doe cases—applies with equal, if not more, force to the application of a negligence or
strict liability standard.
318. Truth ordinarily was a defense at common law. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, §
116, at 839.
319. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (defining “actual malice” to require a showing of “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74
(1964) (defining “actual malice” as a “high degree of awareness of [the] probable falsity” of
one’s statements); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a
public official plaintiff must prove “that the [defendant’s] statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not”). Actual malice is a term of art in defamation law and should not be confused with
common law malice, a state of mind often defined as “spite, hostility, or deliberate intention to
harm.” Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974) (indicating that actual
malice is a “term of art” in defamation law); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 n.6
(1974) (defining “reckless disregard” as “subjective awareness of probable falsity”); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970) (reversing a libel verdict because the trial
court had misdefined “actual malice,” equating it with common law malice). It is also worth
noting that “reckless disregard” as a constitutional standard “is virtually unrelated to ‘recklessness’ in the popular sense of gross negligence or wanton behavior.” SACK & BARON, supra note
78, § 5.5.1, at 277.
320. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan involved this very threat. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 28082. Sullivan’s defamation action against the Times arose from a paid advertisement it published
critical of the conduct of Alabama government officials. See id. at 256-57. Sullivan, the police
commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, claimed that the advertisement had defamed him because it accused the Montgomery police of harassing civil rights demonstrators, and he promptly
sued the Times and four black ministers listed as endorsing the advertisement, for a total of
$500,000 in damages. See id. at 256-57. Sullivan was able to press his claim successfully under
Alabama common law because the advertisement concededly contained a number of minor factual inaccuracies, which the Times could have discovered had it checked its own files before
publishing the article (although, in fairness, the hostile southern jury might very well have found
against the defendants in any event). See id. at 261, 263. Under Alabama law, these factual inaccuracies were enough to deprive the defendants of any defenses or privileges, because they
could not prove that the published facts were “true in all [their] factual particulars,” even
though they were substantially true. Id. at 279. The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000, see id. at
256, and, by the time the Supreme Court decided the Sullivan case, another southern jury had
awarded a $500,000 verdict against the Times based on the same advertisement, and suits seeking a total of $2 million were still pending, see id. at 278 n.18. Given that the $500,000 verdict in
Sullivan was, at the time, the largest libel verdict in history, the Supreme Court rightly feared
that libel suits were being used as a potent weapon to intimidate into silence those who would
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tory falsehoods is protected, at least in cases involving public officials
or public figures; it is only intentional or reckless falsehoods that
subject a defendant to liability.
The rationale for protecting negligent falsehoods is not that they
are valuable in and of themselves. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly said that there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.321 The reason for protecting negligent falsehoods is
to ensure a measure of breathing space around constitutionally valuable speech. As the Supreme Court recognized, “erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate.”322 Without a breathing space around such
erroneous statement, the threat of libel suits would cause “would-be
critics” to be overly cautious due to “doubt whether [their statements]
can be proved true or fear of the expense of having to do so.” In New
York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny, therefore, the Supreme Court
crafted a standard designed to protect the inevitable erroneous statement (i.e., a negligent erroneous statement) from liability. The implicit assumption underlying the standard seems to be that intentional
or reckless falsehoods will be rare and that the ordinary case will, like
323
Sullivan itself, involve only negligent falsehoods.
This assumption makes a great deal of sense when applied to
those who publish in the institutional media, particularly the institutional press. Reporters have both professional and market incentives
to publish accurate information, and the media have institutional
mechanisms designed to ensure the accuracy of the information they
publish. But it is not entirely clear how the actual malice standard

report on the civil rights movement. See id. at 300-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court therefore reversed the verdicts, holding that the First Amendment prohibits states from
imposing liability for defamation unless the public official plaintiff proves actual malice with
convincing clarity. See id. at 283. Conceding that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,” the Court thought the actual malice standard necessary to provide the “breathing space”
necessary to ensure that public debate remain “uninhibited, robust and wide-open.” Id. at 27072.
321. See id. at 271-72.
322. Id. at 271.
323. Commentators have criticized the actual malice standard as applied to media defendants because its focus on the defendant’s state of mind results in expensive and intrusive discovery and because it results in undue judicial interference with the editorial process. See Brian
C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73
N.C. L. REV. 7, 11-12 (1994) (arguing that, “by permitting the use of circumstantial evidence of
journalistic behavior to prove the journalist’s state of mind [on the issue of actual malice], the
Sullivan rule has spawned a de facto set of judge-made standards that covers all aspects of journalistic behavior”); see also Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the
Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 453 (1984) (proposing that courts clarify the standard as one of “generally accepted journalistic practices”).
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would apply to the typical John Doe who posts on financial bulletin
boards. The Supreme Court’s examples of what constitutes actual
malice are geared to the investigative practices of the institutional
press.324 In order for a plaintiff to establish actual malice, “[t]here
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”325 Actual malice may be found, for example, where the defendant invents a story, bases it on “an unverified anonymous telephone
call,” publishes information “so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put [it] in circulation,” or where the defendant publishes despite “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of [an]
informant or the accuracy of his reports.”328
Except for stories based on pure fabrication (like Krum’s statements that he was having an affair with the wife of HealthSouth’s
CEO), these examples have little to do with the process John Doe
goes through before posting to a message board. The typical John
Doe does not get his information from interviews with informants or
even from direct perusal of primary sources.329 Instead, John Doe’s information is likely to be based on secondary sources or on rumors
started by other John Does. The typical John Doe will have no special
training in determining the credibility of his information sources. Nor
will he have a staff to check his facts before publishing, an editor to
peruse his post for problems, and a lawyer on retainer to advise him
of the complexities of libel law. No professional ethic impels him to
be accurate.330 In fact, as previously argued,331 the culture of the boards
encourages just the opposite. The boards prize speed over accuracy
324. Some have argued that the fact that mere failure to investigate cannot constitute actual
malice encourages journalists not to verify questionable sources, because verification might
make it easier for a plaintiff to prove that the journalist had “a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity.” See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-12,
at 871 (2d ed. 1988) (claiming that, “[i]n the world of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, ignorance
is bliss”); William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and
Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 185. Professors Marshall and Gilles have speculated
that the reason the Supreme Court refused to hold that mere failure to investigate constitutes
actual malice is that the actual malice standard must be applied to media and nonmedia defendants alike. See id. at 205.
325. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
328. Id. at 732.
329. See supra notes 23-34, 121-28 and accompanying text.
330. A good text on the ethics of professional journalists is JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING
ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE STUDIES (1997).
331. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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on the assumption that the reader will be able to sort reason from
rhetoric and fact from fiction.
What this evidence suggests is that John Doe is more likely than
the average media defendant to be reckless—perhaps indifferent is a
better description—with regard to the accuracy of the facts he publishes on Internet financial bulletin boards. Therefore, it may be relatively easy for plaintiffs to establish actual malice.332 But an alternative, and more convincing, explanation is possible. Rather than
regarding John Does as more apt than their media counterparts to be
reckless with regard to facts, it may be that both John Doe and his
online audience view most of his commentary as rhetorical hyperbole
or subjective speculation rather than a sober recitation of actual facts.
This alternative explanation also suggests an alternative avenue of
First Amendment protection for John Doe’s speech: the opinion
privilege.
III. PROTECTING JOHN DOE: ADAPTING THE OPINION PRIVILEGE
TO CYBERSPACE
The First Amendment extends a privilege to statements that do
not imply an assertion of objective fact, either because such statements “cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts’” or
because such statements are not provably false.333 This privilege, the
opinion privilege,334 has the potential to protect Internet discourse
from wealthy and powerful plaintiffs who attempt to use defamation
law to intimidate their online critics into silence. Courts can deploy
the opinion privilege at the earliest stages of a defamation action,335
early enough to prevent even impecunious defendants from engaging
332. This Article advocates extending additional First Amendment protection to those who
post on Internet message boards, despite the fact that these posters may be more apt to publish
inaccurate information than the average media defendant. Although some would argue that the
law should provide more, rather than fewer, incentives for Internet users to “look before they
speak,” this Article argues that such an approach would jeopardize the viability of the Internet
as a medium of communication for “ordinary” speakers. In essence, this Article argues that the
speech in Internet message boards has more affinity with informal verbal communication than it
does with formal written communication and that the law should take notice of the conventions
of the medium in determining whether any individual message is defamatory.
333. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
334. Although Milkovich rejected a “wholesale defamation exemption” for opinion, id. at
18, it is fair to say that Milkovich did not abolish the opinion privilege but redefined it. See infra
notes 356-405 and accompanying text.
335. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 507 (perceiving that this rule could be used in a motion
to dismiss or in an early summary judgment motion).
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in undue self-censorship. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal,336 however,
the Supreme Court threw the opinion privilege into such disarray that
it may lack the sensitivity necessary to protect the type of online
commentary at issue in the new Internet libel cases.337 Even so, Milkovich need not hinder lower courts in taking the necessary steps to
adapt the opinion privilege to cyberspace, a task for which this part
gives practical guidance.
A. The Opinion Privilege in the Lower Courts, Post-Gertz and PreMilkovich
In Gertz v. Robert Welch,338 the Supreme Court observed in a
now famous dictum, “Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas.”339 Lower courts seized this dictum as evidence that opinion, traditionally protected by the common
law privilege of fair comment,340 deserved expansive First Amendment protection.341 The constitutional privilege for opinion soon came
to be a powerful defense to counter the chilling effects of libel ac336. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
337. Although the new John Doe cases highlight the deeper flaws in the opinion privilege,
this Article is restricted to consideration of the narrower problems raised by the John Doe
cases.
338. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
339. Id. at 339-40.
340. The Restatement (First) of Torts reflects one common formulation of the fair comment
privilege. Under this approach, opinion is protected if (1) it involves a matter of legitimate public interest, (2) it is based on true or privileged facts available to the audience, (3) it represents
the actual opinion of the speaker, and (4) it was not made solely for the purpose of harming the
plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606(1) (1938); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 35, § 566 cmt. b (christening this form of opinion the “pure type” and contrasting it with
the “mixed type”).
341. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that “Gertz elevated to constitutional principle the distinction between fact and opinion, which at common law
had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair comment”); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 35,
§ 566 cmt. c (assuming that the opinion privilege obviated the need for the common law fair
comment privilege); Anderson, supra note 89, at 507 (noting that, because most courts viewed
Gertz as granting constitutional protection to opinion, the opinion privilege was “the fastestgrowing body of defamation law in the 1980s”); David A. Logan, Of “Sloppy Journalism,”
“Corporate Tyranny,” and Mea Culpas: The Curious Case of Moldea v. New York Times, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 163 (1995) (explaining that “[b]y 1990 every federal circuit and the
courts of at least thirty-six states and the District of Columbia recognized that a statement of
opinion was absolutely protected” based on the Gertz dictum); Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of
Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 468 (1994) (noting that
“lower courts construed [the Gertz dictum] as articulating a broad, First Amendment immunity
for the expression of opinion”).
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tions. Unlike other constitutional privileges, the opinion privilege
could be deployed as early as the filing of a motion to dismiss,342
thereby safeguarding even impecunious defendants from much of the
chilling effect of being sued for defamation.
“Opinion,” in the ordinary, nonlegal sense of the term, includes
statements couched in loose, figurative, or vituperative language,
statements that are purely subjective expressions of the speaker’s
point of view, and statements that contain “deductions from known
data or personal observation.”343 Although a prior Supreme Court decision gave lower courts a mandate to protect hyperbole and vituperation,344 the Supreme Court’s enigmatic dictum in Gertz did not indicate whether all types of opinion are equally deserving of First
Amendment protection. Moreover, the Gertz dictum did not give
lower courts any guidance in separating fact from opinion,345 a challenging task under the best of circumstances.346
342. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 507 (explaining that “[w]hether the defamatory statement was opinion often could be determined from the publication itself, or with a minimum of
discovery” and that the privilege “therefore could be invoked by a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action or by an early summary judgment motion”).
343. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Curbing the High Price of Loose Talk, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 359, 398-99 (1985). Professor Zimmerman argues that there are three types of language
that might be classed as opinion: (1) “[l]oose, figurative language”; (2) the “articulation of subjective and normative judgments”; and (3) “deductions from known data or personal observation.” Id. Professor Sowle, on the other hand, seems to include “vituperation and rhetoric” as
separate categories, although she notes that “[o]pinion, vituperation, and rhetoric are not mutually exclusive speech categories.” Sowle, supra note 341, at 470-71. Professor Sowle follows
Dean Keeton’s distinction between deductive and evaluative opinions. An “evaluative opinion”
is one that is not provable as true or false. See W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the
Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1249-59 (1976). A “deductive opinion” is one that “is provable as
true or false on the basis of objective evidence.” Sowle, supra note 341, at 474.
344. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that the use
of the term “blackmail” to describe a public figure plaintiff’s negotiating tactics was not defamatory in the context of heated public discussion regarding a zoning dispute because “the word
was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [plaintiff’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable”). In Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), which was decided the same term as Gertz, the Supreme Court held
that, in the context of a labor dispute, the use of Jack London’s definition of a “scab” as a “traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class” was “merely rhetorical hyperbole” and
therefore protected under federal labor law. Id. at 268, 286.
345. See Nat Stern, Defamation, Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the
Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REV. 595, 601 (1990) (noting this lack of guidance).
346. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (concluding that
separating fact from opinion is “by no means as easy a question as might appear at first blush”);
SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 4.1, at 201 (“No task undertaken under the law of defamation
is any more elusive than distinguishing between fact and opinion.”); SANFORD, supra note 7, §
5.1, at 133 (2d ed. 1991) (criticizing lower courts’ early attempts to separate fact from opinion);
Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussell, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 869-85 (1984); Herbert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus
Statement of Opinion—A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962);
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Left to their own devices, the lower courts developed various approaches to this critical task.347 The most influential approach was that
put forth in Ollman v. Evans,348 an en banc decision of the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Ollman decision
was a thoughtful exposition of the difficulties of distinguishing fact
from opinion. Writing for the court,349 then-Judge Kenneth Starr designated four factors that, when considered along with the “totality of
the circumstances,”350 should guide courts in distinguishing fact from
opinion: (1) “the common usage or meaning of the specific language
of the challenged statements itself”; (2) “the statement’s verifiability”;351 (3) the linguistic context of the statement;352 and (4) “the
broader [social] context or setting in which the statement appears.”353
Although the Ollman multifactor approach did not obviate the need
for courts to grapple with complex interpretive issues, the factors at
least guided courts in making rational judgments separating fact from
opinion.354 Yet, just when courts appeared to be reaching consensus

Zimmerman, supra note 344, at 400 (identifying the difficulty of separating fact from opinion
and noting that “the distinction between fact and opinion has plagued the courts since the introduction of a qualified privilege for fair comment created some protection for ideas”). Although
many commentators have decried the difficulty of separating fact from opinion, few deny the
importance of extending constitutional protection to statements of opinion. Difficult or not,
therefore, courts must undertake the task.
347. See 2 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 5.7(D), at
580-81 (1999) (collecting cases).
348. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
349. Seven separate opinions were filed in the case. See id.
350. See id. at 979.
351. A statement is verifiable if it is “capable of being objectively characterized as true or
false.” Id.
352. See id. at 985. In other words, the linguistic context is “the full context of the statement—the entire article or column.” Id.
353. Id. at 979; see also id. (“Different types of writing have . . . widely varying social conventions which signal to the reader the likelihood of a statement’s being either fact or opinion.”); id. at 982 (noting that “the context to be considered is both narrowly linguistic and
broadly social”).
354. Although, as this Article contends, the Ollman approach has much to recommend it,
Bruce Sanford, author of one of the leading treatises on defamation law, probably goes too far
in describing the Ollman approach “as a nationwide beacon for a reasoned distinction between
opinion and fact.” SANFORD, supra note 7, at § 5.1, 34 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999); cf. Sowle,
supra note 341, at 469 (observing that the Ollman approach “failed to produce predictable outcomes”); Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 762 (1990) (noting that application of the Ollman
factors leads courts to reach “strikingly varied outcomes” depending on which of the four factors weighs most heavily in the analysis).
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on a method for applying a constitutional opinion privilege, the Supreme Court stepped in and threw the entire area into disarray.355
B. Milkovich Throws the Opinion Privilege into Disarray
After leaving the lower courts to grapple with formulating a constitutional opinion privilege for sixteen years, the Supreme Court finally took up the issue in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.356 The
plaintiff in Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach from Maple
Heights, Ohio, whose team was involved in a fight that broke out
during a wrestling match.357 After a hearing in which Coach Milkovich
and his superintendent testified, the Ohio High School Athletic Association (“OHSAA”) censured Milkovich, placed his team on probation and declared the team ineligible for the state tournament because of their role in the altercation.358 Subsequently, several wrestlers
and their parents sued, claiming that the OHSAA proceeding violated due process.359 The judge agreed and, after a hearing in which
both Milkovich and his superintendent again testified, overturned the
OHSAA probation and ineligibility orders.360
The next day, the defendant, Thomas Diadiun, a sports columnist, harshly criticized Milkovich’s role in the altercation and his testimony in the court proceeding.361 The heading for Diadiun’s “TD
Says” column that day read, “Maple beat the law with the ‘big lie.’”362
In the body of the column, Diadiun made it clear that he had attended both the match at which the brawl had taken place and the
OHSAA hearing.363 Diadiun then wrote:
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights,
Mentor [the rival team], or impartial observer, knows in his heart
that Milkovich and [Superintendent] Scott lied at the [court] hearing
after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.

355. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 507 (stating that the opinion privilege died with the
Court’s decision in Milkovich); Stern, supra note 345, at 595 (observing that the Milkovich decision “cast doubt on the vitality of hundreds of lower court cases decided in ‘mistaken reliance’”
on the Gertz dictum).
356. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
357. See id. at 3-4.
358. See id. at 4.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 4-5.
362. Id. at 5.
363. See id. at 4-5.
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But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from
their high school administrators and coaches?
I think not.

364

Milkovich and Scott both sued for defamation, alleging that
Diadiun’s column accused them of perjury.365 While Milkovich’s suit
was ongoing, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a grant of summary
judgment against Scott.366 Applying Ollman’s four-factor analysis, the
Ohio Supreme Court determined that the context of the column negated the impression that Diadiun was asserting that Scott had actually committed perjury; therefore, the column was deemed “constitutionally protected opinion.”367 Subsequently, the Ohio Court of
Appeals upheld a grant of summary judgment against Milkovich, concluding that it was bound by the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in
Scott’s case.368
In a stinging rejection of the Ollman approach, the United States
Supreme Court reversed.369 The Supreme Court chastised the lower
courts for misreading Gertz “to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’”370 For the Supreme Court, the operative distinction was not that drawn by the
lower courts between fact and opinion; instead, the operative distinction was between statements that imply an assertion of objective facts
and those that do not.371 The Court rejected the fact/opinion distinction as “artificial” because a statement of opinion will often imply the
existence of objective facts and such implicit assertions of fact can
harm reputation just as much as explicit assertions of fact. Hence, the

364. Id. at 5 n.2 (citation omitted).
365. See id. at 6-7.
366. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986).
367. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
540 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1989), rev’d sub nom., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
368. See id.
369. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23.
370. See id. at 18 (noting that the lower courts developed a number of factors for separating
fact from opinion “in what we hold was a mistaken reliance on the Gertz dictum”). The Milkovich Court interpreted the Gertz dictum as “merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes [sic] classic
‘marketplace of ideas’ concept.” Id.; see also Stern, supra note 346, at 617 (arguing that the
Court “assailed a caricature of the approach practiced by the vast majority of courts”).
371. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18 (concluding that opinion should not be protected if it implies “an assertion of objective fact”).
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Court declared that the statement “‘In my opinion Jones is a liar’”
can be just as damaging to the reputation of Jones as the statement
“‘Jones is a liar.’”372 The first statement may imply a false assertion of
fact because it invites the audience to assume that unstated defamatory facts undergird the author’s assertion. Moreover, even if the
author states the underlying facts on which her conclusion is based,
she should still be liable if the underlying facts are incorrect or incomplete, or if she draws erroneous conclusions from them.373 The
Court therefore rejected the proposition that defamatory statements
should be protected as long as it is clear that they reflect the author’s
point of view, or as long as they state accurately the facts on which
they are based.374 Such statements are nonetheless actionable if they
imply factual assertions that are defamatory and untrue.
Despite the Court’s rejection of the “artificial dichotomy”375 between fact and opinion, the Supreme Court did not reject the notion
that the First Amendment requires a measure of protection for opinion on matters of public concern.376 Instead, the Court found adequate

372. Id. at 19.
373. See id.
374. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, opinion was actionable “only if it implie[d]
the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 566 illus. 4 & 5. Although this approach seems similar to that adopted in Milkovich, the drafters of the Restatement would have protected opinion that accurately stated the
facts on which it was based. See id. As Professor Sowle points out, “cogent policy considerations” support this approach. Sowle, supra note 341, at 487. The audience can evaluate the
speaker’s opinion together with the facts and “judge for themselves the soundness of the
speaker’s viewpoint.” Id. at 489. The Milkovich approach, however, would still hold the speaker
liable for drawing an erroneous conclusion from stated facts. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
An erroneous conclusion would be one that was provably false. See Sowle, supra note 341, at
490. Although the Court did not elaborate on the reason for rejecting the Restatement approach,
presumably the Court feared that “erroneous conclusions” drawn from underlying facts could
harm an individual’s reputation because some audience members would give undue weight to
the conclusions rather than to the underlying facts themselves.
375. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
376. This point is worth stressing because it is easy to misread the Court’s opinion as rejecting the constitutional opinion privilege entirely. In rejecting the argument that “an additional
separate constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’ is required to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment,” id. at 21, the Court was not saying that opinion receives
no First Amendment protection, but rather that existing constitutional protections were adequate to the task without using the misleading label “opinion,” see id. at 19. The words “additional” and “separate” in the sentence quoted above thus appear to be redundant, and the
original sentence quoted in its entirety is even more redundant: “We are not persuaded that, in
addition to these protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’ is required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id. at 21.
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protection for opinion—that is, statements that do not imply an assertion of objective fact—in existing First Amendment doctrine.377
Of the doctrines identified by the Court,378 two stand out as being
relevant to whether a defamatory statement implies an assertion of
objective fact. First is the doctrine that requires both public figure and
private figure plaintiffs to bear the burden of proving falsity in all
defamation actions involving matters of public concern,379 a requirement imposed by the Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
380
Hepps. This requirement protects opinion, as the Court defined it,
because statements not capable of being proved false are not actionable as implied assertions of objective fact. Put another way, a statement on a matter of public concern that is not provably false is one
type of constitutionally protected opinion.381
A second type of statement that does not imply an assertion of
objective fact—and is therefore constitutionally protected—is a
statement that “cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual
facts’ about an individual.”382 The Court gleaned this principle from a
line of prior cases protecting rhetorical hyperbole, satire, and parody.383 The first of these cases, Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
384
Ass’n v. Bresler, was the earliest Supreme Court case to suggest that
opinion deserves some constitutional protection. In Bresler, a real es-

377. See id. at 19 (finding that “existing constitutional doctrine” gives adequate breathing
space to freedom of expression “without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between ‘opinion’ and fact”).
378. According to the Court, there are four existing doctrinal requirements that safeguard
opinion: (1) the requirement that plaintiffs prove falsity in defamation actions aimed at speech
of public concern; (2) the requirement that the defendant not be held liable for speech “that
cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts”; (3) the requirement that plaintiffs
prove that the defendant was at fault with regard to the falsity of his speech on a matter of public concern; and (4) the requirement that appellate courts independently review determinations
of fault. Id. at 20-21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
379. See id.
380. 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding that “the common-law presumption that defamatory
speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for
speech of public concern”).
381. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
382. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
383. See id. at 17, 20 (analyzing Bresler and Letter Carriers); see also Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57
(stating that, because a parody of Reverend Falwell was “not reasonably believable,” it thus
could not form the basis for an award of damages); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n
of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285-86 (1974) (claiming that the term “scab,” as used,
was rhetorical hyperbole and was “protected by federal law”); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1970) (finding that the word “blackmail” would have been perceived
as rhetorical hyperbole by “even the most careless reader”).
384. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
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tate developer involved in negotiations with the city council sued a
newspaper for publishing that some citizens “had characterized [his]
negotiating position as ‘blackmail.’”385 The Supreme Court held, however, that the First Amendment barred imposing defamation liability
because “even the most careless reader” would have interpreted the
term “blackmail” as “no more than rhetorical hyperbole,”386 at least
where the term “blackmail” arose in the context of a heated public
debate over zoning.387 Although the Bresler Court did not frame its
analysis in terms of protecting “opinion,” the decision nonetheless
constitutes strong authority for protecting statements that, while
seemingly factual on their face, cannot be construed as stating actual
facts when read in context.
This reading of Bresler was confirmed by the Court in No. 496,
388
National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, a case in which the defendant union members labeled the plaintiffs as “scabs” and then invoked Jack London’s famous definition of a “scab” as a “traitor to his
God, his country, his family and his class.”389 Emphasizing that the
statement occurred in the context of a labor dispute, the Court found
that the defendants had not accused plaintiffs of treason, but had
merely employed the words “in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union’s disagreement with the views of those workers [like
plaintiffs] who oppose unionization.”390
391
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell presents a more recent statement of this principle. Falwell involved an action of intentional infliction for emotional distress stemming from a highly offensive advertisement parody suggesting that the Reverend Jerry Falwell had sex
with his mother in an outhouse.392 The Court viewed the parody at is-

385. Id. at 7.
386. Id. at 14.
387. See id. at 13.
388. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
389. Id. at 268.
390. Id. at 284. The Court found that federal labor law protects “[e]xpression of such an
opinion.” Id. Letter Carriers was based on federal labor law rather than tort law, but the opinion
made clear that the Court’s analysis was dictated by First Amendment concerns. See id. at 28082.
391. 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17, 20 (analyzing Falwell).
392. In Falwell, the plaintiff sued for both defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47-48. The jury rejected the former claim because the advertisement parody could not be interpreted as stating actual facts, but it imposed liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 49. For the full text of the advertisement parody at issue in Falwell, see POST, supra note 159, at 122.
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sue as being related, albeit distantly, to political cartoons, satire, and
caricature393—all of which contribute color and “‘emotional impact’”394
to public discourse. The Court thus held that, at least in cases involving public officials and public figures, the First Amendment bars imposition of liability for “nonfactual” statements like the one at issue
in Falwell.395
What these cases establish, and Milkovich confirms, is that the
First Amendment protects statements that cannot be interpreted as
stating actual facts in order “that public debate will not suffer for lack
of ‘imaginative expression.’”396 Taken together, therefore, these cases
might form the basis for extending broad First Amendment protection to “loose talk” of the sort that is common in cyberspace.397
Bresler, in particular, emphasized the role of social context in transforming an apparently factual accusation of crime into “no more than
rhetorical hyperbole,”398 and therefore it might be used as authority
for courts to create an opinion privilege responsive to the culture of
cyberspace.
In Milkovich itself, however, the Supreme Court failed to specify
what role, if any, context plays in interpreting allegedly defamatory
statements. The majority’s analysis of Diadiun’s statements stressed
their verifiability rather than their surrounding context; as the Court
noted, whether Milkovich actually committed perjury could be objectively verified “by comparing, inter alia, [Milkovich’s] testimony before the [association] with his subsequent testimony before the trial
court.”399 In addition, the Supreme Court observed that neither the

393. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.
394. Id.
395. See id. at 56 (“We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for
the tort of infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue
without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was
made with ‘actual malice’ . . . .”).
396. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
397. See 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 347, § 5.7, at 585 (arguing that “the Court doesn’t
provide a definition of ‘loose’ language needed to permit lower courts to distinguish between
‘loose’ and, if you will, ‘unloose’ language as it might affect actionability under the First
Amendment”); Anderson, supra note 89, at 509 (stating that Milkovich failed to indicate how
broadly courts should construe First Amendment protection “for statements that do not state
actual facts”).
398. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
399. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21; see also 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 347, § 5.7, at 592 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on verifiability left lower courts unsure “whether the contextual factors had been swept away, and [whether], if they were, common sense results might
be sacrificed on the alter of objective verifiability”); Logan, supra note 341, at 167 (“Despite the
common sense notion that the context in which a statement occurs is relevant, if not essential, to
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“language” of Diadiun’s column nor its “general tenor” negated the
impression that he was accusing Coach Milkovich of perjury.400 The
Court’s analysis took little notice of the fact that the alleged accusation of perjury had appeared in a signed editorial sports column, the
tone of which, as described by the dissent, was “pointed, exaggerated,
and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage.”401 Indeed, the broader social context in which Diadiun’s accusation was
made appeared to play no role in the Court’s analysis.402
The Court’s failure to specify what role context plays in determining whether a statement implies an assertion of objective fact is a
critical flaw in its analysis. Whether a given statement constitutes rhetorical hyperbole or satire requires close contextual analysis of the
sort in which the Court engaged in the Bresler case, but the Milkovich
opinion makes it clear that the Court had no intention of immunizing
speech just because it appears in “[c]ertain formats—editorials, reviews, political cartoons, letters to the editor—[that] signal the reader
to anticipate a departure from what is actually known by the author
as fact.”403 Thus, of the many questions raised by Milkovich,404 one of
the most vexing is whether, and to what degree, the context in which
a defamatory statement appears should be considered by courts when
determining whether a statement implies an assertion of objective
fact.405
understanding the meaning of that statement, the Chief Justice’s opinion focused only upon
verifiability.”); Stern, supra note 345, at 614 (arguing that the “the attribute of nonverifiability is
woven into the very concept of opinion”).
400. In doing so, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Ohio court’s finding that the context of Diadiun’s article negated the impression that he was accusing Milkovich of perjury. See
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. Five years after the United States Supreme Court decided Milkovich,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio constitution required the court to protect opinion
and that opinion was to be distinguished from fact based on the Ollman factors: the specific language used, the verifiability of the assertion, the immediate context of the statement, and the
broader social context in which the statement was made. See Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 649
N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ohio 1995).
401. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
402. See Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Moldea II] (“Milkovich did not even pause to assess the effect that the column’s context may
have had on those who read it.”). But see Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The
Verifiability of Allegedly Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 53-54 (1993) (stating
that the Milkovich Court “seemed to suggest that the context surrounding a challenged statement is relevant” only in some circumstances).
403. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
404. See generally Sowle, supra note 341, at 552-612 (outlining the issues raised by Milkovich).
405. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to Meaning in Defamation Law, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 345-51 (1999) (providing a provocative discussion of the importance of context in ascertaining defamatory meaning). The Milkovich opinion also failed to
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C. The Opinion Privilege in the Lower Courts, Post-Milkovich
Not surprisingly, the Milkovich decision created confusion in the
lower courts on this issue. Some courts continue to rely heavily on
context in assessing whether an allegedly defamatory statement implies an assertion of fact.406 Other courts downplay context in favor of
verifiability.407 The epitome of this confusion is the D.C. Circuit’s
stunning “self-reversal” in Moldea v. New York Times Co. (“Moldea
408
II”). Dan Moldea, an investigative reporter and author, sued the
New York Times over a negative book review that stated, among
other things, that Moldea’s book contained “too much sloppy journalism” and provided several examples to support this conclusion.409
The district court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of
the Times on the grounds that the review “exemplifies a description
of a literary work, from one’s personal perspective.”410
In what came to be known as Moldea I, a panel of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.411 Applying Milkovich,
two of the judges concluded that the allegation that Moldea’s book
contained “sloppy journalism” implied an assertion of “provable, albeit unstated, defamatory facts”—including the facts “that Moldea
specify whether nonmedia defendants should receive the benefit of the opinion privilege. See
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 n.6 (noting that the Court “reserved judgment” on the question of
whether the protection for statements that are not “provably false” applies to nonmedia defendants). In Bresler, however, the Court observed that the accusation of blackmail was “not slander when spoken, and not libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review.” Greenbelt Coop.
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970). Although this statement is dicta as to the nonmedia speakers, the practical implication is that nonmedia defendants should at least be protected
from defamation liability when making statements about matters of public concern that cannot
be interpreted as stating actual facts.
406. See, e.g., Assa’ad Faltas v. State Newspaper, 928 F. Supp. 637, 647 (D.S.C. 1996) (looking not only to the words used but also to their context), aff’d, 155 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1998);
Weinstein v. Friedman, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1769, 1778 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying a test of
defamation that required looking at the context), aff’d, 112 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1996); Keohane v.
Wilkerson, 859 P.2d 291, 296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the context and surrounding
circumstances of the statement are relevant), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1293 (Colo. 1994); Kumaran v.
Brotman, 617 N.E.2d 191, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (using contextual analysis to find the term
“scam” actionable); Gross v. New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (N.Y. 1993) (examining both the immediate context and the broader social context).
407. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court’s holding that plaintiff had not proven Andy Rooney’s statements to be false in substance).
408. 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For an interesting and enlightening discussion of this case,
see Logan, supra note 341, at 168-74, 186-89.
409. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter Moldea I],
opinion modified and summary judgment aff’d, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
410. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 793 F. Supp. 335, 337 (D.D.C. 1992).
411. See Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1137.
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plays fast and loose with his sources” and “that his allegations are not
to be believed.”412 The court thought it irrelevant to the Milkovich
analysis that “the challenged statements appeared in a ‘book review’
rather than in a hard news story,”413 and it noted that the appearance
of Diadiun’s allegations in Milkovich in “a forum well known for
spirited expressions of personal opinion” had not affected the outcome of the case. Although Moldea I was a defensible, if highly literal, application of Milkovich, it prompted immediate criticism from
journalists and media lawyers alike,414 and the Times promptly petitioned the panel for rehearing.
Surprisingly, the panel granted this petition, and, without hearing
additional argument in the case, “confess[ed] error” and “amend[ed]
its earlier decision.”416 Judge Harry T. Edwards, author of the court’s
opinion in Moldea I, apologized for giving insufficient consideration
to the fact that the allegedly defamatory statements had “appeared in
the context of a book review, a genre in which readers expect to find
spirited critiques of literary works.”417 Judge Edwards conceded that,
“[w]hile Milkovich could be interpreted as . . . [the court had in its]
initial decision,” a better interpretation is that the Supreme Court did
not “sweep away so much settled law”419 but instead retained a focus
on “the context in which speech appears.”420 The court then held that
commentary of the sort at issue in Moldea should be actionable “‘only
when the [reviewer’s] interpretations are unsupportable by reference
421
to the written work.’” Applying this new “supportable interpretation” standard, the court concluded that the statement that Moldea’s
book contained “too much sloppy journalism” was “supported by revealed premises that [the court could not] hold to be false in the context of a book review.”422 By adopting a strained interpretation of
412. Id. at 1145.
413. Id. at 1145-46; see also id. at 1146 (“To permit a defendant to escape liability for libel
merely because defamatory remarks are published in a book review would be as simplistic as
permitting an author to insulate himself or herself by merely prefacing assertions with the words
‘I think . . .’ and calling everything that followed nonactionable opinion.”).
414. See Logan, supra note 341, at 177-79 (giving examples of criticism).
416. Moldea II, 22 F.3d 310, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
417. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 314.
421. Id. at 315 (quoting Petition for Rehearing at 8).
422. Id. at 317. Note that the court is using context not to determine whether the statements
are “rhetorical hyperbole,” but rather to determine whether they are provably false. Apparently
the court deemed it necessary to use context to ascertain the “real” meaning of the phrase “too
much sloppy journalism.” Once the “real” meaning was determined, the court then concluded
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Milkovich, therefore, the Moldea II court managed to reach a pragmatic result: its decision extended broad protection to an important
genre of speech by acknowledging the important role context plays in
shaping the meaning of allegedly defamatory statements.423
As the strange saga of Moldea illustrates, whether a court accepts
or rejects contextual analysis plays an important role in the outcome
of defamation cases, and lower courts can (and many do) plausibly
claim to be following Milkovich no matter which route they choose.
Some courts have therefore resolved the difficulties created by Milkovich by interpreting it expansively to allow consideration of social
context.424 Others have simply rejected Milkovich entirely, holding
that their own state constitutions or the common law requires an
Ollman-type “totality of circumstances” approach to separating
opinion from fact.425 Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding Milkovich forces lower courts to address the fact/opinion determination
with little meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court, making it
difficult to predict in advance what role context will play in the outcome of any particular defamation action.
D. Adapting the Opinion Privilege to Cyberspace
Given this uncertainty, it is worth asking what role context
should play in adapting the opinion privilege to new Internet libel
cases. After Milkovich, the opinion privilege applies only to statements that do not imply an assertion of objective facts.426 As this section illustrates, when the new Internet libel cases are analyzed with
due consideration for both the inherently speculative nature of “investment advice” generally427 and the specific conventions that govern
that the phrase was not provably false but was rather an aesthetic evaluation of the work based
on stated facts. See id. For more discussion of the necessity of using context to determine verifiability, see infra notes 452-80 and accompanying text.
423. See Karl Olson, On Review, A New Standard for Reviews, RECORDER, May 25, 1994, at
8 (“[I]n real estate, the three most important factors are ‘location, location, and location;’ in
defamation law the three most important factors in determining whether you have a defamatory
factual statement . . . are ‘context, context and context.’”), quoted in Logan, supra note 341, at
193 n.210.
424. See Sowle, supra note 341, at 535-40 (citing cases).
425. See, e.g., Vail v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 649 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ohio 1995) (discussing
the “separate and independent guarantee of protection for opinion” provided by the Ohio constitution).
426. See supra notes 356-73 and accompanying text.
427. See Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
context of a challenged article reflected the author’s speculative supposition); Jefferson County
Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (D. Colo. 1997)
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discourse on financial message boards, it becomes apparent that many
of the allegedly defamatory statements made on financial message
boards will not imply assertions of objective fact. In other words,
courts should extend the benefit of the constitutional opinion privilege to many (though by no means all) of the defendants in the new
Internet libel cases.428
1. An Illustration: Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell. Consider once
more the facts of Hitsgalore.com v. Shell.429 There, numerous John
Does had posted a variety of serious allegations about
Hitsgalore.com, Inc. and its officers.430 The anonymous posters called
the corporation a “scam,”431 a “fraud,”432 a “flying turd”;433 they labeled
its officers as “criminals,”434 “crooks,”435 “con men,”436 “slime,”437 and
“scum”438 who had lied to the SEC439 and duped investors in a “classic
pyramid scheme.”440 Two posters specifically stated that their posts
were stating facts rather than opinion,441 and one even dared the
corporation to sue him.442
Most of these accusations are, in Milkovich’s terms, “provable”
as true or false. Although it may not be verifiable that the corporation
(holding that a bond rating agency’s statements were opinions and therefore protected speech),
aff’d, 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999); National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 793 F. Supp.
627, 649 (D. Md. 1992) (refusing to find the actual malice required for a defamation action
against a publisher of investment materials).
428. This Article emphatically does not support extending the opinion privilege as a categorical matter to the entire genre of speech on financial message boards. For criticism of such
categorical approaches, see generally Thomas, supra note 405.
429. Complaint, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D. Fla. filed June
1999). The plaintiffs sued Janice Shell, who may have used her real name in her posts, as well as
four posters who used only screen names—”Paul Kersey, Mayor, Mr. Pink, and Mshater”—and
“John Does 5-100.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 5-7.
430. See id. ¶ 1. The messages were posted on the Silicon Investor and Raging Bull message
boards.
431. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25-27 (posting by “Paul Kersey”), ¶ 31 (posting by “Mayor”), ¶ 33 (posting
by “Mr. Pink”), ¶ 36 (posting by “Mshater”).
432. Id. ¶ 23 (posting by “Paul Kersey”), ¶ 30 (posting by “Mayor”).
433. Id. ¶ 32 (posting by “Mr. Pink”).
434. Id. ¶¶ 23, 28 (posting by “Paul Kersey”), ¶ 34 (posting by “Mr. Pink”), ¶ 36 (posting by
“Mshater”).
435. Id. ¶ 2 (posting by “Mr. Pink”).
436. Id. ¶ 21 (posting by “Janice Shell”).
437. Id. ¶ 37 (posting by “Mshater”).
438. Id. (posting by “Mshater”).
439. Id. ¶ 31 (posting by “Mayor”).
440. Id. ¶ 21 (posting by “Janice Shell”).
441. See id. ¶ 23 (posting by “Paul Kersey”), ¶ 34 (posting by “Mr. Pink”).
442. Id. ¶ 34 (posting by “Mr. Pink”).
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is a “flying turd” or even a “scam,”443 it is certainly verifiable whether
its management engaged in fraudulent or criminal behavior. The defendants’ “cybersmear campaign,” as the plaintiffs dubbed it,444
stemmed largely from a Bloomberg News article indicating that Hitsgalore.com, Inc., had failed to disclose that one of its founders “‘was
accused of cheating customers . . . at a previous job.’”445 Plaintiffs alleged that the article created the misleading impression that Hitsgalore.com had acted improperly in failing to disclose the FTC action
against its founder.446 Plaintiffs further alleged that the SEC imposed
no duty to disclose the FTC action in the particular, and rather peculiar, factual circumstances of the case.447 Thus, one easily could verify
whether Hitsgalore.com had defrauded its investors simply by determining whether the SEC rules did or did not require disclosure.
If verifiability is the chief determinant of whether the statement
constitutes “opinion,” the defendants’ prospect of being rescued from
defamation liability by the First Amendment looks bleak. Apparently, most of Hitsgalore.com’s online detractors made only a minimal degree of investigation before making such inflammatory accusations.448 They almost certainly did not contact the corporation to get

443. Even this proposition is debatable. The word “scam” is commonly used to describe a
scheme to defraud. Thus, the allegation that Hitsgalore.com was a scam might be tantamount to
accusing the corporation of defrauding its investors. On the other hand, when read in context, it
seems more likely that the word is used to mean that the corporation’s stock price is overvalued,
a subjective valuation that is not provably false. See Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v.
Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 848, 850, 854 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that an article stating that the “outlook” on plaintiff’s refunding its bond was “negative” due to “ongoing
financial pressures” did not contain a “provably false factual connotation” when viewed “in the
context of the entire article”). For disagreement as to whether the term “scam” is verifiable,
compare Stern, supra note 345, at 615 (arguing that the term “scam” is “‘incapable of being
proven true or false’”), and NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. The Living Will Center, 879
P.2d 6, 11-12 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that the term “scam” when used in the context
of a news broadcast discussing the marketing of a living will package was not actionable because
the facts on which the broadcaster based his opinion were disclosed), with Kumaran v. Brotman,
617 N.E.2d 191, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding the term “scam” to be actionable). What this
disagreement illustrates is that, in order to determine whether a statement is provably false, a
court must first determine what the statement means—an interpretive inquiry that often cannot
be resolved without reference to context.
444. Complaint ¶ 36, Hitsgalore.com., No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C. The plaintiffs alleged that
“[t]he May 11, 1999 Bloomberg Report served as the catalyst for the Defendants to perpetuate a
nationwide cybersmear campaign of HITSGALORE on the Internet.” Id.
445. Rancho Cucamonga, Hitsgalore.com Omitted Fraud Link; Stock Plunges, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, May 11, 1999.
446. Complaint ¶ 30, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
447. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.
448. The tenor of the comments suggests that the detractors had not conducted independent
research. See infra notes 461-63 and accompanying text.
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its view. Nor is it likely that they researched exactly what the SEC requires corporations to disclose in the unique circumstances at issue in
the case, even though the corporation issued a press release that
might have put them on notice that the Bloomberg News report’s version of events was contested.449 Indeed, not only did some posters accept the Bloomberg report and the accusations of other posters at
face value, they extrapolated from the reported facts to accuse the
corporation of outright criminality and fraud.450 Thus, one might argue
from the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs have a colorable argument that the defendants acted with reckless disregard of the falsity
of their allegations and, moreover, that these allegations caused
monetary damages.451
Even under Milkovich, however, this need not be the end of the
analysis. As Milkovich observed, the First Amendment safeguards
more than just statements that are not “provably false.”452 It also safeguards statements that “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts.”453 Although Milkovich itself did not indicate how
broadly such protection should extend, the decisions relied on by
454
Milkovich as the basis for such protection—Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, No. 496, National Ass’n of Letter Carriers
v. Austin, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell—clearly indicate that the
inquiry demands close contextual analysis.455
Contextual analysis, in turn, suggests that the comments of Hitsgalore.com’s detractors should not be interpreted as stating actual
facts about the corporation and its officers. The immediate context of
the allegedly defamatory message posts makes apparent that they

449. See Complaint ¶ 37, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
450. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
451. The company attributed the losses to a drop in the corporation’s stock price, the loss of
advantageous business relationships with third parties, and exposure of the corporation to
shareholder class action lawsuits. See Complaint ¶ 39, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
452. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1990).
453. Id. at 2.
454. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). For more extensive discussion of these cases, see supra notes 38398 and accompanying text.
455. See Jerry J. Phillips, Opinion and Defamation: The Camel in the Tent, 57 TENN. L. REV.
647, 660 (1990) (arguing that the “thrust” of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bresler, Letter
Carriers, and Falwell is that context is highly relevant to the question of constitutional protection for opinion).
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were not intended to be sober recitations of fact.456 Most of the posters made no pretense to having firsthand knowledge of the facts, and
it is apparent that many of them were merely expressing outrage over
the facts reported in the Bloomberg News article. The tone of the
postings ranged from shrill457 to sardonic,458 and many were filled with
grammatical errors, misspellings, cryptic abbreviations, and odd punctuation459—all of which signal readers that they were not reading buttoned-down analyses of Hitsgalore.com’s financial prospects. If this
were not enough to caution readers to read the contents with care,
the comments also appeared in a forum that explicitly warns readers
not to rely solely on the information posted in making investment decisions.460
Furthermore, as noted in Part I, any reader familiar with the culture of the financial bulletin boards (and indeed of most electronic
bulletin boards) would know that board culture encourages discussion
456. The full text of the allegedly defamatory posts is included in Complaint ¶¶ 39-43, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
457. See, e.g., id. ¶ 40 (“Come on folks, please do yourselves a favor cleanse yourselve [sic]
and your soul of this mess and admit to being duped. By remaining silent you will allow Dorian
Reed to perpetrate this crime to yet another bunch of unsuspecting victims . . . . End this SCAM
now!” (quoting post # 6570 by “Paul Kersey”)); id. (quoting post # 8272 by “Paul Kersey”):
If this message board were truly uncovered it would reveal the entire IR [Investor
Relations] department of HITT [Hitsgalore.com, Inc.’s abbreviation on NASDAQ]
lead [sic] by none other than Dorian Reed posting under the name of Mr. Hopkins.
Save those amateurish scare tactics for the fellow inmates of your next federal penitentiary . . . . This is a 100% SCAM.
See also id. ¶ 40 (“I PHUCKING HATE CRIMINALS, especially ones that repeat the same
phucking pathetic scam over and over on unsuspecting victims and abuse the American market
system in their path of personal gains and destruction.” (quoting post # 8451 by “Paul Kersey”)).
458. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 32, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (quoting post # 2708
by “Mr. Pink”):
A “flying turd” is a company that Mr. Pink is [sic] believes will rise in spite of a valuation difficult to arrive at by traditional valuation measures. A T3/f is either a fraud or
overvalued company that Mr. Pi&f, in His infinite wisdom believes is poised to fall.
He will do some work on this potential turd [Hitsgalore] but for now withholds His
regal opinion.
459. See, e.g., id.
460. See Silicon Investor Message Boards: StockTalk>Terms of Use (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.siliconinvestor.com/misc/tou. html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“You
should exercise discretion and skepticism before relying on information in messages, since it
may be incorrect or misleading.”); Yahoo! Message Boards: About the Business and Finance
Message Boards (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://messages.yahoo.com/reminder.html> (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“Reading information from message boards is no substitute for independent research, and it’s a bad idea to trade or make any investment decisions based on message boards.”).
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participants to play fast and loose with facts. Within this culture,
readers understand that other participants are, like themselves, neither trained journalists nor trained financial analysts. Indeed, the very
fact that most of the posters remain anonymous, or pseudonymous, is
a cue to discount their statements accordingly. Thus, when an anonymous poster states that Hitsgalore.com is “100% SCAM”461 and that
its officers are “criminals,”462 it is not clear that these statements
should be taken any more literally than the statement that Hitsgalore.com is a “flying turd.”463 The general tenor of the entire thread of
conversation in the aftermath of the Bloomberg News report was
emotional and overheated. Accusations were thrown about loosely by
perhaps as many as a hundred different participants. Often, the text
of a posted message alone suggested that it was no more than an emotional rant against the corporation. Viewed in this light, the inflammatory comments of Hitsgalore.com’s online detractors seem immature
and irresponsible, but not necessarily factual.
This argument is even more compelling when one places the
comments of Hitsgalore.com’s detractors within the broader context
of “stock tips”—a category of speech long recognized as a haven for
conjecture and speculation rather than strict factual accuracy.464 In
465
Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit noted the speculative nature of “stock tips”
generally in extending the opinion privilege to a stock tips article in
466
Forbes magazine. The defamation suit at issue in Biospherics was
brought by a corporation that had been described as overvalued in
467
Forbes’s “Streetwalker” column. The article, entitled “SweetTalkin’ Guys,” concluded that the plaintiffs’ low-calorie sweetener
461. Complaint ¶ 27, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (posting by “Paul Kersey”).
462. Id.
463. Id. ¶ 32 (posting by “Mr. Pink”). As defined by “Mr. Pink,” this term seems to mean
that the stock is overvalued. Id.
464. See Jefferson County Sch. Dist No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848,
850, 855 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an investment advice article stating that “[t]he outlook on
[plaintiff’s] general obligation debt is negative, reflecting the [plaintiff’s] ongoing financial pressures” was opinion rather than fact); Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir.
1998) (noting that “stock tips” commonly express opinion rather than fact); see also McCullough
v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., No. CIV.A.86-2752, 1988 WL 23008, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18,
1988) (concluding that investors “who blindly follow third party stock tips” should not be entitled to relief under section 10(b) of the Securities Act because such reliance is unreasonable).
465. 151 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1998).
466. See id. at 184 (“We do not propose a ‘doctrinal exemption’ [from defamation law] for
stock tip articles . . . . But rarely would a stock tip article of this tenor and in this context prove
actionable.”).
467. See id. at 182.
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was not “‘up to the company’s claims,’” apparently because the
sweetener had not yet gained FDA approval and because it would be
priced too high to compete with other sugar substitutes.468 The article
therefore advised investors to “short the stock.”469 Apparently, some
investors heeded this advice, because plaintiffs soon brought a libel
suit seeking over $15 million.470
The court nonetheless affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s action on
the grounds that the statements at issue were constitutionally protected opinion.471 Citing Milkovich as authority for its conclusions,472
the court relied heavily on the context and tenor of the Forbes article
in determining that the author’s statements were “constitutionally
protected subjective views.”473 The court noted that the article made
“no claim to first-hand knowledge of facts,”474 that its tone was
“breezy”475 rather than “solemn,”476 that it contained “irreverent and
indefinite language,”477 and that it fully disclosed the (apparently true)
underlying facts on which it was based.478 Although the court stopped
short of declaring a “‘doctrinal exemption’ for stock tip articles,” its
opinion did acknowledge that such articles are generally subjective
and speculative rather than objective assertions of fact.479 Thus, the
court concluded that, “even assuming [the allegedly defamatory
statements] could be verified, no fact finder could ‘reasonably . . . interpret’ any of them as stating or implying ‘actual facts.’”480
468. Id. (quoting Caroline Waxler, Sweet-Talkin’ Guys, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 266, available in 1997 WL 9058534). The plaintiffs did not dispute these underlying facts. See id. at 184.
469. Id. at 182. An investor sells a stock short by “enter[ing] an order to sell the security at
the current price with the understanding that the investor is to fulfill that obligation at a later
date by purchasing the security at a lower price.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.12, at 530 (West 3d ed. 1996).
470. See Biospherics, 151 F.3d at 182.
471. See id.
472. See id.
473. Id. at 184.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 185.
478. See id.
479. Id. at 184; see also id. at 186 (observing that “the role of stock analysts in assessing the
price of a security, even given their highly valued skills, remains a far cry from a presiding
judge’s role in determining the result in a case before him”).
480. Id. at 186. Of course, one might contend that the “stock tips” authored by anonymous
John Does such as those sued by Hitsgalore.com, Inc., are a far cry from stock tips in Forbes’s
“Streetwalker” column and that therefore they are undeserving of such protection. Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Milkovich explicitly refused to answer whether constitutional protection for
statements that are not provably false should extend to nonmedia defendants. See Milkovich v.
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The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Biospherics is equally applicable
to many of the new Internet libel cases, including Hitsgalore.com, Inc.
v. Shell. When one views the allegedly defamatory statements at issue
in context—both the immediate context and the broader social context—it becomes apparent that many of the allegedly defamatory
statements cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts, but instead
are either “subjective speculation” or “merely rhetorical hyperbole.”
Indeed, it is immediately apparent that most of the comments that
Hitsgalore.com found objectionable were based, however loosely, on
the original Bloomberg News report and the precipitous drop in Hitsgalore.com’s stock price. In order to conclude that such commentary
is constitutionally protected, however, a court must understand the
culture of the boards and be willing to read and interpret the defendants’ statements in the context within which they occur.
2. Justification and Limitations. Compelling policy justifications
favor adoption of the contextual approach to Internet libel suggested
here. The Supreme Court has noted that protection of “statements
that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts” is necessary so that “public debate will not suffer for lack of imaginative expression.”481 The Court thus recognizes, at least implicitly, that
meaningful public discourse consists of more than merely dry recitations of facts. Public debate entails appeals to the emotions as well as
appeals to reason, and appeals to the emotions are often couched in
loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language. Thus, the privilege for nonfactual expression is designed to protect the richness and texture of
public discourse as well as its purely factual content, and extending
the privilege to the ordinary John Does who frequent financial message boards would validate their unique contributions to financial discourse. True, the contributions of ordinary John Does to financial
discourse are less controlled, less factual, less accurate, and less reliable than those of financial analysts, but in some senses that is exactly
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 n.6 (1990). Yet, as discussed extensively supra Part II.B, the
speech of ordinary John Does makes a significant contribution to public discourse on financial
matters. See supra notes 204-47 and accompanying text. Although that contribution may not be
equivalent to the contribution of Forbes or other financial publications, it is nonetheless worthy
of protection.
481. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Supreme
Court does not elaborate on this justification, except to say that such expression has “traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.” Id. at 20; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988) (giving several historical examples of how political cartoons
have contributed to public debate).
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the point. John Doe makes a distinctive contribution to public discourse and, as extensively argued in this Article, one that is worthy of
a high degree of First Amendment protection.
A second, more complex argument supports protecting statements that cannot be interpreted as stating actual facts. Defamatory
statements are actionable because of their presumed effect on those
who hear or read them. A defamatory statement is defined as a
statement that tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of
his community.482 Thus formulated, the structure of the tort acknowledges that harm to reputation is “a socially constructed injury, an injury defined by the response of others to the defendant’s communications.”483 Courts must therefore gauge the tendencies of a defendant’s
statements based on their predicted effect on the “attitudes, beliefs,
and prejudices” of the audience that receives them.484
It is impossible to predict correctly the effect of a defendant’s
statements without consideration of both the immediate textual context and the larger social context.485 Context may render innocent a
statement that appears to be harmful, or it may render harmful a
statement that appears to be innocent. The statement that “Brutus is
an honourable man,”486 standing alone, appears to be complimentary,
but every reasonable reader of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar knows
that, when read in context, the statement means just the opposite. To
give another example, what could be more factual than the statement
that “Dr. Jones is a murderer”?488 Yet, an audience that knows the
482. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 559.
483. Lidsky, supra note 53, at 13.
484. Id.
485. Although one could gather a number of hermeneutic theorists to make this point, it
seems unnecessary, at least for present purposes. One of the most eloquent statements of this
point is that of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
That is not to say that hermeneutic theory is not valuable in providing a clearer understanding
of the deficiencies of the opinion privilege as currently constituted. For a detailed critique, see
Thomas, supra note 405, at 346-50 (discussing linguistic theories that illustrate the role of context in determining meaning).
486. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (Mark Antony’s funeral oration).
488. RODNEY SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 60 (1986); see also Van Duyn v. Smith, 527
N.E.2d 1005, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the statement that a director of an abortion
clinic was “wanted” for “killing the unwanted” was opinion when considered in its social context).
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statement is made by an abortion protestor criticizing Dr. Jones for
performing abortions can discount this apparently factual statement
as nothing more than a statement of hyperbole; consequently, it
would be fundamentally unfair to subject the protestor to defamation
liability based on the literal meaning of the statement, particularly
where it is offered as commentary on an important subject of public
discourse.
This argument suggests that courts failing to consider context run
the risk of holding the defendant liable for harm he did not cause.489 It
also suggests that courts must be careful not to presume that they understand the context of a given statement, for, as one writer has
noted, “[t]o decide that the statement is factual outside its context
only assumes unconsciously that it appeared in a ‘normal’ context.”490
Indeed, this is why courts should not simply assume that the ordinary
John Does who frequent financial message boards adhere to the same
standards of factual accuracy as professional journalists; doing so
poses a risk that courts will err in predicting the actual effects of John
Doe’s statements.
It is not fair to say, however, that the First Amendment protects
statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts because they cause no harm. Recall the earlier discussion of
491
HealthSouth v. Krum. It is likely that the readers of the HealthSouth message board on Yahoo! Finance did not believe that “I AM
DIRK DIGGLER” actually was having an affair with the CEO’s
wife, Leslie Scrushy.492 Therefore, it is hard to see how the reputation
of either the CEO or his wife could have been damaged by “Diggler’s” statements.493 Yet, there is no doubt that both Scrushys were
489. The necessity of pursuing such abstract inquiries arises from defamation’s anomalous
doctrine of presumed harm. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (describing “[t]he common law of defamation [as] an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss”). It is important to understand
that the doctrine of presumed harm allows plaintiffs to recover substantial damages with no
proof that they suffered any actual harm. See Anderson, supra note 53, at 749-51. The doctrine
of presumed harm applies in most, though not all, libel actions. For further discussion, see Lidsky, supra note 53, at 5-6, 12-13.
490. See Ott, supra note 354, at 786. Ott gives several other interesting examples of how context affects meaning. See id. at 785-87.
491. See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
492. See Phillips, supra note 455, at 663 (“[I]t appears disingenuous to argue that statements
are not actionable because, owing to the context in which they are made, nobody believes
them.”).
493. See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983) (“[D]efamation does not provide compensation for
emotional disturbance, but rather remedies a wrongful disruption in the ‘relational interest’ that
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offended, outraged, and embarrassed by the statements, and they may
well have been exposed to pity or ridicule as a result.494 Even if the
audience does not believe the truth of aggressively uncivil statements
of the sort at issue in HealthSouth v. Krum, such statements have the
potential to inflict psychological or emotional harm on their targets.495
Thus, protection of such statements as “opinion” runs the risk of giving free license to the likes of Peter Krum to inflict harm on his targets.
This analysis suggests two possible limitations that should be imposed on any extension of the opinion privilege to cyberspace. As
noted above, First Amendment doctrine protects nonfactual expression not because it does no harm,496 but because it makes an important
contribution to public discourse. However, speech that deals only
with private matters (like the sex life of a private individual) makes
no contribution to public discourse almost by definition,497 and to
grant broad protection to such speech would unjustifiably skew the
balance between protection of speech and protection of individuals

an individual has in maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others.” (citing LEON GREEN,
CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 193-276 (1940))). Although statements that harm reputation
may cause emotional distress, the distress is deemed to stem from others’ reaction to the statement rather than from the statement itself. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 111, at 771. Of
course, defamation plaintiffs do not sue solely to gain recompense for reputational harms but
also “to salve hurt feelings and express outrage at the misbehavior of defendants who publish
false statements.” Lidsky, supra note 53, at 15; see also Walter Probert, Defamation, A Camouflage of Psychic Interests: The Beginning of a Behavioral Analysis, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1173, 1177
(1962) (arguing that the common law of defamation fails to adequately protect psychic injuries
that flow from defamatory communications).
494. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 428 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a private figure plaintiff who cannot prove actual malice can only recover for defamation upon a
showing of “actual injury,” which includes impairment of reputation as well as “personal humiliation[] and mental anguish and suffering.” Id. at 380. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1977), the Supreme Court held that a private figure plaintiff could establish “actual injury” by
showing emotional distress alone, thereby giving states authority to predicate defamation actions on “elements other than injury to reputation.” Id. at 460-61.
495. Perhaps such actions are more properly thought of as actions for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV.
303, 309 (1987) (arguing that “[t]he focus of defamation . . . should remain on reputation, not on
the unpleasant but usually temporary effects that communication has on the victim himself” and
stating that “these effects are better addressed by the tort of infliction of emotional distress”).
496. It is nonetheless fair to say that the harm is somewhat indeterminate, and it is a harm
different from that caused by a false factual statement. See id.
497. Under this approach, the privilege would extend only when the defendant’s comments
were reasonably related to the topic of the board. As the analysis of Dun & Bradstreet suggests,
matters of truly private concern should be relatively rare. See supra notes 304-12 and accompanying text.
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from uncivil communications.498 Thus, protection for “opinions” on
the financial message boards should apply only when such opinions
relate to a matter of public concern.
A second limitation flows in part from the first: courts should not
extend the privilege to every statement made on a financial message
board, but should evaluate each case on its own merits. Courts must
determine not only whether the defendant’s speech involved a matter
of public concern; courts must also evaluate each individual statement
in both its immediate and larger social context to determine whether
the defendant’s statements are capable of being interpreted as stating
actual facts about the plaintiff. Although it is fair to predict that many
of the new Internet libel cases will involve rhetorical hyperbole or
nonfactual speculation and can therefore be resolved by a motion to
dismiss, this Article does not advocate a wholesale exemption for
statements that appear on financial message boards. As argued previously, the conventions of discourse on the boards tolerate a great deal
of loose, figurative language, and readers are generally on notice that
they should not put much reliance on the information posted there.
Occasionally, however, either the language of a message will denote it
as being factual, or a poster will take affirmative steps to induce reliance by suggesting that he has special expertise or insider access to information. Thus, although the culture of the boards and the inherently speculative nature of financial discourse will commonly signal
readers that they should not interpret the statements posted as being
purely factual, a poster who tries to cloak himself in an aura of factual
accuracy must take the consequences when the audience does in fact
rely on his posts as stating actual facts.499 Applying these limitations
helps to maintain at least a minimal degree of civility in cyberspace
without jeopardizing its unique contributions to public discourse.
If the approach advocated here is not mandated by Milkovich,
neither is it forbidden. Moreover, lower courts need not rely on federal constitutional law to begin adapting the opinion privilege to cy-

498. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (restricting its holding
to commentary about public figures).
499. See, e.g., Miller, Firm Accuses Former Executive, supra note 6, at C1 (discussing John
Doe cases brought in order to discover whether a former president was the poster of allegedly
defamatory messages); cf. Wat Henry Pontiac Co. v. Bradley, 210 P.2d 348, 351 (Okla. 1949)
(observing that superior knowledge can transform opinion into fact in the sales context); Valley
Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding that “knowledge of the
seller, in conjunction with the buyer’s relative ignorance, operates to make the slightest divergence from mere praise into representations of fact”).

LIDSKY TO PRINTER2

944

06/22/00 3:15 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:855

berspace, but instead can adapt state constitutional or common law500
to the task. Ideally, of course, the Supreme Court should resolve the
uncertainty its decisions have engendered, but lower courts cannot
wait for Supreme Court guidance to begin protecting John Doe.
At the risk of being redundant, this Article urges courts to extend to the new class of Internet libel defendants all of the existing
protections the First Amendment has to offer. Although each new
case must be judged on its own merits, the typical plaintiff is likely to
be a public figure. Courts should therefore require the plaintiff to
prove fault and falsity in addition to the common law elements of
defamation. Standing alone, however, this requirement does little to
alleviate the chill of the new libel actions. The costs of responding to a
libel suit are beyond the average person’s means, regardless of
whether he ultimately prevails. Protecting freedom of speech in cyberspace therefore requires courts to take an active role in dismissing
cases at an early stage. Fortunately, the constitutional privilege for
nonfactual expressions lends itself to use for resolving libel cases as
early as a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, if the privilege is to prevent libel suits from silencing John Doe, courts must apply it with due
consideration for the unique social context of cyberspace.
CONCLUSION: PROTECTING JOHN DOE REDUX
Defamation law has long contained “anomalies and absurdities
for which no legal writer ever has had a kind word,”501 and this legal
writer is no exception. Since 1964,502 the Supreme Court has held out
the promise that systematic application of First Amendment principles could cure these anomalies and absurdities and bring needed uniformity to the unruly mass of state tort law. This promise has never
been borne out. Over the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court
has constitutionalized the tort of defamation in a piecemeal fashion,
responding “bit by bit”503 to the threat defamation poses to media defendants.

500. See, e.g., Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 150 (D.D.C. 1995) (remarking
that the fair comment privilege would “also be an adequate basis upon which to grant [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment” because the commentary at issue revealed its factual
foundation and therefore any reasonable reader could “judge independently whether the comment [was] reasonable”).
501. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971);
see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 35, § 111, at 771.
502. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
503. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 554:
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The new Internet libel cases highlight the deficits of this approach. As the Internet turns more ordinary John Does into publishers, it is also turning them into defamation defendants. Yet, lower
courts are forced to guess whether and to what extent these new defendants merit First Amendment protection. Of particular concern is
the uncertainty attending some of the most basic inquiries of First
Amendment doctrine, including whether nonmedia defendants merit
full protection, whether corporations are public figures, and whether
context plays a role in separating statements that imply an assertion
of objective fact from those that do not. Although the increasing pervasiveness of “interstate” speech makes libel a “field that cries out for
[the] uniformity”504 that only the Supreme Court can bring,505 lower
courts cannot wait for Supreme Court guidance to deal with the complex issues raised by the new John Doe cases.
The chief threat posed by the new cases is that powerful corporate plaintiffs will use libel law to intimidate their critics into silence
and, by doing so, will blunt the effectiveness of the Internet as a medium for empowering ordinary citizens to play a meaningful role in
public discourse. If this were the only threat the new John Doe cases
posed, they would be relatively easy to resolve, perhaps with antiSLAPP legislation of the sort recently enacted in California.506 The
problem, however, is that many plaintiffs will have legitimate claims
against aggressively uncivil and vicious speakers whose only intent is
to destroy the reputation of their targets. Thus, courts must formulate
a response that is nuanced enough to respond to the facts of each individual case and that resolves cases quickly enough to prevent ordinary John Does from being chilled by the mere threat of being sued.
As this Article has argued, one of the most effective means for
countering the chill of the new John Doe suits is the opinion privilege—the privilege for statements that do not imply assertions of obOver the past quarter century, case by case and bit by bit, the [Supreme] Court has
thoroughly revised the common law of libel. It has created . . . a matrix of substantive
principles, evidentiary rules, and de facto innovations in judge-jury roles and other
procedural matters. These are all constitutional based and can only be changed by
those who have the power to change constitutional rules.
504. Id. at 553.
505. See id. at 554.
506. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2000). Twelve other states have antiSLAPP provisions, including Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See Gail Diane Cox,
Pushing the SLAPP Envelope, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 19, 1999, at A1 (discussing some of the “unintended consequences” of anti-SLAPP statutes). Ten additional states are said to be contemplating anti-SLAPP legislation at present. See id.
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jective facts. Unlike other constitutional privileges, the opinion privilege can be deployed against meritless defamation actions as early as
a motion to dismiss. And, when it is applied with due consideration
for the unique social context of the financial message boards and the
inherently speculative nature of financial discourse, the privilege
gives broad protection to the imaginative expression that ordinary
John Does contribute to the formerly staid world of financial discourse. More importantly, it allows the First Amendment “preference”507 for a truly participatory public discourse to be realized.508
Perhaps, as the great Judge Learned Hand suggested,509 this preference is folly, but it is folly on which we have staked our all.

507. See Cate, supra note 205, at 578 (“The Internet gives real meaning to the constitutional
preference for a ‘multitude of tongues.’” (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945))).
508. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1671 (“To foreclose . . . a most interesting experiment
in democratic discourse would be disheartening and disillusioning. Is it not possible to find some
other way of moderating abuses of computer-mediated communications systems?”).
509. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372 (“[T]he First Amendment . . . presupposes that
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all.”).

